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Abstract
The fundamental concept unifying this thesis is that outcomes at small geograph-
ical units can shed light on key economic questions of interest for both macroeco-
nomics and finance. Some of the questions I explore in my work include whether
bank networks facilitate access to financial capital by small businesses in the US,
whether lending to small businesses is important for short-term economic growth,
and whether different cultural and institutional endowments improve economic out-
comes in the long run.
Small Business Lending and the Bank-Branch Network: In this chapter,
I examine the role of banks in propagating local economic shocks from one area to
another through their network of bank branches, by exploiting a newly developed
branch-level dataset. Specifically, I examine the change in the geographical distribu-
tion of small business loans within each bank network in response to: 1) increases
in deposit growth due to presence in areas with new fracking wells; 2) changes in
the profitability of real estate loans due to presence in areas experiencing real estate
booms. I evaluate how the supply-driven changes in lending following these shocks
impact real economic activity. I find that banks export the increase in liquidity from
the fracking areas and fund more small business loans at other, more distant branches.
Borrowers from banks with a higher exposure to fracking experience faster establish-
ment growth at areas beyond 100 miles from the fracking activity. The results for the
real estate booms show that increases in the return of real estate loans contributed
to a decrease in small business lending at branches away these booms. Borrowers
from banks with high exposure to residential appreciation experienced slower estab-
lishment growth even within areas at a significant distance from the real estate booms.
Does It Matter Where You Came From? Ancestry Composition and
Economic Performance of US Counties, 1850 - 2010: The United States pro-
vides a unique laboratory for understanding how the cultural, institutional, and hu-
man capital endowments of immigrant groups shape economic outcomes. In this pa-
per, we use census micro-samples to reconstruct the country-of-ancestry composition
of the population of US counties from 1850 to 2010. We also develop a county-level
measure of GDP per capita over the same period. Using this novel panel data set,
we show that the evolution of the country-of-origin composition of a county is signif-
icantly associated with changes in county-level GDP. The cultural, institutional, and
human capital endowments from the country of origin drive this association. Particu-
larly important are attitudes towards cooperation with others. Using an instrumental
variable strategy, we identify a significant effect of changes in the ancestry-weighted
endowments on economic development. Finally, our results suggest that while the
fractionalization of ancestry groups is positively related to county GDP, fractional-
ization in attributes such as trust is negatively related to local economic performance.
Culture: Persistence and Evolution: This paper presents evidence on the
speed of evolution (or lack thereof) of a wide range of values and beliefs of different
generations of European immigrants to the US and interprets the evidence in the
light of a simple model of socialization and identity choice. The main result is that
persistence differs greatly across cultural attitudes. For instance, many family values,
political orientation, and most deep personal religious values converge slowly to the
prevailing US norm. Others, such as attitudes toward cooperation, children’s inde-
pendence, and sexual matters, converge rather quickly. The results obtained studying
higher generation immigrants differ greatly from those found when the analysis is lim-
ited to the second generation, as typically done in the literature, and they imply a
lesser degree of persistence than previously thought. Finally, we show that persistence
is “culture specific” in the sense that the country from which one’s ancestors came
matters for the pattern of generational convergence.
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Chapter 1
Small Business Lending and the
Bank-Branch Network
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I examine the role of banks in propagating local economic shocks from
one area to another through their network of bank branches. There is a significant
literature that studies the extent of spillovers of local shocks both across industries and
geographies. Spillovers are usually transmitted through the labor market – either by
labor migration due to wage differentials or by improved productivity due to sharing
of labor pools or technology.1 Here, I provide a novel mechanism that can explain
how local shocks can spill into areas farther away from their origin. Simply put,
banks with branches in areas with local shocks experience changes in their ability to
lend and impose positive or negative credit supply shocks in the rest of their markets,
affecting the real activity of bank-dependent borrowers in these distant locations.
1Blanchard and Katz (1992) use a structural model to study how employment and migration
respond to local shocks. Black et al (2005) examine the effect of the boom/bust of coal industry had
on other local industries. Greenstone et al (2010) study whether productivity of incumbent plants
changes when a new plant is built within a county. Freyrer et al (2015) study both geographical and
industry spillovers of fracking and argue that the size of commuting zones can explain the positive
effects on income and employment as far as 100 miles away from fracking.
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To focus on the effect of credit supply on bank-dependent borrowers I study small
businesses. Small businesses contribute nearly 40% of the US private nonfarm output
each year. Yet, many of them depend on relationship-based lending, which takes into
account “soft” information (Berger and Udell (2003)). Since “soft” information is not
easily transmitted across the hierarchical layers of a bank (Liberti and Mian (2009))
or across space (Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)), small businesses can be forced to
borrow locally. Banks, on the other hand, are not constrained in their ability to
allocate capital across different markets and do so in response to local shocks. The
combined effect of locally constrained borrowers and locally unconstrained lenders
can lead to spillovers of economic shocks across distant locations. In this paper,
the branch network exposes banks to changes in two local economic factors: new
fracking wells increase local deposits; residential booms increase the profitability of
construction loans. Intermediaries transmit these changes across their network by
optimally expanding or reducing lending, ultimately affecting real activity.
This paper studies how capital is allocated across the bank network, by going be-
yond the bank-level information, with data on lending at distinct offices. The dataset
combines locations of small businesses, reported under the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA), and locations of bank branches. The distance between businesses and the
nearby bank offices is used to associate census-tract lending to the closest branches,
providing a granular geographical distribution of lending activity over time. The
resulting geographical and temporal variation is critical for the identification of the
changes in the credit supply at different branches following local funding or asset
price shocks. I consider these shocks because they directly affect a portion of the
network with the changes in the rest of the branches being driven by internal capital
allocation. The geographical separation from the origin of the shocks is important
because distance can attenuate the direct correlation between the local shock and the
credit demand conditions. It also highlights the extent to which bank networks can
2
propagate shocks across locations. The presence of multiple banks in the same credit
market allows me to control for common fluctuations in credit demand and rule out
explanations of the spillovers which are based on the local market-wide changes.
The novel data allows me to analyze how business credit and real activity change
in response to two distinct local shocks: drilling of new fracking wells and residential
real estate booms. This paper is not the first to utilize the fracking revolution as
an exogenous increase in deposits and to analyze the resulting effect on lending and
real activity. Plosser (2014) emphasizes the exogeneity of the fracking revolution and
shows that banks use the increase in deposits from the energy booms to expand total
lending and liquid securities. Gilje et al (2014) show that banks, which have a higher
proportion of total branches in counties with fracking, originate more mortgages in
counties that do not have fracking. Gilje (2012) and Freyrer et al (2015) study
the impact of the energy booms on the local economy. The effect of residential
appreciation on bank lending and real outcomes has also been previously studied.
Chakraborty et al (2014) document that bank-holding companies which are located
in states with higher residential prices increase their investments in mortgages and
decrease commercial lending to bigger firms. The authors show that firms borrowing
from these bank-holding companies decrease investments. Loutskina and Strahan
(2015) show that the geographical variation in the residential prices caused banks to
allocate their internal capital towards areas where mortgages are more profitable.
One of the novelties in this paper is that it considers the sensitivity of small busi-
ness lending to each of the two shocks.2 While the previous literature has focused on
total lending, mortgages, and commercial loans to bigger firms, there is no evidence
2For other uses of the small business lending data: Brevoort and Hannan (2006) study the
distance between the physical branch location and the location where the loan was given. Keeton
(2009) examines the effect of an aggregate shock on small business lending at the headquarters of
the bank versus the rest of the network. Greenstone et al (2014) separate local changes in small
business lending for each bank-holding company into an effect common to all lenders in the county
and to banks specifically. Nguyen (2014) uses the most disaggregated version of the CRA data and
studies the impact of branch closures on small business lending in markets where M&A activity
creates redundant branches.
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that loans to small enterprises are affected. Small business lending is of particular in-
terest since it is a main source of financing for a big portion of small firms (Berger and
Udell (2003)). It also tends to be geographically concentrated around the branches
of the lending banks (Brevoort et al (2010)). The dependence of firms on this type
of loans makes it likely that credit supply shocks will affect real activity. As a result
bank networks can have a special role in transmitting local shocks across locations.
A second novelty of the paper is the rich geographical structure considered. I
characterize bank lending at the level of the branch by utilizing a geographical algo-
rithm which matches locations of borrowers with bank offices. When analyzing the
effects of the two shocks on lending, previous papers have resorted to various levels
of geographical aggregation. Gilje et al (2014) consider total mortgage origination at
counties away from energy booms. Chakraborty et al (2014) rely on state house price
indices and percent of total deposits in each state in order to determine the level of
bank exposure to real estate booms. Loutskina and Strahan (2015) aggregate total
mortgage origination at the CBSA level. To analyze variations in lending which is
aggregated at particular geographical units one needs to assume that banks allocate
credit according to the same units. I do not make this assumption in this paper.
Instead, I assume that banks allocate funding to each of their branches, which, in
turn, lend to borrowers in the proximity. These borrowers can cross county, MSA, or
state lines, as long as they are close to the branch that provides credit.3
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the real estate and energy shocks
by documenting that these shocks induce changes in credit which affect real economic
activity. I argue that the precise channel involves smaller banks which engage in lo-
cal lending. Gilje (2012) suggests that the additional liquidity from fracking benefits
financially-dependent industries within counties with energy booms. I examine lo-
cations away from energy booms and show that the liquidity provided by the bank
3Laderman (2008) provides evidence that the amount of out-of-county lending is not trivial.
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network boosts economic activity there. Within the literature on real estate booms,
Chakraborty et al (2014) document that bank-holding companies reduce credit to big-
ger firms, which, in turn, reduce investment. The particular location of these firms is
not explicitly considered. Here, I focus on much smaller firms and study the number
of establishments at different zip codes. Moreover, I emphasize the importance of
regional banks rather than bank-holding companies.
I provide evidence that fracking generates important changes in bank lending and
real activity. I find that geographical proximity to new fracking wells boosts liquidity
at local bank branches. While this leads to a substantial increase in deposits for
smaller banks, defined as those having less than 30 branches, the rest of the inter-
mediaries with local presence are not affected. A small bank with offices next to two
new fracking wells sees a 0.5% increase in total deposit growth, 45% increase in large
deposit growth, and a 10 basis points decrease in interest expense relative to banks
without exposure. In the aggregate, small banks with exposure to new wells receive
$2.6 billion of additional deposits over the sample period of 2001 to 2007, a 10.4% of
the total deposits held by these banks each year. The additional liquidity allows these
intermediaries to expand lending to small businesses at branches outside fracking ar-
eas. A small bank with two new wells increases originations by approximately 9%
relative to competitors in the same credit market with no exposure. The combined
increase in originations over the sample is over $5 billion, which is 15% of the total
originations of all small banks within 200 miles of areas with fracking activity. I show
that lending activity expands not only in areas close to fracking but also at locations
more than 100 miles away. Finally, zip codes containing borrowers from banks ex-
posed to fracking experience faster establishment growth compared to the rest of the
zip codes. In particular, these locations experience 0.5% to 1% faster establishment
growth.4 This amounts to approximately 50,000 new establishments between 2001
4This excludes industries in mining, construction, finance and real estate.
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and 2007, a 13% of the aggregate change in the number of U.S. establishments for
this period. Each $100,000 in small business loans is associated with an additional
establishment.
The evidence from the real estate booms points to the important role of bank net-
works in allocating capital across locations. The results are significant both for banks
with small and big networks. I use two different measures of real estate exposure: 1)
the fraction of branches in areas with appreciation in the top decile; 2) the average
quarterly appreciation at the median branch for each bank network.
A small (big) bank with 70% (38%) of branches in the top decile, an average level
of exposure, has 0.5% (0.9%) more higher concentration in construction and devel-
opment (C&D) loans. In terms of actual lending, banks with branches in residential
booms increase total C&D loans by approximately 1%. The increased investment in
land development is financed by a reduction in small business lending at branches
away from the real estate booms. Small banks with average exposure contract orig-
ination growth by 78% relative to competitors in the same credit market, while big
banks contract by 23%. The aggregate reduction implied by the coefficient estimates
is $0.4 and $3.5 billion, respectively. These are substantial decreases in lending ac-
tivity, representing 25% and 9% of aggregate originations by the exposed banks in
areas outside of the residential booms. The amounts of credit reduction surpass the
overall increase in C&D lending, indicating that the affected banks increased other
types of lending in the booming areas. Importantly, the decrease in lending by small
banks impacts real activity. Zip codes where credit was provided by small banks with
average exposure experience 0.9% slower establishment growth. This amounts to a re-
duction in the number of establishment of approximately 13,000, or 4.4% of the total
new establishments added between 2001 and 2005. A reduction of $170,000 in small
business lending is associated with the closure of one establishment. Qualitatively
similar results emerge when one identifies a real estate boom using appreciation at
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the median branch – banks which are more exposed to appreciations decrease small
business lending at branches not directly subject to rapid appreciation. The decrease
in lending captured by this measure leads to a slower establishment growth at loca-
tions where credit was reduced.
Efficient market theory predicts that lending in one credit market is independent
of conditions elsewhere. In order for credit to be affected by shocks to liquidity or
alternative investments, banks should be subject to frictions in accessing external
financing. This is not enough to generate changes in bank lending. I also assume
that credit markets are segmented due to high switching costs for borrowers. The
first friction explains why banks are unable to expand lending unless their deposits
increase. The second friction explains why there are more loans to be made – other
banks cannot profitably extend all of the loans in a given market. The results in
this paper can be viewed as an evidence for the relevance of the two frictions. The
departure from efficient market theory implies that the internal allocation of bank
capital resulting from local shocks can have substantial real effects.
Finally, the identification strategy in this paper is related to the recent literature
on bank lending which focuses on cross-country spillovers of financial shocks. The
seminal papers by Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) study the effect of a shock to
the bank balance sheet which originates from Japan on lending in the US.5 Similarly
to these papers, I separate the origin of a bank shock from the areas where I exam-
ine the effects, in order to minimize the correlation between the shock and demand
conditions.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset. Section 3 out-
lines a simple model of multi-branch lending and discusses the identification assump-
tions. Section 4 includes the methodology and results regarding small business lend-
ing. Section 5 presents results regarding the impact on real activity. Section 6 includes
5For additional papers in this literature see: Schnabl (2012), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012).
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robustness and extensions. Section 7 concludes the paper.
1.2 Dataset
This section outlines how I measure the lending activity to small businesses at indi-
vidual branches of different bank retail networks. I also discuss the data sources for
each of the two local shocks that generate changes in banks’ lending.
1.2.1 Bank Network and Small Business Lending
Information on the origination of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans and loans
secured by nonresidential real estate with value of less than $1 million (small busi-
ness loans) is filed each year by banks that fall within the requirements set in the
Community Reinvestment Act. Generally, these are independent commercial banks
and savings institutions with more than $250 million in assets or banks owned by a
bank-holding company with more than $1 billion in total assets.6 The bank filings
consist of the gross originations amounts, together for both types of loans, and the
total count of small business loans by distinct geographical categories. The provided
information allows me to identify total bank loan originations by census tract or by
groups of census tracts.7
The exact locations of bank branches are listed in the Summary of Deposits (SOD),
compiled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The CRA data effec-
tively maps the locations and lending volumes for different small-business borrowers
for each of the banks in the sample. In this form, the data allows me to investigate
the effect of credit on real activity but it does not capture the overall lending ac-
tivity across retail branches of banks and across different credit markets. In order
6After 2004 the asset requirement for commercial banks not owned by bank-holding companies
was increased to $1 billion
7Please refer to the data appendix for more information.
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to measure lending done at distinct bank branches, I match borrowers with the set
of closest locations of the bank they borrowed from. The underlying assumption in
this matching is that distance matters and businesses use the closest bank locations.
This is supported by general findings using the National Survey of Small Business
Finance.8
The matching algorithm involves several steps. First, I compute the distance
between a given lending location and all of the retail branches of the lending bank.
Locations farther than 186mi (300km) from any branch are not associated. For the
rest of the locations, I extend the distance to the closest branch of the lending bank by
25% and use this distance as the radius of the circle that contains the branches that
likely originated the loan. For each of these branches I use the inverse of the distance
to the borrower to capture the likelihood they provided the funding. Finally, each
branch is assigned the expected value of the total origination of business loans based
on this likelihood i.e. the total origination amount times the probability of origination
for the particular branch. Similarly, each branch is assigned the expected number of
small business loans observed at the lending location. This process is repeated for each
of the lending locations reported in the CRA filings and for each bank that provided
this information. The resulting dataset includes the expected origination value (and
count) of small business lending at each branch of the bank network. I use the unique
branch number, provided by the SOD, to create the panel data of branch observations.
Notice that the matching algorithm implies that opening/closing of physical locations
will decrease/increase the expected value of loan originations at branches that remain
open. To account for this I control for the change in the number of bank offices in all
of the estimated models in this study.
Bank balance sheet data comes from the Consolidated Report of Condition and
8Findings by Petersen and Rajan (2002) indicate that the median distance between a business
and the bank lender is between 2 and 5 miles. Brevoort et al (2010) show that this relationship has
persisted over time.
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Income (Call Reports) provided by the FDIC. The reports for each bank are matched
to the Summary of Deposits data using the bank certificate number. The balance
sheet variables are the annual average of quarterly observations.
Data on the number of establishments is taken from the County Business Patterns
(CBP). CBP is maintained by the US Census and provides detailed information on
the annual number of businesses with paid employees as of March 12th.9 Businesses
are separated into industries according to the 6-digit NAICS industry classification.
I use the information at the zip code level and aggregate the industry classification
to the 2-digit. The industries of mining, construction, finance, and real estate are
excluded from this study as they can be directly affected by the shocks considered in
this paper.
1.2.2 Shocks
The first shock, namely the increase in bank deposits, is a result of a technological
break-through that allowed for profitable drilling in several states in the US. The
implementation of hydraulic fracturing in horizontal wells allowed access to oil and
natural gas reserves at a much lower cost than previously considered. Plosser (2014)
and Giljie (2012), both using different data sources, document the impact that this
break-through had on deposits at banks in the areas where drilling was initiated. Gilje
et al (2014) provide evidence that banks with branches in counties with fracking wells
had higher deposits growth and lower interest expense.
This paper uses a newly released data source from the U.S. Geological Survey
which examines the historical development of drilling that utilized hydraulic fractur-
ing between 1947 and 2010 (Gallegos and Varela, (2015)). The data provides locations
of both horizontal and directional wells, aggregated to the 8-digit hydrologic unit code
9To match the reporting frequencies of the rest of the data, I assign the total number of estab-
lishments reported as March 12th of a given year to the end of the previous year.
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areas (HUC), in order to conceal the precise well locations.10 Plosser (2014) and Giljie
(2012) suggest that the purchase of the rights to drill provides a significant one-time
payment for the owner of the land. Consequentially, I use the the number of new
horizontal wells in a given area to capture deposit growth. Figure 1 plots the location
of new horizontal wells for the period of interest between 2001 and 2007.
The second shock considered in this paper is related to the housing real estate
boom before the recession. Rapid increases in residential prices lead to an increased
investment construction and development loans, especially by smaller banks (FDIC
(2012)). Changes in residential appreciation across the US affect the relative return
of lending to small businesses versus lending to land developers. I use the real estate
booms to proxy for the shock to the profitability of real estate loans. The information
on house prices is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The
agency maintains a quarterly House Price Index (HPI) both for MSAs and for the
state areas outside of the MSAs. The index is compiled by tracking price changes
for repeat house sales. I use the average quarterly HPI appreciation to capture the
intensity of the housing boom across locations. The evolution of this measure can
be seen in Figure 2. Areas in California, Arizona, Florida, and D.C. experienced
unprecedented real estate booms, while the growth in the rest of the U.S. does not
exhibit a particular pattern. In close parallel with the definition of the energy shock,
I capture the bank exposure to real estate booms by the fraction of branches in the
areas with appreciation above the 90th percentile for the country. Alternatively, I
parametrize the bank network exposure to real estate booms by the appreciation at
the median branch. The parameterization of both the deposit shock and the real
estate shock are tightly related to the simple model that I present below.
10The original source for the well location is the proprietary IHS database (IHS Energy (2011)).
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1.3 Model and Identification Issues
This section outlines a simple econometric model of internal allocation of bank cap-
ital. The purpose of the model is to provide intuition for a possible mechanism of
capital allocation between different branches and to bring to light some important
identification issues. Importantly, the model highlights the necessary frictions which
can allow financial intermediaries to propagate local shocks through their network.
The setup is an extension of Khwaja and Mian (2008). It assumes that banks lend
to two different types of firms at different physical offices. Banks, indexed by i, have
more than one branch and each of the branches, indexed by j, provides credit to one
small business, Lij, and to one land developer, Kij. While j refers to a particular
branch of a bank, I use it interchangeably to refer to the credit market where the
branch is located. This is done in order to simplify notation. Each bank is assumed
to be a monopolist with respect to both the small business and the land developer.
One justification of this assumption is the existence of high switching costs for the
borrowers.11 The marginal return to Lij is r
L
j + r
L
i − αLLij, and the marginal return
to Kij is r
K
j + r
K
i − αKKij. I assume that the marginal return to each of the loan
types has a local component, indexed by j, and a bank component, indexed by i.
Each branch can collect deposits up to Dij at no cost. Finally, the bank can borrow
Bi form the interbank market at the marginal cost of α
i
BBi, which is specific to each
bank.
There are two periods. During the first period, t, bank i maximizes profits by
choosing Ltij and K
t
ij at each branch subject to the constraint that total lending is
equal to the total bank liabilities,
∑
j L
t
ij +
∑
jK
t
ij =
∑
j D
t
ij +B
t
i . At the end of the
first period, the bank observes three different shocks: 1) the marginal return to Lij
increases by ηij; 2) the marginal return to Kij increases by κij; 3) the deposits that
11The reason why even a land developer may have significant switching costs has to do with the
local nature of information regarding real estate. Land developers will need to invest significant
resources in educating lenders about the real estate opportunities in a given market.
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the bank can collect at each branch increase by δij. Each of these shocks is specific to
a branch of i. After observing the shocks, at the beginning of t+ 1 the bank chooses
Lt+1ij and K
t+1
ij at each branch to maximize profits.
The details of the maximization problem and the derivation of the solution for the
change in small business lending between the two periods are provided in Appending
A2. Intuitively, the bank chooses Kij and Lij in order to equalize the marginal return
of each of the loans, at each of the locations, to the marginal cost of borrowing from
the interbank market.12 It is worth emphasizing that the final expression for small
business lending assumes for tractability that αiB = γ/Ni. The assumption leads to
the implication that lending depends on the average of the deposit shocks as well as
the average of the shocks to the return of real estate loans. The justification of the
assumption rests on the arguments in Stein (1998) of asymmetric information about
banks’ assets and on the discussion in Stein (2002) that horizontally integrated small
banks lend to more opaque firms.
Solving for the optimal allocation at each branch and taking the difference between
the two periods, I get:
4Lij = aηij − b1 1
Ni
∑
j
ηij − b2 1
Ni
∑
j
κij + b3
1
Ni
∑
j
δij (1.1)
where j refers to the branches of i different from j. a, b1, b2, and b3 are positive
parameters.
The model highlights how the marginal return of each loan type at different
branches and the deposits throughout the network affect lending to a small busi-
ness. When there is an increase in the marginal return to L at branch ij, the bank
increases Lij. This effect is captured by the positive term in front of ηij. An increase
in the marginal return to L at any other branch, j, of i will decrease Lij. Intuitively,
when the return is higher at another location, the bank increases lending there and
12This assumes that the bank cannot provide all of the lending using only its deposits.
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decreases lending at ij. This is the mirror image of the effect of ηij. When the
marginal return to K increases at any branch, including ij, Lij will decrease. The
intuition is exactly the same as when the marginal return to L increases at another
branch of the network. The only difference is that local increases in the return to K,
κij, will decrease Lij. Finally, an increase in deposits at any branch of the bank will
increase Lij. Higher deposits imply that the bank will rely less on external borrowing,
which will lower the marginal cost of funds. The lower cost of funds allows the bank
to fund loans that have lower marginal return.
Two frictions in this model play a key role in the allocation of funds across the
bank network. The first friction comes from the assumption that the bank is a
monopolist and implies that borrowers cannot access alternative sources of financing.
It is justified by the existence of high switching costs for borrowers, who may find
it prohibitively expensive to switch lenders. The assumption implies that each bank
faces a downward sloping curve for L and K. Alternatively, if banks share a credit
market, the effects of each of the shocks will depend on the complementarity or
substitutability of the lending of each bank. The second friction in the model is that
banks are constrained in accessing external capital. This is captured by the fact that
the marginal cost of bank borrowing depends on the total amount borrowed and on
the size of the bank. In particular, I have assumed that a bank with more branches
will have a lower marginal cost of borrowing, for any amount borrowed. As the size
of the bank goes to infinity the cost of borrowing becomes constant in the limit. This
implies that only the local shock to the marginal return of L, ηij matters for Lij.
The parameter b3 captures the effect of an increase in bank deposits on lending.
Let us assume that there are no real estate shocks, κ. The model highlights the im-
portance of using an exogenous shift in deposits when identifying b3. Usually, changes
in deposits are related to changes in the marginal return of loans. I can identify their
effect on lending, ceteris paribus, only with exogenous changes in deposits. This is
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the main reason why I resort to deposit shocks driven by the fracking revolution –
Gilje (2012) and Plosser (2014) have argued that fracking is not related to changes
in the marginal return of lending. If I assume that the deposit shocks from fracking
are exogenous and that the shocks to the marginal return of small business lending
are common to all banks within a credit market (a county) i.e. ηij = ηj for all i in
a location j, then I can use the entire sample of bank branches, within and outside
of the energy boom areas, to identify the effect of higher deposits. This is because I
can include a control for the common credit-market year shocks, such as county-year
fixed effects. I do not follow this approach. Instead, I exclude the areas within the
energy booms. It is likely that within fracking areas ηij 6= ηj. Banks that specialize
in lending to industries related to fracking can experience an increase in the marginal
return of lending within the fracking areas. Other banks may not be impacted. This
means that a county-year fixed effect will not be an adequate control for demand con-
ditions at places with energy booms. Additionally, in the case that there is a positive
correlation between local deposit shocks and the local marginal return of lending, the
estimate of the effect of deposits on small business lending at branches away from
fracking will be a lower bound. This correlation is, nevertheless, likely to be small.
The effect of an increase in the return of real estate loans is captured by b2. Let us
assume that there are no deposit shocks, δ. I use residential appreciation to capture
changes in the return of RE loans. I can identify the effect of the shock to the return
of RE loans on business lending by using the entire sample of branches under two
conditions: 1) local shocks ηij are common to all i in the area j; 2) Corr(ηij, κij) = 0
i.e. local shocks to the return of each loans are not correlated. The first condition
implies that county-year fixed effects will adequately control for local shocks. The
second condition implies that residential appreciation will only capture the effect of
changes in the return of RE loans.
It is likely that the two conditions are violated in the case of RE booms. In
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particular, within areas where residential appreciation results in an increase to the
return of RE loans there will also be increases in the return of business loans, i.e.
Corr(ηij, κij) > 0. It is also plausible that in these areas the shocks to the return of
business loans are not common to all of the banks, i.e. ηij 6= ηj for all i in the area
j where κij > 0. The first assumption implies that I will not be able to identify the
effect of the shock to the RE loans separately from that to the business loans. The
second assumption implies that a county-year fixed effect will not adequately control
for local shocks at the areas with booms. In order to accommodate both assumptions,
I exclude from the estimation branches which are directly exposed to shocks to the
return of RE loans. Branches not affected by a local κ shock will be affected by a
κ and possibly by a η shock somewhere else in the network. Both effects lower L
locally since they capture the combined increase in L and K at other branches of the
network. Therefore, at branches without a local κ shock, I can identify the combined
effect of higher lending elsewhere in the network. I focus on these branches in the
empirical section assuming that outside of areas with RE booms I can control for
local shocks to the return of business loans with county-year fixed effects.
1.4 Local Supply Shocks and Small Business Lend-
ing
In this section, I study how local economic factors in certain areas – discovery of
oil or increased demand for construction lending – affect the balance sheet of banks
which have geographical presence in these areas through their branch network. I,
then, explore whether the affected banks re-optimize their lending to small businesses
in accordance with the model in the previous section, particularly in the part of
their branch network that is not directly exposed to the local shocks. Financial
intermediaries which have a limited access to external borrowing and therefore depend
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on additional deposits to fund new investments are expected to optimally respond to
the two local shocks. This coordinated response across the branch networks allows
banks to propagate economic factors across areas at significant distance.
The literature on small business lending has provided theoretical arguments as
well as empirical evidence for the difference in the types of loans originated by banks
of varying size. Stein (2002) argues that loans based on “soft” information favor
organizations with a high degree of horizontal integration, while “hard” information
loans are best handled by vertically integrated organizations. Nakamura (1994) puts
forward a complementary argument suggesting that small banks have a cost advantage
compared to bigger banks in providing credit to opaque businesses. Berger et al (2005)
and Brickley et al (2003) find empirical evidence for the organizational difference
across bank size and in terms of the type of loans extended. Smaller banks are
also restricted in their ability to expand their assets both for regulatory reasons
(Nakamura (1994)) and for agency problems arising in the interbank-lending market
(Kashyap and Stein (1997)). More broadly, financial intermediaries of different assets
size and geographical scope are considered to be fundamentally different in terms of
the business model they follow and the types of customers they service. DeYoung
and Rice (2004) show that intermediaries with less than $1 billion in assets follow
a traditional lending-based business model, while bigger intermediaries increasingly
focus on a non-interest, fee-based, business model driven by investment banking and
securitization activities. In keeping with this distinction in the literature I differentiate
between two categories of intermediaries using the size of the branch network. More
specifically, I define banks as small if they have no more than 30 branches. This
definition roughly corresponds to banks with less than $1.1 billion in assets. In the
robustness section, I show that the results in this section are not sensitive to the
particular definition of bank size.
In order to identify the effect of exposure independently from other differences
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in the bank characteristics I include a set of balance sheet controls from the Call
Reports.13 Table 1 lists the bank-year averages for each of the years considered here,
divided into banks below/above 30 branches.
1.4.1 Deposit Shock
First, I study the effect that new fracking wells have on the deposits made at local bank
branches located in the same areas. Banks with branches in these areas can be subject
significant increases in liquidity which lower the cost of funding investments. These
banks can choose to expand their loan portfolios or match the increased liabilities
with liquid securities. I focus on the effect on small business loan originations for the
period between 2001 and 2007.
Methodology and Summary Statistics
The main premise behind the effect of fracking on bank liabilities is that land owners
receive renumeration from the oil companies which they deposit at the local branches.
It follows that communities which include owners of land used for fracking will be an
important source of deposits for banks servicing these areas. I assume that most of the
owners live in proximity to the wells and that the deposits are made relatively close
to the actual drilling locations. Since the data on the fracking wells is aggregated at
Hydrological Unit Codes (HUC), I designate a branch as exposed to fracking deposits
if it is located within one of the HUCs with new horizontal wells. To confirm that the
owners are likely to inhabit the areas where fracking is being done I compare some
key census statistics for zip codes within fracking areas to zip codes outside of these
areas. This information is provided in Table 2. The average zip code with fracking
locations has slightly lower population and income compared to the zip codes outside.
13The list of controls includes one year lags of Log of Assets, Deposits over Assets, Interest Expense
on Deposits, Tier-1 Capital Ratio, C&I Loans over Assets, Mortgage Loans over Assets, Net Income
over Assets, Unused Loan Commitments over Assets, and also Indicators for Bank Holding Company
Ownership, Change in the number of offices.
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Importantly, areas with fracking are not significantly more rural or less populated than
the average for the U.S.. This suggests that land owners are not expected to live away
form the fracking locations.
Banks source their deposits from different areas. This is reflected in the proportion
of deposits held at different branches of the same bank. The fracking areas can be an
important source of deposits for some banks, while for others the branches in these
areas are primarily lending outlets. I measure bank exposure to the liquidity shock
with the weighted average of new wells across the network. The weights used are the
share of bank deposits collected at each branch in the previous year. Formally:
Expit =
∑
b∈Bi,t
DepSharebi,t−1 ×NewWellsHUC,t (1.2)
Bi,t is the set of bank branches of bank i in year t. DepShare
b
i,t−1 is the share of
total bank deposits collected at branch b during the previous year. New WellsHUC,t
is the number of new horizontal wells in Hydrological Unit HUC. The weights in this
measure also eliminate from the sample branches which did not exist or were owned
by a different bank in the previous year. Table 3 lists the medians for the bank-
level averages for well exposure, deposit growth, cost of deposits, and small business
origination growth for each year in the sample. The average exposure across all years
for small banks is 3.65 while the median is 0.8. There are a total of 305 bank x year
observations of exposed small banks. For big banks the average is 1.3 and the median
is 0.15. There are 410 bank x year observations of exposed big banks.
It is worth noticing that small banks with positive exposure experience higher
growth in deposits and loan origination and lower interest expense compared to small
unexposed banks, during most of the sample years. This is in line with my assumption
that the exposure to new wells is a proxy for a deposit shock. This is, however, not
true for the big banks.
The effect of new wells on deposits at individual branches and on the bank liabil-
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ities is estimated with the following equations:
4 ln Depib,t = α1
(
Smalli ×NewWellsHUC,t
)
+ α2
(
Bigi ×NewWellsHUC,t
)
+ β1X
i
t + σt + 
i
b,t
(1.3)
4 ln Depit = α3
(
Smalli × Expit
)
+ α4
(
Bigi × Expit
)
+ β2X
i
t + φi + σt + 
i
b,t (1.4)
4Interest Expenseit = α5
(
Smalli × Expit
)
+ α6
(
Bigi × Expit
)
+ β3X
i
t + φi + σt + 
i
b,t
(1.5)
where4 ln Depib,t is the branch-level growth in deposits, while4 ln Depit and4Interest Expenseit
are, respectively the bank-level growth in deposits and change in interest expense over
deposits between year t and t− 1. I consider the growth in both the overall deposits
and deposits over $100,000. The latter will better capture big deposits from local
landowners. X it includes bank-level controls.
14 φi and σt are bank fixed effects and
year fixed effects. The first regression examines the effect of new wells in a given HUC
area on the growth of deposits at individual branches. The second and third regres-
sion estimate the impact of bank exposure on deposit growth and interest expense.
All of the idiosyncratic errors are assumed to be correlated within a given bank and
are clustered at the bank level. While the last two regressions document the effect of
bank exposure to fracking on the total deposit growth and deposit expense, the first
regression provides evidence that the effect can be traced to individual branches in
areas with energy booms.
In the next step I examine whether banks exposed to liquidity inflows, proxied
by new wells, re-optimize their small business loans portfolio. In particular, I focus
on the extent to which higher deposits contribute to expanded loan originations at
branches outside of the fracking areas. I estimate:
4 lnSBLib,t = α1
(
Smalli × Expit
)
+ α2
(
Bigi × Expit
)
+ βXit + φi + ηc,t + 
i
b,t (1.6)
14Control variables include the lags of Log of Assets, Deposits/Assets, C&I Loans/Assets, Mort-
gage Loans/Assets, Unused Loan Commitments / Assets, and the change in the number of branches.
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SBLib,t is the small business originations by branch b of bank i in year t. Exp
i
t is
allowed to have a different effect across banks with less and more than 30 branches.
ηc,t is a county-year fixed effect. In all samples I exclude branches located within
areas with fracking wells.15 Following the discussion in Section 3, I do this in order to
provide a lower bound estimate for the effect of deposits in the case that the marginal
return of small business loans is positively correlated with the local deposit shock.
The parameters of interest are α1 and α2. Positive estimates imply that new
wells allow for increases in small business lending at branches outside of the energy
booms. Under the assumption that exposure to fracking delivers additional liquidity
to the affected banks, positive estimates are evidence that these intermediaries expand
lending to small businesses only when deposits increase. In other words, the affected
banks are dependent on internal sources of funding. It is worth noticing that the
inclusion of the county-year fixed effect, ηc,t, implies that α1 and α2 are identified
by comparing the originations of small business loans by banks of varying degree of
exposure in the same county in a given year.16
I use the growth of loan originations, rather than the level, for two reasons. The
first reason is that small business loans generally have short terms. Assuming that
the average maturity is twelve months implies that most of these loans are rolled over
each year. These show up as new originations in the data. The second reason is that
loan refinancing is reported as a new origination. As a result, the origination amount
at a given branch may include the stock of previous loans. Finally, to control for the
fact that some banks may refinance more than others or provide loans with longer
maturity, I also include a bank fixed effect in the main equation.
In the baseline sample, I exclude branches within fracking areas. This may not
15I exclude branches in areas with new horizontal wells as well as places with existing horizontal
and directional wells. Excluding areas with wells is warranted under the concern that demand shocks
are correlated with active drilling.
16This is the case because the effect of exposure in a location where all banks have the same
exposure (or no exposure) cannot be distinguished from the county-year fixed effect.
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be sufficient to achieve identification of the liquidity shock for two reasons. First,
fracking can be correlated with demand shocks in the areas surrounding these energy
booms i.e. the development of the new wells may require an additional supporting in-
frastructure in nearby areas. Any increases in lending in these areas cannot, therefore,
be attributed solely to changes in the bank credit supply. Second, the landowners
may deposit their checks at branches just outside of the fracking areas. This implies
that differences in the lending of treated and untreated banks will not capture differ-
ences in the available liquidity. Both of these concerns imply that I should exclude
additional branches located near the energy booms. I provide additional coefficient
estimates using only branches located at least 24 mi, 30 mi, 50 mi, and 100 mi away
from any fracking wells.17
Finally, I use the proxy for liquidity shocks directly, rather than as an instrument
for deposit growth, since it is likely that the exogeneity assumption will be violated.
It is possible that fracking not only affects deposit growth but carries information
about the stability of the deposit growth over time. If lending depends both on
deposit growth and the stability of this growth, an instrumental variable approach
will not be justified.
Results
The results from the estimation of equations (1.3), (1.4), and (1.5) are presented in
Table 4. The estimates from the branch-level regression suggest that new fracking
wells boost the liquidity at local branches. The effect is significant and similar in
magnitude for banks with small and big networks, which is consistent with local land
owners who do not have a preference for one type of branch over another. Branches
located within areas with two new wells experience 10bps faster deposit growth rel-
ative to branches with no new wells in the proximity. The coefficient of exposure in
17I have done this analysis using degrees as a measure of distance. In the paper, I report the
approximate distance in miles.
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second regression in Table 4 is positive and significant only for banks with less than
30 branches. It appears that the additional deposits at the branch level do not have a
significant impact at the balance sheet level of the big banks. For small banks, an av-
erage exposure of 2 new wells is associated with 0.5% faster total deposit growth and
45% faster growth in large deposits relative to banks with no exposure. The evidence
from the growth in large deposits is particularly compelling since one expects that
fracking payments lead to large deposits. This increase in deposit growth translates
into a decrease in interest expense by close to 10bps.18 Big banks are not affected.
How significant is the implied increase in deposits that results from the new frack-
ing wells? To provide a simple answer, I calculate the expected increase in bank
deposits using the coefficient estimate for small banks from the second column of
Table 4, the overall bank exposure, and the stock of deposits from the previous year.
The aggregate results for all small banks are listed in the first two columns of Table
6. The first column lists the annual increase in deposits while the second column lists
the cumulative increase. The cumulative increase in each year is a more appropriate
measure for the additional deposits available to exposed banks at each year given
that retail deposits have relatively long duration. The drilling of new fracking wells
has added an additional $2.6 billion of deposits to the small banks with branches in
areas of the wells. This is a substantial increase relative to the $25 billion deposits
held by these institutions.
The results from the estimation of equation (1.6) can be found in Table 5. The
first regression excludes all branches within areas with active wells in the current
and previous year. While the effect of exposure for small banks is positive, it is
marginally significant. The coefficient increases and becomes significant at 5% when I
exclude from the sample branches within 24 miles of fracking areas. Further excluding
branches within 30, 50, and 100 miles leads to a stable and similar coefficient across
18Interest expense is in percentage units. I use the change in the interest expense rather than the
level because the interest expense is extremely persistent.
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the estimations. All of the estimates for small banks imply that increased liquidity
has a substantial effect on the banks’ lending activity. After controlling for local
variation in demand at the county level, I find that a branch of a small bank with
2 new wells increases origination growth of small business loans by 9% relative to a
branch of a bank with no branches in fracking areas. The county-year fixed effects
are crucial for identification in this estimation. Fracking can invigorate local demand
for small business loans. As long as this leads to a county-wide increase, this effect
will be controlled for with the fixed effects. My results, therefore, imply that even
in counties that experience an overall increase in credit demand due to the energy
booms, the banks with a liquidity shock increase their credit supply more relative
to the banks with no liquidity shocks. The effect of exposure for big banks is not
significant for any of the samples. This is consistent with the fact that these banks
did not experience a liquidity shock from presence in fracking areas.
There seems to be a smaller difference between the lending of exposed versus
unexposed banks at branches close to fracking areas. As discussed in the previous
subsection, this is a result of a combination of spatially correlated demand shocks
originating from the fracking areas and liquidity shocks experienced by banks located
strictly outside the energy booms. Comparing lending activity at bigger distances,
the effect of the liquidity shock stabilizes in size and remains significant.
I calculate the aggregate amount of additional loan originations by small banks
following the procedure I applied for the aggregate deposits. The third column of
Table 4 lists the incremental lending amounts resulting from the liquidity shock.
Over the entire sample originations increased by over $5 billion. The average annual
originations for locations within 200 miles of the energy booms are close to $33 billion,
making the identified credit-supply increase substantial. Interestingly, almost the
entire increase in the stock of deposits was invested in new originations between 2001
and 2005. While this estimate is higher than what is estimated by Plosser (2014), it
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is not necessarily comparable since it uses the deposit increases only from the drilling
of new wells.
How far do small banks export liquidity? This question is important since smaller
banks have a somewhat limited geographic span. Figure 3 plots the α1 coefficient from
equation (1.6) with the 95% confidence bands for samples that sequentially exclude
branches within the indicated distance. The figure also includes the distribution of
the branches of small banks by distance from the fracking areas. The coefficient plot
indicates that liquidity has a big impact on lending within the band between 30 to
60 miles outside of fracking areas. Still, the impact is significant when I use only
variation form branches beyond 100 miles. Beyond 130 miles, the effect of liquidity
converges to zero. This is likely due to the fact that there are not too many branches
of small banks beyond this distance.
The credit-supply effect is identified by comparing competing branches in different
credit markets. To confirm that this comparison is justified and to make sure that the
small banks exposed to fracking are not fundamentally different, I compare some key
statistics from the balance sheet of exposed and unexposed banks. I also compare
performance across the two bank categories by examining key components of the
ROE.19 The information for the two relevant categories of small banks – with no
exposure, located within 100 miles of fracking and with positive exposure – is listed
in Table 7. Treated banks have a higher concentration in commercial and consumer
lending and a lower concentration in loans secured by real estate and in securities.
They fund their investments with a higher fraction of deposits and lower borrowing.
The two groups have similar profitability, with the exposed banks earning slightly
more non-interest income. The health of the portfolio is also similar. Overall, the
information does not suggest that the treated banks are fundamentally different.
The identification rests on the important assumption that banks do not expand
19Here I follow the modified Dupont analysis introduced by MacDonald and Koch (2014)
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their networks in a strategic way. In particular, I assume that banks that face an
increase in the marginal return of small business loans outside of fracking areas do
not enter fracking areas in order to finance the increase loan demand. Evidence in
Plosser (2014) and Gilje et al (2014) suggests that banks did not chase funds within
fracking counties. In the robustness section I show that the results are not sensitive to
the dropping from the sample of recently acquired/new branches in fracking areas.
1.4.2 Real Estate Shock
In the previous section, the particular geographical location of the branch networks
allowed some banks access to a cheap deposits due to fracking. Similarly, in this
section the location of the branch network placed some intermediaries in the midst
of local construction booms in the run up to the recession of 2007. I document
the association between the exposure of banks to surging house prices and their
concentration in construction and development loans.20 I, then, study how these
intermediaries, with branches both inside and outside areas with residential booms,
re-optimized their credit supply to small businesses.
Methodology and Summary Statistics
The identification strategy for the effect of a real estate boom is closely linked to the
model presented in Section 3. In parallel with the setup for the deposit shocks, the real
estate shocks, κij, can be set to one at locations with relatively high appreciation, and
set to zero everywhere else. This effectively defines booming zones where every bank
is exposed to real estate shocks. I identify these zones with residential appreciation
in the top 90th percentile for the US. Alternatively, I use the residential appreciation
at the median branch of each bank to capture the exposure to real estate booms. The
20Compared to other loans secured by real estate, such as traditional mortgages, construction and
development loans are not usually securitized by the originating banks. As a result, they remain on
the balance sheet.
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first measure is area specific, while the second measure is bank specific.
Booming Zones: In this setup, I parametrize the variation in the exposure to real
estate booms by the fraction of branches located inside areas with appreciation in the
top decile for the US:
Expit =
1
TotBri,t
∑
b∈Bti ,t
Ib(Boomc,t)
TotBri,t and B
t
i are, respectively the total number of branches of bank i, in year
t, and the set of all branches. Boomc,t takes the value of 1 if the quarterly growth
rate of HPI of county c is in the top decile for the year t. Ib(Boomc,t) takes a value
of 1 if the branch b of bank i is located in a county with a boom. Table 8 lists the
bank averages for real estate exposure, deposit growth, cost of deposits, and small
business origination growth for each year in the sample. The average exposure for an
exposed small (big) bank is 70% (38%). In all but one year, small banks with positive
exposure experience both higher loan origination growth and higher deposit growth,
compared to small unexposed banks. Similar pattern is observed for the big banks.
The increased exposure to real estate booms is assumed to increase the marginal
return of construction and development loans. In other words, banks with a higher
fraction of branches within areas with surging house prices will be better positioned
to provide these loans due to access to local information about the profitability of
these investments. Higher profitability can lead to increased lending as banks maxi-
mize their return on equity. Ideally, I would use information on branch-level lending
related to real estate and show that it increases within areas with high residential ap-
preciation. Since I do not have this information, I use balance sheet variables instead,
and estimate:21
C&Dit/Assets
i
t = α1
(
Smalli × Expit
)
+ α2
(
Bigi × Expit
)
+ β1X
i
t + φi + σt + 
i
b,t (1.7)
21Loutskina and Strahan (2015) show that banks originate more mortgages at parts of their
network which experience higher appreciation.
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C&Dit is construction and development loans on the balance sheet. Additionally,
I estimate the same equation using construction and development loans plus the
unused commitments for these loans, as well as using the total amount of real estate
based loans plus unused commitments. The latter two dependent variables provide a
more comprehensive picture of the amount of real estate loans extended by financial
intermediaries. X it includes bank controls as defined in the previous section; φi is
a bank fixed effect; σt is a year fixed effect. Idiosyncratic errors are clustered by
bank. The parameters of interest here are the set of α’s. Positive α1 or α2 imply
that higher geographical concentration in residential booms is associated with higher
investment concentration in construction and development loans. This measure of
exposure, therefore, captures the extent to which the geographical distribution of the
branch network allows banks to invest in loans other than small business loans.
Banks which increase their concentration in construction and development loans
can maintain their lending activity in the rest of the credit markets they service.
They can do this by increasing their leverage through additional wholesale funding –
brokered deposits, FHLB advances, or fed funds. This funding strategy will increase
the interest expense and reduce the net interest income. It will also expose the
bank to a liquidity risk inherent in wholesale funding. Alternatively, the additional
construction and development loans can be financed by reallocating funding from
other investments such as small business loans. To identify the extent to which banks
engaged in the second funding strategy, I estimate the equation:
4 lnSBLib,t = α1
(
Smalli × Expit
)
+ α2
(
Bigi × Expit
)
+ β1X
i
t + φi + ηc,t + 
i
b,t (1.8)
Following the same logic as in the case of fracking, I exclude all branches within
areas with appreciation above the 90th percentile, as these locations are likely subject
to positive demand shocks. I also re-estimate the above equation with a sample that
excludes branches within 24, 30, 50, and 100 miles of the areas with residential booms.
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Negative α’s imply that banks finance their increased concentration in construction
and development loans by reducing credit to small businesses in areas away from the
residential booms. It should be emphasized that the identification of this effect is
not driven by differences in overall economic conditions in different counties – the
county-year fixed effects already accommodate these differences.
Median Branch: In this setup I use the median residential appreciation at distinct
branches of the network to quantify bank exposure to real estate booms. Here there
are two dimension of variation in appreciation: 1) across different banks; 2) within
a given bank. Banks with higher median appreciation should be more exposed to
changes in the marginal return of real estate loans. Within banks, these marginal
returns are not likely to be uniform across the branch network. In particular, branches
with above-median appreciation are likely to be more exposed to real estate than the
rest of the branches. I assume that these branches are directly affected by shocks to
the return of real estate loans. It is likely that the return to small business lending also
increases at these branches due to a positive local correlation between the shocks to
the returns. In this case I can only identify the combined effect of the increase in the
return of both loans on lending. As discussed in the section 3, this effect is consistently
estimated only at the branches with appreciation equal to or less than the median for
the network. Therefore, I remove branches with above median appreciation when I
estimate the effect on small business lending.
The variation in the appreciation at the median branch across different banks
captures the extent of geographical concentration in residential booms. To provide
evidence for this, I compare the loan concentration in construction and development
lending across banks with different median appreciation. More specifically, I estimate:
C&Dit/Assets
i
t = α1
(
Smalli ×Medianit
)
+α2
(
Bigi ×Medianit
)
+β1X
i
t+φi+σt+
i
b,t (1.9)
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whereMedianit is the residential appreciation at the median branch of bank i in year t.
Additionally, I estimate the same equation using construction and development loans
plus the unused commitments for these loans, as well as using the total amount of
real estate based loans plus unused commitments. Positive α’s confirm the association
between geographical and portfolio concentration.
As discussed above, increased investment in construction and development loans
can be achieved through a decreased funding available for small business loans. To
identify the extent to which banks engage in this strategy, I estimate:
4 lnSBLib,t = α1
(
Smalli ×Medianit
)
+α2
(
Bigi ×Medianit
)
+β1X
i
t +φi+ηc,t+
i
b,t (1.10)
where X it includes lagged bank controls for assets and asset composition. ηc,t is a
county-year fixed effect. I use the variation in the residential appreciation within
each of the bank network to exclude from the sample credit markets where banks can
experience increased profitability of both construction and development loans and
small business loans. In particular, I exclude from the sample credit markets where
any of the competing banks faces residential appreciation above its respective median.
I further exclude from the sample, bank networks for which less than 15% of branches
are above median.22 The resulting sample includes only the portion of the branch
networks which are not subject to a direct shock to the return of construction and
development loans as captured by residential appreciations.
The parameters of interest here are the set of α’s, which capture the effect of higher
median branch appreciation on small business lending at branches with no real estate
booms, which here are bank-specific. Negative α’s imply that small business lending
decreases at branches away from the real estate shocks for banks with higher exposure
to these shocks. Under the assumption that real estate booms increase the return
22I have experimented with removing from the sample banks with less than 25%, 35%, and 45% of
branches above the median. The results are qualitatively similar but rely on a significantly smaller
sample of banks.
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of both real estate and small business loans locally, the set of α’s will capture the
combined effect of higher loan origination in the part of the network which is excluded
form the sample.
Results
Booming Zones: The association between the investment concentration in con-
struction lending and the geographical concentration in residential booms, captured
by the fraction of branches in the top decile, is explored in Table 9. The coefficient esti-
mates for C&D loans are statistically significant and positive for both bank categories.
Adding the off-balance-sheet commitments for these loans further increases the size
of the coefficients implying that banks increased their exposure to real estate beyond
what is evident from examining just the balance sheet activity. A small (big) bank
with an average level of exposure of 70% (38%) increases (C&D + Unused)/Assets
by 0.5% (0.9%) relative to banks with no exposure. The results for all loans secured
by real estate including the unused commitments imply that small banks did not just
increase their concentration in C&D loans – a small banks with average exposure
invested 0.7% more of its assets in real estate. The first two columns of Table 11
list the implied aggregate increases in construction loans for exposed banks. Over
the entire sample, small (big) banks with branches in the top decile areas increase
construction loans by $0.3 (3.1) billion. Annually, these increases represent close to
1% of the total construction and development loans extended by these banks.
The results from the estimation of equation (1.8) are given in Table 10. The
sample for the first results excludes only branches in the top decile. Regression (2)
to (5) exclude branches within 24 to 100 miles from a residential boom. The effect of
exposure to residential booms is negative and significant for both small and big bank
networks. This is consistent with the fact that both bank categories increased their
exposure to loans related to construction and development. It is expected that bigger
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banks will face a lower marginal cost of borrowing from the interbank market and will
be able to expand lending to land developers without decreasing small business loans
compared to smaller banks. This expectation is borne out by the data – the coefficient
for big banks is half the size of the small bank coefficient for most of the estimates. For
both bank types, the effect increases once the branches close to residential booms are
eliminated. There can be two explanations for this: 1) positive demand shocks affect
areas close but outside the booming areas; 2) close to the booms branches of different
banks are impacted similarly despite differences in the measure of exposure.23
To quantify the results, consider estimation (3) from Table 10. At a branch more
than 30 miles away from the residential boom, a small bank with 70% exposure
will decrease loan origination growth by 78% relative to a branch of a bank with
no exposure. The difference in origination drops to 23% if we consider all branches
outside the booms. Focusing on big banks, a 38% difference in exposure leads to a
23% difference in loan origination growth if we only consider branches that are at
least 30 miles away. If we consider all branches the difference drops to 14% and is
marginally significant.
The results indicate that geographical concentration in areas with surging resi-
dential prices allows banks to take a relatively bigger positions in C&D investments.
These are financed not through an increase in leverage but through a substitution
away from small business credit in markets outside residential booms. This pat-
tern is consistent across the two bank categories. The implied aggregate decrease in
small business originations in provided in the last column of Table 8. On average
small banks reduce small business credit outside residential booms by $0.4 billion,
while big banks reduce credit by $3.5 billion. These numbers represent respectively
23There is an additional reason that the effect of exposure can have either sign in locations close
to the boom. On one hand small business lending in a location with increasing housing prices should
decrease because small businesses will rely on financing through home equity lines. Adelino et al
(2013) document this mechanism. On the other hand small business loans should increase due to a
demand boom that results from increases in household wealth as housing prices increase.
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25% and 9% of the aggregate originations by the exposed banks outside of residential
booms. The reduction in small business credit is significantly higher than the increase
in C&D loans. This suggests that the credit reduction is used to finance other types of
bank investments, possibly small business loans in the areas of residential booms. In
other words, an overall increase in the demand for bank capital in the booming areas
can explain the negative credit supply shift that banks impose on small businesses.
The contraction in credit can be traced to more than 100 miles away. Figure 4
plots the geographical extent of the credit reduction. Small banks contract credit
predominantly within 30 to 100 miles away from the booming area. This periphery
practically contains all of their branches outside. For big banks, the contraction in
credit is more pronounced at branches beyond 100 miles. The combined effect for both
bank types suggests that there was an overall reduction in credit to small businesses
– at closer distance credit was reduced by small banks, while at bigger distances this
was done by big banks.
Table 12 lists a selection of balance sheet and performance measures for small
banks with and without exposure to residential booms. Small banks with positive
exposure are relatively bigger than other small banks within 100 miles of the residen-
tial booms. Both groups hold the same fraction of real estate loans, with the exposed
banks holding a higher fraction of commercial and consumer loans. Unexposed banks
hold a higher fraction of their assets in liquid investments. The difference in the loan
mix makes exposed banks more profitable, partially due to the higher asset utilization
(aTA/aTE) and partially due to the slightly higher leverage. The portfolio health
of both groups is very similar. The overall differences between the two groups are
consistent with the increases in the profitability of investments available to banks
with higher geographical concentration in areas with residential booms.
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Median Branch: The alternative measure of exposure to residential booms – ap-
preciation at the median branch – accommodates the continuous distribution of res-
idential appreciation. While some bank networks may not have branches within the
top decile areas, they may still be located within areas with significant appreciation
and be able to invest in profitable construction projects. The results in Table 9
suggest that the appreciation at the median branch of bank networks captures the
variation in the incentive to invest in construction projects. In particular, coefficient
estimates form regression (5) confirm that for both groups of intermediaries increases
in network exposure to residential appreciation is associated with higher concentra-
tion in C&D loans. A small (big) bank with a 1% higher median appreciation has
a 0.6% (0.4%) higher concentration in C&D (including commitments) loans. This
evidence implies that even banks outside of the top decile areas take advantage of
the booming house market and increase their investments in real estate. The first
two columns of Table 14 list the implied aggregate increases in construction loans for
exposed banks. Over the entire sample, variations in residential appreciation at the
median branch for small (big) banks explain a $2 (4.6) billion increase in C&D loans
(including commitments). Annually, these increases represent close to 1.5% of the
total construction and development loans extended by small banks and close to 0.8%
of the total credit by big banks.
The impact of the real estate booms on small business lending is explored in
Table 13. The table includes results from estimating equation (12) for three different
samples: 1) no branches above the median; 2) no branches above the median and
in areas in the top 95th percentile; 3) no branches above the median and in areas in
the top 90th percentile. The evidence across all estimations suggests that an increase
in the median appreciation for small banks leads to a decrease in lending growth at
the part of the network with lower appreciation. The effect of median appreciation is
marginally significant for big banks but has the same direction. Focusing on counties
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where the residential appreciation is below the median for each bank, a small bank in
the top quartile of exposure (2.6%) decreases origination growth by 13%-16% relative
to competitors in the first quartile of exposure (1%). The advantageous geographical
locations of some banks allows them to increase their profitability by investing in
construction lending, which is offset on the balance sheet by a decrease in credit
to small businesses in counties where the residential market experiences relatively
slower appreciations. Notice that this effect is not driven by county-level differences
across the U.S. – the county-year fixed effects accommodate this variation. The
results indicate that within a county with a lower residential appreciation, banks
with exposure to “hotter” markets decrease local credit to businesses at a higher
rate.
The implied aggregate decrease in credit to businesses in counties with below
median appreciation for all bank competitors is listed in Table 14. On average, each
year small banks decreased lending by $2.1 billion while big banks decreased lending
by $4.4 billion. These contractions are significant since they represent close to 20% of
total originations in these market by small banks and close to 10% of total originations
for big banks. Similarly to the case of the top decile areas, the credit reduction is
bigger than the increase in C&D loans, implying that banks substitute between small
business lending at below median branches and a combination of C&D loans and
other types of lending in areas with higher residential appreciation.
Table 15 compares performance and asset composition of small banks above and
below 1.4% (the median) of appreciation at the median branch. Higher exposure
to residential appreciation is related to a higher concentration in loans secured by
real estate and lower concentration in commercial and consumer lending. This is
consistent with the increased incentive for investing in real estate when banks have
a geographical advantage. Also consistent with the interpretation that real estate
booms increase the profitability of real estate loans, higher median appreciation is
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associated with higher bank profitability. This is driven by higher asset utilization
and slightly higher leverage. The health of the portfolio across the two groups is
similar.
The results, taken together, are consistent with the argument that small banks
extend more loans related to real estate when parts of their networks experience rapid
residential appreciation. This leads to a decease in capital allocated for small business
credit at branches where real estate prices are not growing as fast relative to the bank
median. The shift is tantamount to a negative lending-supply shock for small busi-
nesses in areas which do not experience abrupt price appreciation of residential real
estate. The results are consistent with evidence provided by Loutskina and Strahan
(2015), who show that banks increase the growth rate of mortgage originations at
the counties of their network where prices are higher. Chakraborty et al (2014) show
that banks with exposure to real estate appreciations increase the real estate loans in
their portfolios. My findings are also consistent with the evidence from the literature
on the lending channel of monetary policy where smalls banks (as defined by assets
(Kashyap and Stein (2000)) or by BHC affiliation (Campello (2002), Schnabl (2012))
are unable to alleviate funding shocks and decrease the supply of credit. Here banks
face a higher return when investing in loans secured by residential real estate. They
fund these loans by decreasing small business lending at locations that are not subject
to real estate booms.
1.5 Small Business Lending and Real Activity
The results so far indicate that deposit growth from fracking and residential booms,
combined with the dependence on traditional sources of funding, lead to considerable
credit supply shifts to small businesses. I estimate that small banks with exposure to
new wells increased loan originations by $5 billion between 2001 and 2007. In response
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to surging house prices and increased investment in construction loans, small banks
decreased originations to small businesses in areas with slower appreciation between
$0.4 and $2.1 billion annually depending on the measure – about 20% of total annual
originations for these banks. Big banks reduced originations by close to 10% of their
annual volume. This section investigates whether these credit supply shifts impacted
real activity measured by establishment growth.
1.5.1 Methodology
Studying the independent effect of credit on real activity is challenging – one is
likely to observe both increases in credit and establishment growth not only because
increased credit allows for economic expansion, but also because increases in business
activity are associated with higher demand for credit.
While the amount of lending in a given geographical area is clearly endogenous
with respect to the level of economic activity, one can argue that bank exposure to
deposit growth or residential appreciation in other, disconnected, markets is not. In
other words, it is unlikely that a small business, far from an energy boom, is more
likely to be established when the bank in the proximity has more physical branches
in an area with new fracking wells.24 This allows me to investigate the link between
the supply-driven changes in lending, proxied by bank exposure to the shocks, and
establishment growth.
In order to study the impact on real activity I focus on the locations of borrowers
rather than the locations of branches, as I have done in the previous sections. I
compile a measure of how exposed a set of borrowers is to banks which, in turn, are
24A business within an industry that is directly related to mining is likely to be established in
response to new fracking wells, even if the business is not in direct proximity to the energy boom. I
exclude industries that are directly impacted by the shocks that I consider in the paper in order to
avoid this source of endogeneity.
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subject to shocks. It is defined as:
AreaExpzip,t =
1
TotalBankszip,t
∑
BankSetzip,t
BankExposurei,t (1.11)
where BankSetzip,t and TotalBankszip,t are, respectively, the set of distinct banks
providing credit at a given zip code, and their total number. BankExposurei,t de-
pends on the definition used for each of the shocks:
• Deposit Shock: BankExposurei,t =
∑
b∈Bi,t DepShare
b
i,t−1 ×NewWellsHUC,t
• Real Estate Shock, Booming Zones: BankExposurei,t = 1TotBri,t
∑
b∈Bti ,t Ib(Boomc,t)
• Real Estate Shock, Median Branch: BankExposurei,t = Lowib,t
Area exposure to the deposit shocks is defined as the average of new wells exposure
across all of the banks which provide credit to borrowers in a zip code. The area
exposure to the real estate appreciation captured by booming zones is defined as the
average fraction of branches within the top decile for banks that provide credit to
a zip code. The area exposure to the real estate appreciation captured by median
appreciation is defined as the fraction of at-or-below median branches which provide
credit to a zip code. The first measure captures the increase in credit to borrowers
due to fracking, while the second and third measures capture the decrease in credit
to borrowers induced by real estate booms.25
The area exposure to small banks with new fracking wells for 2004 is shown in
Figure 5. As expected, the areas closest to the locations of the energy booms have a
higher exposure, yet there is significant variation in exposure away from the booms.
The plot for the real estate shock using exposure to the top decile exhibits a similar
25A possible concern with the third definition is that it is related to the local conditions, since it
does not rely on bank-level exposure. Yet, the relative position of a branch within a bank depends on
the conditions at the rest of the branches. Additionally, locations where credit is provided exclusively
by below median branches will not provide identification due to the zip code fixed effects included
in all estimations.
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pattern. In each of the cases, having areas with no exposure close to areas with
exposure will be important for the identification of the effect of the balance sheet
shocks.
I measure the impact of credit supply shift on establishment growth with:
4 lnEstindzip,t = α1AreaExpSmallzip,t + α2AreaExpBigzip,t + δind,state,t + θzip,ind + εind,zip,t
(1.12)
4 lnEstindzip,t is the log difference of the number of total establishments of industry ind
in area zip during year t. Industries are defined at the 2-digit NAICS level and exclude
mining, construction, finance, and real estate (and insurance).26 AreaExpSmallzip,t
and AreaExpBigzip,t are defined as in (1.11), using only small or only big banks.
δind,state,t is an industry-state-year fixed effect which absorbs time-varying demand
shocks at the industry level in each state. θzip,ind is a location-industry fixed effect
which allows for differences in the permanent industry endowments at the zip code.
Some of the difference in exposure can be explained by the level of urbanization
of zip codes. The location-specific controls accommodate this source of variation.
The identification of the area exposure effect is achieved by comparing establishment
growth for the same industry within the same state but at different zip codes. In all
estimations I restrict the sample to the zip codes outside of the source of the shocks.
I further exclude zip codes at increasing distance from the shocks in order to gauge
whether there is an overlap between the credit supply shocks and the variation in
establishment growth.
The coefficients of interest in this specification are the set of α’s. Positive coeffi-
cients in the case of the energy booms imply that locations where credit was provided
by banks with new fracking wells, grow faster than locations where credit is provided
by the rest of the banks. Negative coefficients in the case of real estate booms imply
that location where credit was reduced by banks investing in real estate loans grow
26These industry are possibly affected directly by the shocks considered here.
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slower than locations where this decrease was smaller.
It should be noted that the evidence from estimating equation (1.12) will not
directly imply that the increase in the establishment growth is linked to changes in
small business credit. While the results in the previous section indicate that the
liquidity and real estate shocks impacted small business credit, the effect that these
shocks have on establishment growth could be explained by a change in a different
type of bank lending.
1.5.2 Results – Deposit Shock
The results from the estimation of specification (1.12) is provided in Table 16. The
first estimation excludes zip codes which intersect with areas with fracking activity
in the current or previous year. Estimations (2) to (5) exclude additional zip codes
within 24 to 100 miles to fracking areas. Figure 6 shows how distant the zip codes in
each of the specifications are.
The coefficient for area exposure to small banks is statistically significant and
positive for all but the first samples. The point estimate is higher when more zip
codes are excluded but the standard error increases as well. To quantify the impact,
assume that credit in a given zip code is provided by a bank with two new wells
and that the zip code is more than 30 miles from a fracking area. The results form
regression (3) imply that this zip code experiences 0.5% faster establishment growth
relative to a zip code where credit is provided by a bank with no new wells. This effect
goes up to almost 1% if we consider the results form estimation (5). The impact of the
positive credit supply shock is substantial given that the average (median) zip code
establishment growth is 0.8% (0%). The change in the coefficient for small banks is
consistent with the pattern of lending. At branches close to fracking there was not a
significant difference in lending between exposed and unexposed banks. This was due
to the fact that unexposed banks close to fracking also received a positive liquidity
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shock. This can explain why close to fracking zip codes with low exposure experience
similar establishment growth as zip codes with high exposure – all of these zip codes
likely experience credit inflow.
The implied aggregate change in establishments due to the increase in the credit
supply is approximately 50,000 between 2001 and 2007.27 This accounts for 13% of
the aggregate change in the number of U.S. establishments during the period, which
was approximately 380,000. These estimates suggest that a $105 thousand increase
in small business originations is associated with the creation of a new establishment.
At the zip code level, a 1% increase in small business origination growth is associated
with a 5bps increase establishment growth.
The zip codes where bank exposure lead to establishment growth are closely
matched with the areas where branches increased lending as shown in Table 5. This
match can be further confirmed from Figure 7, which shows the coefficient plot for
the area exposure to small banks. Comparing this to Figure 3, it is evident that zip
codes, more than 100 miles away, experienced faster establishment growth when they
received credit from branches of banks exposed to fracking.
How different are zip codes where credit was provided by small banks with ex-
posure to fracking? Table 17 compares the industry composition and population
characteristics for zip code with and without exposure to fracking credit. Zip codes
without exposure more agricultural, construction, and transportation establishments,
while those with exposure have more FIRE, and professional services establishments.
This is consistent with the fact that zip codes with exposure are more urban, have
a higher income, population, and education levels. This comparison underscores the
importance of controlling for differences in the endowments across locations in the
main regression. Even though the results are not driven by these fixed differences, it
appears that the increase in lending and in establishments occurred mostly in areas
27This estimate uses the small bank exposure coefficient of 0.00239.
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with urban characteristics.
1.5.3 Results – Real Estate shock: Booming Zones
The effect of the negative credit supply shift on real activity is presented in Table 18.
The results focus on a set of samples that sequentially exclude zip codes in proximity
to the residential boom. Contraction of credit by small banks has a significant nega-
tive impact on establishment growth. The effect is statistically significant and has a
similar value across all of the samples. A zip code where credit was provided by banks
with 70% of branches in booms experiences 0.9% slower establishment growth relative
to a zip code with credit from banks with no branches in booms. This difference in
bank exposure at individual banks lead to a 78% decrease in lending growth.
The implied aggregate decrease in the number of establishments at zip codes where
credit was provided by small banks with branches in the top decile is approximately
13,000 between 2001 and 2005. This represents 4.4% of the total new establishments
added during the same period. The total decrease in originations for this period
is $2.2 billion, implying that a $170 thousand decrease in small business lending is
associated with the closure of an establishment.
The effect of credit contraction by big banks does not have a significant effect on
establishment growth. The contraction was likely substituted away by businesses from
alternative sources. This is consistent with the idea that borrowers form bigger banks
rely on transactions-based lending and are less constrained in terms of alternative
sources of credit. Notice from Figure 4 that big banks reduced credit at branches more
than 100 miles from residential booms. At such a distance, there is no evidence that
small banks also contracted credit. It is, therefore, likely that businesses substituted
the credit reduction from big banks with credit from small banks.
Figure 8 plots the effect of exposure to small banks as different zip codes are elim-
inated from the sample. The reduction in real activity matches well the contraction
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in credit by small banks. As expected, the effect goes to zero as branches at larger
distances are eliminated. While small bank networks have a limited geographic span,
they can still generate negative effects on real activity beyond 100 miles from areas
with booms.
Table 19 compares the characteristics of zip codes across exposure to banks with
branches in the top decile. Similarly to the case of fracking, zip codes where credit is
provided by small banks with exposure to residential booms are more urban. They
have a higher share of professional and health care services establishments, higher
population, and income. While urban areas with high levels of income and eduction
are the hubs of innovation and business start-ups, being located in these areas is not
sufficient. The availability of business credit appears to be critical for growth in real
activity.
1.5.4 Results – Real Estate shock: Median Branch
Table 20 lists the relevant results from the estimation of specifications (1.12), using
the fraction of median, or below-median, branches as a measure of exposure. The first
regression uses the entire sample and effectively compares establishment growth at zip
codes that borrow from below versus above median branches. The second regression
excludes zip codes intersecting with areas in the 90th percentile of appreciation. The
last two estimations further exclude zip codes within 50 and 100 miles from the 90th
percentile areas.
The results show that borrowing from below median branches of small banks has
a statistically significant, negative effect on establishment growth. The magnitude of
the effect decreases when zip codes with high residential appreciation or zip codes in
the proximity are excluded from the sample. This is a result from the fact that these
areas likely experience faster growth. To quantify the impact of the credit reduction,
assume that a zip code is located within 50 miles of an area in the top decile and
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it borrowers only from below-median branches. This zip code will experience 0.34%
slower establishment growth relative to a zip code which borrows only from above-
median branches. Previous evidence showed that banks with geographical advantage
in areas with residential appreciation will increase their concentration in C&D loans,
financing them with a contraction in originations at the part of their network where
residential appreciation is relatively lower. With the increase in the fraction of banks
for which a zip code is below median, driven by a pickup in the housing market
somewhere else, originations in the zip code contract and establishment growth slows
down.
The implied aggregate decrease in the number of establishments explained by the
fraction of below-median branches is approximately 37,000 between 2001 and 2005.28
This represents 11.5% of the total new establishments added during the same period.
The total decrease in originations by small banks at branches that were below the
median is $10.6 billion. This implies that a $283 thousand decrease in small business
lending is associated with the closure of an establishment.
Table 21 compares the characteristics of zip codes where the fraction of below
median branches is less than a half with the rest. The two groups of zip codes are
very similar. This suggests that the locations with lower fraction of below median
branches are not fundamentally different. The major difference is that banks lowered
their loan concentration in the first group and increased their concentration in the
second.
The combined results form both specifications of residential booms imply that
real activity is negatively affected by bank capital re-allocation following asset price
appreciations. Small banks are limited in their ability to expand their assets and
so they increase lending to land developers at the expense of small businesses away
from the booms. Despite not being as limited in their ability to expand, big banks
28The estimate uses the coefficient from regression (2), -0.00277.
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also decrease lending to small businesses. Only the credit supply shock from small
banks affects real activity. This is in line with the argument that big banks lending
to businesses with alternative sources of credit. As a result, big banks are able to
finance residential expansions without affecting small business activity. When small
banks engage in the same activity, this can have serious cost to small businesses.
1.6 Robustness and Extensions
This section extends the results for small business lending by exploring the extensive
margin. In addition, I examine whether the effects of each of the shocks is robust to:
using an asset-based definition of bank size; controlling for both shocks at the same
time; excluding new branches; controlling for the headquarter effect or home bias;
controlling for the average distance between a branch and the borrowers.
Asset-based Bank Groups The main results in the paper distinguish between
two groups of banks based on whether the branch network has less than 30 branches.
The group of small banks closely overlaps with institutions with less than $1.1 billion
in assets. Table 22 provides some key regression results based on the asset-based
definition. The coefficient estimates are close to those in the main section.
The Extensive Margin The information provided in the CRA filings allows me
to infer not only the gross origination amounts, but also the total number of loans at
distinct bank branches. The results from the extensive margin are hard to interpret –
when banks increase the amount of credit to existing customers, they have discretion
over whether they report this as one origination or two separate originations. For this
reason, it is hard to distinguish if the bank is serving new customers and refinancing
less or whether the bank is just refinancing more loans. Most importantly, finding
that a coefficient is not statistically different form zero does not imply that no loans
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to new businesses are made.
The results are reported in Table 23. The first estimation presents the impact of
new wells on the growth rate in the number of originations, excluding from the sample
branches within 30 miles of fracking activity. While the coefficient for small banks
is positive, the effect is not statistically significant. The second set of results focuses
on the fraction of branches in areas with residential booms (top 90th percentile of
appreciation). The coefficient for small banks is statistically significant and negative.
This indicates lower origination activity for banks with higher exposure to residential
booms. The effect is not significant for bigger banks. The last set of results focuses
on the effect of real estate appreciation at the median branch. The coefficients for
both bank categories are negative but not significant.
Controlling for Both Shocks The identification strategy for each of the shocks
has implicitly assumed that they are not related. The rationale for this is the partic-
ular geography of each of the shocks – drilling was mostly done in the central part of
the country, while the residential booms where most significant at the areas near the
East and the West coast. Furthermore, given that small banks were mostly affected,
one need not worry about the spillovers between the two shocks due to the limited
span of their networks. A simple way to introduce possible interactions between the
two shocks is to include the measure of both shocks simultaneously. In particular, I
focus on the period between 2001 and 2005, the overlap between the two shocks, and
estimate the lending equation with both measures of exposure.
The estimates are presented in Table 24. The first estimation only uses exposure
to new wells, while the second uses only the fraction of branches within areas in the
top decile. The sample in both estimations is identical. In the last regression, I
include both measures simultaneously. Coefficients are almost identical in each of the
estimations. This suggests that the two shocks are close to orthogonal to each other.
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Network Selection, Headquarter Effect, and Distance to the Branch The
main results related to fracking assume that banks do not deliberately open new
branches within areas with new fracking wells in order to capture additional liquidity.
Over the period between 2001 and 2007 there is indeed a significant number of branch
acquisitions and construction of new branches. 168 (647) of the 819 (4,038) branches
of small (big) banks that have been in proximity to new fracking wells have either been
acquired or established. To explore the sensitivity of the main results to the changes
in the branch network I exclude these branches from the sample when calculating
bank exposure. The results based on branches farther than 50 miles from fracking
are listed in the first column of Table 25. The coefficient for small banks does not
change. This is an indication of the fact that most of the branch acquisitions involved
institutions which already had an exposure to fracking.
Results by Keeton (2009) and Presbitero et al (2014) suggest that bank head-
quarters are treated differently, either because of home bias or due to informational
problems. I explore the sensitivity of my results to this by examining whether the ef-
fects of the shocks are different at the headquarter branch. This is done by interacting
each of the measures of exposure to a particular shock with an indicator for whether
the branch is also the main bank branch. The results are listed in Table 25. In the
case of fracking, there is some evidence that lending is expanded at non-headquarter
branches while the main branch does not experience much of a change. In the case of
branches in top decile, it seems that the headquarter reduces lending more than the
rest of the branches. The fracking result can be explained by the fact that most of the
investment opportunities are at the non-headquarter branches. The real-estate result
can be due to the fact that the expansion of lending to construction and development
done at the headquarter.
The literature on borrower distance and small business lending argues that rela-
tionship lending is conducted at close proximity to the borrowers (Degryse and On-
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gena (2005)). Therefore, branches that serve more distant businesses provide credit
to less opaque firms. In order to see whether the baseline results are sensitive to the
type of firms each branch is serving (as proxied by average distance to the firm), I
control for the average distance between the branch and the lending locations. In
particular, I interact average distance between the branch and the firms that it serves
with the measure of exposure to each of the shocks. Notice that the average distance
could alternatively capture branches that lend in rural areas where firms are more
geographically dispersed. The results are listed in Table 25. The coefficients for the
impact of exposure are mostly unaffected. In the case of appreciation at the median
branch, exposed banks reduce lending primarily at branches that serve more distant
customers.
1.7 Conclusion
This study investigates how shocks to the bank balance sheet affect small business
lending at different branches of the network. In particular, it quantifies the sensitivity
of the small business lending at different branches to: 1) increases in deposits due
to bank presence in fracking counties; 2) changes in asset profitability of real estate
loans due to presence in areas with high residential appreciation. I further evaluate the
effect of the supply-driven changes in small business loans on real economic activity at
zip codes. The results for the funding shock imply that small banks export liquidity
across the bank network, funding small business loans in locations away from the
source of the boom. These loans have a real economic impact. Locations that have
a higher exposure to the fracking boom through bank presence experience faster
establishment growth. The results for the real-estate shock show that bank asset
substitution contributes to a decrease in small business lending at branches away
from the real estate booms. Areas serviced by banks with high exposure to these
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booms experience slower establishment growth.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Intermediaries Reporting Small Business Loans
Banks with less than 30 branches
Year N ln Assets Deposits
Assets
Interest Expense
Deposits
Securities
Assets
Tier1 Capital
Assets
C&I
Assets
Mortgages
Assets
Net Income
Assets
Unused Commit
Assets
2001 1,222 13.029 0.788 0.009 0.218 0.088 0.097 0.250 0.007 0.217
2002 1,308 13.048 0.788 0.006 0.228 0.088 0.094 0.230 0.007 0.171
2003 1,436 13.082 0.788 0.004 0.234 0.089 0.092 0.217 0.007 0.192
2004 1,369 13.131 0.787 0.004 0.229 0.090 0.096 0.204 0.007 0.237
2005 668 13.547 0.770 0.005 0.236 0.089 0.091 0.211 0.007 0.297
2006 614 13.639 0.774 0.007 0.219 0.091 0.093 0.208 0.007 0.220
2007 581 13.711 0.760 0.008 0.186 0.097 0.102 0.205 0.006 0.300
Banks with more than 30 branches
Year N ln Assets Deposits
Assets
Interest Expense
Deposits
Securities
Assets
Tier1 Capital
Assets
C&I
Assets
Mortgages
Assets
Net Income
Assets
Unused Commit
Assets
2001 238 15.368 0.727 0.008 0.209 0.074 0.114 0.231 0.007 0.202
2002 256 15.497 0.726 0.005 0.226 0.075 0.108 0.223 0.008 0.202
2003 255 15.501 0.728 0.003 0.231 0.075 0.101 0.226 0.007 0.199
2004 238 15.545 0.728 0.003 0.231 0.077 0.102 0.235 0.007 0.207
2005 242 15.608 0.730 0.004 0.213 0.077 0.102 0.237 0.008 0.222
2006 238 15.663 0.734 0.006 0.195 0.079 0.103 0.227 0.007 0.248
2007 245 15.629 0.734 0.007 0.179 0.080 0.108 0.218 0.006 0.234
Notes: The table reports medians for the bank controls for each of the years in the sample.
Interest expense is reported at the quarterly level.
Table 2: Census Statistics for Fracking and Non-Fracking Zip Codes
Zip Codes Inside Fracking Zip Codes Outside Fracking
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Population 9695 10323.03 (12392.93) 153177 11686.24 (14123.91)
Median Age 9695 36.62965 (5.139222) 153177 37.481 (5.233941)
Median Income 9695 35234.14 (12451.33) 153177 41664.27 (16368.72)
Income Per Capita 9695 17153.05 (6010.743) 153177 20159.59 (8704.774)
Poverty Percentage 9694 17.90% (10.65%) 152943 14.07% (10.77%)
Urban 9694 39.01% (41.69%) 153073 45.08% (43.64%)
Fraction with Bachelor’s Degree 9694 9.86% (6.78%) 153031 11.96% (7.77%)
Notes: The table lists the summary statistics for key characteristics for two categories of
zip codes: those within areas where fracking occurs and those outside. The information
is from the 2000 U.S. Census.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Banks Exposed to Fracking
Banks with less than 30 branches
No Exposure Positive Exposure
N New Wells 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep Interest Expense
Deposits
N New Wells 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep Interest Expense
Deposits
2001 1,015 0.000 0.248 0.081 0.96% 37 0.893 0.217 0.139 0.82%
2002 1,058 0.000 0.058 0.072 0.57% 36 0.395 0.024 0.076 0.52%
2003 1,101 0.000 0.085 0.082 0.41% 43 1.136 0.122 0.067 0.36%
2004 1,120 0.000 0.011 0.055 0.33% 84 0.953 0.047 0.049 0.29%
2005 588 0.000 0.030 0.074 0.44% 32 0.346 0.074 0.076 0.43%
2006 525 0.000 0.007 0.080 0.66% 19 1.682 0.025 0.092 0.67%
2007 445 0.000 0.018 0.048 0.83% 54 0.642 0.012 0.051 0.76%
Banks with more than 30 branches
No Exposure Positive Exposure
N New Wells 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep Interest Expense
Deposits
N New Wells 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep Interest Expense
Deposits
2001 168 0.000 0.227 0.085 0.85% 52 0.064 0.413 0.061 0.84%
2002 198 0.000 0.063 0.077 0.50% 42 0.069 0.068 0.042 0.49%
2003 209 0.000 0.047 0.089 0.36% 37 0.229 0.082 0.089 0.34%
2004 175 0.000 0.021 0.066 0.30% 59 0.140 0.053 0.056 0.26%
2005 181 0.000 0.045 0.092 0.41% 54 0.133 0.036 0.087 0.39%
2006 163 0.000 0.044 0.076 0.61% 69 0.436 0.006 0.093 0.60%
2007 137 0.000 0.033 0.049 0.75% 97 0.321 -0.036 0.038 0.73%
Notes: The table lists averages for bank exposure to fracking, growth in originations, growth in deposits, and
interest expense, across small and big banks, and across exposed and unexposed banks.
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Table 4: Effect of New fracking Wells on Deposit Growth
Dependent Variable 4 ln Branch 4 ln Bank 4 ln Bank 4 Interest
Deposits Tot. Deposits $100K+ Deposits Expense
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Wells in Proximity × Small Bank 0.000487**
(0.000238)
New Wells in Proximity × Big Bank 0.000395***
(0.000130)
Avg. New Wells × Small Bank 0.00225*** 0.223** -0.0386**
(0.000871) (0.102) (0.0155)
Avg. New Wells × Big Bank -0.00154 -0.0245 -0.0296
(0.00211) (0.191) (0.0425)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 -0.00305 -0.142*** -6.304** 0.380
(0.00189) (0.0266) (2.456) (0.744)
Deposits/Assetst−1 0.0896** -0.190** -27.51*** -0.319
(0.0410) (0.0759) (5.861) (9.993)
Securities/Assetst−1 -0.0227 -0.121*** -14.32*** 0.890
(0.0467) (0.0446) (4.974) (1.345)
C&I/Assetst−1 -0.207*** -0.0586 -4.601 20.32
(0.0623) (0.0878) (11.29) (14.76)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 0.0844 -0.0664 1.292 -2.625
(0.0551) (0.0579) (7.060) (5.038)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 0.00650 0.000718 -0.371 0.249
(0.00756) (0.00387) (0.956) (0.251)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank 0.0851*** 0.178*** 10.43*** -3.711
(0.0225) (0.0305) (2.131) (2.935)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank 0.0391 0.355*** 15.91*** -0.416
(0.0240) (0.0838) (3.325) (0.318)
4I(Small Bank) -0.0219 0.0245 0.383 0.163
(0.0173) (0.0287) (1.598) (0.414)
Observations 310,206 7,490 7,177 7,490
R-squared 0.007 0.546 0.427 0.405
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of
new fracking wells on, respectively, branch-level deposit growth, bank-level total deposit growth,
bank-level $100K+ deposit growth , and bank-level change in interest expense. Interest expense
is in percentage units and is at an annual basis. Each of the controls is the quarterly average from
the previous year. Sample covers 2001 to 2007.
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Table 5: Effect of New fracking Wells on Small Business Lending
Dependent Variable 4 ln Small Business Lending
No Branches No Branches No Branches No Branches No Branches
in Fracking within 24mi within 30mi within 50mi within 100mi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg. New Wells × Small Bank 0.0191* 0.0256** 0.0450*** 0.0406** 0.0414**
(0.0107) (0.0120) (0.0157) (0.0180) (0.0206)
Avg. New Wells × Big Bank -0.00181 0.00153 0.00187 0.00270 0.0119
(0.00631) (0.00496) (0.00509) (0.00545) (0.0124)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 -0.0316 -0.0399 -0.0479 -0.0606 -0.0615
(0.0480) (0.0474) (0.0477) (0.0501) (0.0485)
Deposits/Assetst−1 -0.0662 -0.125 -0.156 -0.226 -0.331
(0.299) (0.289) (0.288) (0.306) (0.342)
Cost of Depositst−1 3.453 5.297 5.645 7.848 15.16
(9.471) (9.501) (9.650) (10.06) (10.48)
Securities/Assetst−1 0.178 0.253 0.256 0.291 0.250
(0.225) (0.228) (0.229) (0.234) (0.261)
Tier1 Capital/Assetst−1 -0.472 -0.841 -0.996 -1.493 -1.657
(1.322) (1.325) (1.336) (1.380) (1.450)
C&I/Assetst−1 0.106 0.213 0.252 0.401 0.579
(0.382) (0.370) (0.372) (0.377) (0.411)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 0.936*** 0.930*** 0.928*** 0.901*** 1.038***
(0.349) (0.337) (0.331) (0.314) (0.336)
Net Income/Assetst−1 0.0159 -0.179 0.0786 0.212 2.059
(4.536) (4.660) (4.680) (4.857) (5.305)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 0.0432 0.0429 0.0464 0.0525* 0.0475*
(0.0305) (0.0288) (0.0293) (0.0301) (0.0288)
Is Part of Multi-BHC? -0.0148 -0.00655 -0.00382 -0.000497 0.0181
(0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0877) (0.0875) (0.0973)
Is Part of Single-BHC? 0.0266 0.0296 0.0307 0.0269 0.0321
(0.0889) (0.0893) (0.0892) (0.0892) (0.0969)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank -0.462*** -0.453*** -0.454*** -0.462*** -0.443***
(0.0948) (0.0976) (0.0989) (0.111) (0.117)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank -0.146** -0.178** -0.185** -0.199*** -0.177**
(0.0738) (0.0704) (0.0724) (0.0769) (0.0705)
4I(Small Bank) 0.0845* 0.0687 0.0614 0.0508 0.0784
(0.0488) (0.0504) (0.0516) (0.0557) (0.0645)
Observations 263,105 239,519 230,845 210,678 169,632
R-squared 0.178 0.178 0.177 0.175 0.174
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of new
fracking wells on the growth in originations of small business loans at different branches of the bank
network. Each of the regressions excludes branches in areas with horizontal or directional wells as well as
areas with drilling activity in the previous year. The first regression excludes branches within areas with
fracking activity (as defined by Hydrological Unit Codes). Regressions (2) to (5) exclude branches within
the corresponding distance from the boundary of an area with fracking activity. Each of the samples covers
the period form 2001 up to 2007.
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Table 6: Small Banks: Implied Changes in Aggregate Deposits and Loan Originations
Year Annual 4 Deposits Cumulative 4 Deposits Annual 4 Loan Originations
2001 $33,020 $33,020 $73,573
2002 $80,391 $113,411 $208,321
2003 $127,117 $240,528 $241,382
2004 $466,253 $706,781 $962,551
2005 $1,272,668 $1,979,449 $2,499,601
2006 $159,252 $2,138,701 $370,304
2007 $441,304 $2,580,005 $823,608
Notes: The table lists implied increase in deposits for small banks exposed
to new fracking wells. These are calculated by multiplying the coefficient
from Table 4 regression (2) with the amount of exposure for each bank and
with the total bank deposit for the previous year. The same calculation is
used for the last column using the coefficient from Table 5 regression (3)
and the amount of originations in the previous year. The second column list
cumulative increases in deposits.
Table 7: Small Bank Comparison: Fracking vs Non-fracking exposure
No Exposure, within 100mi Positive Exposure
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Average Total Assets (aTA) 1764 777975 (1585136) 310 995670 (1951839)
RE Loans / aTA 1764 0.4701 (0.1796) 310 0.4391 (0.1627)
Commercial Loans / aTA 1764 0.0917 (0.0871) 310 0.1098 (0.0804)
Consumer Loans / aTA 1764 0.0542 (0.0763) 310 0.0621 (0.0725)
Total Loans / aTA 1764 0.6330 (0.1798) 310 0.6390 (0.1693)
Loan Loss Allowance / aTA 1764 0.0086 (0.0050) 310 0.0080 (0.0034)
Total Investments / aTA 1764 0.2889 (0.1789) 310 0.2757 (0.1694)
Other Real Estate / aTA 1764 0.0014 (0.0027) 310 0.0014 (0.0033)
Total Deposits / aTA 1764 0.7944 (0.1123) 310 0.8036 (0.1063)
FHLB Advances / aTA 1764 0.0671 (0.0871) 310 0.0573 (0.0838)
Common and Pref Stock / aTA 1764 0.0959 (0.0389) 310 0.0949 (0.0243)
ROE 1764 0.1394 (0.0977) 310 0.1380 (0.0745)
ROA 1764 0.0124 (0.0092) 310 0.0126 (0.0071)
aTA / aTE 1764 11.3271 (2.6917) 310 11.0927 (2.2635)
Total Operating Income / aTA 1764 0.0712 (0.0241) 310 0.0732 (0.0209)
Profit Margin 1760 0.1873 (0.2002) 307 0.1857 (0.0756)
Operating Expense / aTA 1764 0.0537 (0.0202) 310 0.0562 (0.0205)
Interest Expense / aTA 1764 0.0215 (0.0091) 310 0.0200 (0.0090)
Non-interest Expense / aTA 1764 0.0294 (0.0143) 310 0.0337 (0.0179)
Provision for Loan Loss / aTA 1764 0.0028 (0.0061) 310 0.0025 (0.0032)
Non-interest Income / aTA 1764 0.0117 (0.0182) 310 0.0145 (0.0185)
Interest Spread Earned 1764 0.0384 (0.0131) 310 0.0392 (0.0088)
Loan Charge-offs / Total Loans 1764 0.0043 (0.0080) 310 0.0040 (0.0051)
90+ Past Dues Loans / Total Loans 1764 0.0019 (0.0039) 310 0.0013 (0.0016)
Non-accruing Loans / Total Loans 1764 0.0073 (0.0089) 310 0.0064 (0.0070)
Notes: The table lists asset composition and performance statistics for small banks with
no exposure to fracking which are located within 100 miles of fracking areas and for small
banks with positive exposure. Information is calculated from Call Reports.
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Table 8: Summary Statistics – Top Decile of Residential Real Estate Appreciation
Banks with less than 30 branches
No Exposure Positive Exposure
Exp 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep Exp 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep
2001 0 0.212 0.143 0.733 0.227 0.139
2002 0 0.005 0.120 0.752 0.023 0.130
2003 0 0.058 0.131 0.691 0.073 0.160
2004 0 -0.027 0.082 0.661 -0.024 0.194
2005 0 0.009 0.129 0.623 -0.092 0.236
Banks with more than 30 branches
No Exposure Positive Exposure
Exp 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep Exp 4 lnSBL 4 lnDep
2001 0 0.112 0.106 0.417 0.221 0.094
2002 0 0.036 0.084 0.489 0.067 0.097
2003 0 0.030 0.095 0.337 0.065 0.087
2004 0 -0.066 0.077 0.368 -0.016 0.097
2005 0 -0.021 0.101 0.310 -0.008 0.141
Notes: The table lists averages for exposure to real estate boom, the
average small business origination growth, and the average deposit
growth across banks with no exposure and banks with positive ex-
posure, and across size. Exposure here is defined as the fraction of
branches in the areas where average quarterly appreciation of resi-
dential real estate is in the top decile for the U.S..
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Table 9: Balance Sheet Effects of Real Estate Shocks
Booming Zones Median Branch
Dependent Variables C&D C&D RE C&D C&D RE
/TA +Unused/TA +Unused/TA /TA +Unused/TA +Unused/TA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Small Bank 0.00477** 0.00676** 0.0103**
(0.00186) (0.00302) (0.00519)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Big Bank 0.0166*** 0.0236*** 0.00506
(0.00533) (0.00660) (0.0123)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Small Bank 0.351*** 0.574*** 0.462**
(0.0997) (0.144) (0.198)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Big Bank 0.309* 0.412** 0.130
(0.172) (0.207) (0.298)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 0.00110 0.00106 -0.000957 0.00115 0.00159 0.00131
(0.00298) (0.00428) (0.00762) (0.00297) (0.00422) (0.00694)
Deposits/Assetst−1 -0.0369*** -0.0380* 0.0742* -0.0443*** -0.0469** 0.0535
(0.0141) (0.0207) (0.0385) (0.0141) (0.0208) (0.0367)
Cost of Depositst−1 -0.967 -1.205 -1.753 -0.913 -1.086 -1.458
(0.664) (0.931) (1.668) (0.656) (0.918) (1.595)
Securities/Assetst−1 -0.0721*** -0.102*** -0.188*** -0.0733*** -0.103*** -0.201***
(0.0131) (0.0190) (0.0358) (0.0133) (0.0192) (0.0343)
C&I/Assetst−1 -0.00603 -0.0436 -0.222*** -0.00443 -0.0413 -0.228***
(0.0224) (0.0322) (0.0554) (0.0224) (0.0321) (0.0564)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 -0.0492*** -0.0724*** 0.0586 -0.0484*** -0.0713*** 0.0562
(0.0157) (0.0236) (0.0406) (0.0155) (0.0231) (0.0404)
Tier1 Capital/Assetst−1 0.0542 0.0276 -0.0739 0.0634 0.0462 -0.0471
(0.0439) (0.0839) (0.116) (0.0434) (0.0849) (0.115)
Net Income/Assetst−1 0.0533 0.199 -0.108 0.0505 0.185 0.0144
(0.158) (0.212) (0.413) (0.156) (0.211) (0.384)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 0.000126 6.12e-05 0.00230*** 7.89e-05 2.46e-05 0.00220***
(0.000336) (0.000717) (0.000756) (0.000340) (0.000719) (0.000748)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank 0.000864 0.000834 0.00439 0.000375 0.000138 0.00383
(0.00258) (0.00408) (0.00685) (0.00256) (0.00403) (0.00694)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank -0.00133 -0.00339 -0.0189 -0.00245 -0.00476 -0.0200
(0.00465) (0.00674) (0.0158) (0.00459) (0.00661) (0.0156)
4I(Small Bank) -0.000794 -0.000718 -0.00530 -0.00300 -0.00498 -0.0120
(0.00314) (0.00443) (0.00892) (0.00338) (0.00456) (0.00859)
Observations 5,550 5,550 5,550 5,500 5,500 5,500
R-squared 0.939 0.943 0.945 0.939 0.944 0.946
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides the coefficient estimates for the impact real estate booms on the
bank balance sheet. The first three regressions use fraction of the bank network in areas with real estate price appreciations
in the top decile as a measure of exposure to the real estate booms, while the last three use the appreciation at the median
bank branch as a measure of exposure. The dependent variables are construction and development loans as a fraction of assets,
construction and development loans + unused commitments as a fraction of assets, and loans secured by real estate + unused
commitments as a fraction of assets . Sample covers 2001 to 2005.
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Table 10: The Effect of the Fraction of Network in Top Decile on Small Business
Lending
Dependent Variable 4 ln Small Business Lending
No Branches No Branches No Branches No Branches No Branches
in Top 90th within 24mi within 30mi within 50mi within 100mi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Small Bank -0.335** -0.659** -1.111*** -1.267*** -1.322**
(0.169) (0.296) (0.311) (0.452) (0.596)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Big Bank -0.369* -0.587** -0.599** -0.645* -0.785**
(0.201) (0.291) (0.304) (0.346) (0.369)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 0.101 0.134 0.142 0.161 0.166
(0.117) (0.122) (0.125) (0.129) (0.135)
Deposits/Assetst−1 0.0720 0.231 0.243 0.340 0.417
(0.421) (0.448) (0.448) (0.460) (0.481)
Cost of Depositst−1 13.73 6.687 5.660 4.010 1.418
(13.81) (13.95) (13.86) (13.85) (14.06)
Securities/Assetst−1 0.104 0.0892 0.120 0.189 0.218
(0.344) (0.356) (0.362) (0.377) (0.398)
Tier1 Capital/Assetst−1 0.269 0.405 0.625 0.854 1.472
(2.210) (2.218) (2.232) (2.292) (2.346)
C&I/Assetst−1 -0.115 -0.157 -0.225 -0.284 -0.532
(0.574) (0.615) (0.625) (0.657) (0.701)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 0.785** 0.856*** 0.858*** 1.017*** 0.994***
(0.337) (0.330) (0.329) (0.338) (0.336)
Net Income/Assetst−1 1.734 1.649 1.360 1.178 1.067
(5.151) (5.208) (5.213) (5.195) (5.207)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 -0.0426 -0.0428 -0.0451 -0.0431 -0.0403
(0.0411) (0.0403) (0.0406) (0.0396) (0.0378)
Is Part of Multi-BHC? 0.0858 0.0638 0.0811 -0.0658 -0.0252
(0.128) (0.127) (0.130) (0.123) (0.135)
Is Part of Single-BHC? -0.0236 -0.0631 -0.0449 -0.189* -0.144
(0.110) (0.108) (0.111) (0.101) (0.116)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank -0.501*** -0.496*** -0.496*** -0.463*** -0.459***
(0.0912) (0.0962) (0.0981) (0.0988) (0.102)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank -0.0390 -0.0378 -0.0377 -0.0342 -0.0405
(0.106) (0.109) (0.111) (0.113) (0.122)
4I(Small Bank) 0.0974 0.0909 0.0919 0.0775 0.0770
(0.0686) (0.0719) (0.0733) (0.0756) (0.0789)
Observations 177,429 165,300 161,574 154,177 143,735
R-squared 0.204 0.211 0.212 0.215 0.216
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of real estate
booms, measured by the fraction of the network in areas with real estate appreciation in the top 90th on small
business originations. The first regression excludes branches within areas with residential booms. Regressions (2)
to (5) exclude branches within the corresponding distance from the boundary of an area with residential booms.
Sample covers the period between 2001 and 2005.
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Table 11: Fraction in Top Decile: Implied Changes in C&D Loans and Loan Origi-
nations
Year 4 C&D + Unused Cumul. 4 C&D + Unused 4 Loan Originations
Small Banks
2001 $66,242 $66,242 -$357,869
2002 $72,182 $138,423 -$363,224
2003 $74,438 $212,862 -$409,630
2004 $75,784 $288,646 -$478,427
2005 $65,901 $354,547 -$616,593
Big Banks
2001 $715,235 $715,235 -$3,180,941
2002 $835,756 $1,550,990 -$3,746,167
2003 $601,135 $2,152,125 -$3,400,864
2004 $790,590 $2,942,715 -$3,408,468
2005 $1,000,050 $3,942,765 -$3,958,372
Notes: The table lists implied increase in C&D loans plus commitments
for small and big banks with branches in the top decile areas. These are
calculated by multiplying the respective coefficients from Table 9, (2) with
the amount of exposure for each bank and with the total C&D loans plus
commitments. The same calculation is used for the last column using the
respective coefficients from Table 10, (3) and the amount of originations in
the previous year. The second column list cumulative increases in C&D loans
plus commitments.
Table 12: Small Bank Comparison: Fraction in Top Decile
No Exposure No Exposure, within 100mi Positive Exposure
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Average Total Assets (aTA) 3651 623196 (564411) 551 663599 (625700) 317 1290240 (1136938)
RE Loans / aTA 3651 0.4952 (0.1547) 551 0.5095 (0.1508) 317 0.5082 (0.1874)
Commercial Loans / aTA 3651 0.0933 (0.0732) 551 0.0817 (0.0810) 317 0.0972 (0.0752)
Consumer Loans / aTA 3651 0.0554 (0.0685) 551 0.0434 (0.0560) 317 0.0430 (0.0660)
Total Loans / aTA 3651 0.6643 (0.1497) 551 0.6478 (0.1376) 317 0.6674 (0.1584)
Loan Loss Allowance / aTA 3651 0.0086 (0.0037) 551 0.0087 (0.0037) 317 0.0088 (0.0040)
Total Investments / aTA 3651 0.2580 (0.1473) 551 0.2721 (0.1336) 317 0.2588 (0.1562)
Other Real Estate / aTA 3651 0.0013 (0.0027) 551 0.0006 (0.0018) 317 0.0008 (0.0017)
Total Deposits / aTA 3651 0.7909 (0.1003) 551 0.7797 (0.1108) 317 0.7734 (0.1033)
FHLB Advances / aTA 3651 0.0698 (0.0802) 551 0.0762 (0.0800) 317 0.0745 (0.0844)
Common and Pref Stock / aTA 3651 0.0951 (0.0269) 551 0.0965 (0.0284) 317 0.0944 (0.0285)
ROE 3650 0.1363 (0.0664) 551 0.1241 (0.0673) 317 0.1337 (0.0614)
ROA 3651 0.0123 (0.0057) 551 0.0114 (0.0067) 317 0.0120 (0.0052)
aTA / aTE 3650 11.1854 (2.4113) 551 11.0966 (2.5272) 317 11.3610 (2.6480)
Total Operating Income / aTA 3651 0.0692 (0.0178) 551 0.0682 (0.0159) 317 0.0703 (0.0165)
Profit Margin 3650 0.1826 (0.1499) 551 0.1694 (0.0612) 317 0.1799 (0.0696)
Operating Expense / aTA 3651 0.0518 (0.0157) 551 0.0513 (0.0127) 317 0.0523 (0.0160)
Interest Expense / aTA 3651 0.0207 (0.0089) 551 0.0216 (0.0095) 317 0.0207 (0.0100)
Non-interest Expense / aTA 3651 0.0288 (0.0127) 551 0.0279 (0.0093) 317 0.0298 (0.0138)
Provision for Loan Loss / aTA 3651 0.0023 (0.0031) 551 0.0018 (0.0028) 317 0.0018 (0.0026)
Non-interest Income / aTA 3651 0.0107 (0.0141) 551 0.0091 (0.0120) 317 0.0111 (0.0133)
Interest Spread Earned 3650 0.0387 (0.0081) 551 0.0389 (0.0074) 317 0.0389 (0.0089)
Loan Charge-offs / Total Loans 3654 0.0031 (0.0041) 553 0.0025 (0.0040) 317 0.0025 (0.0032)
90+ Past Dues Loans / Total Loans 3654 0.0016 (0.0026) 553 0.0011 (0.0020) 317 0.0011 (0.0019)
Non-accruing Loans / Total Loans 3654 0.0058 (0.0058) 553 0.0045 (0.0042) 317 0.0054 (0.0050)
Notes: The table lists asset composition and performance statistics for small banks with no exposure to top decile, with
no exposure to top decile and within 100 miles of top decile areas, and with positive exposure. Information is from Call
Reports.
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Table 13: The Effect of Appreciation at the Median Branch on Small Business Lending
Dependent Variable 4 ln Small Business Lending
Exclude Above Exclude Above Median Exclude Above Median
Median Branches Branches & Top 95th in US Branches & Top 90th in US
(1) (2) (3)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Small Bank -8.703** -9.741** -8.182**
(3.548) (3.817) (4.068)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Big Bank -4.651* -4.810* -4.709*
(2.615) (2.634) (2.637)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 0.166 0.166 0.162
(0.107) (0.108) (0.109)
Deposits/Assetst−1 0.462 0.475 0.453
(0.487) (0.490) (0.498)
Cost of Depositst−1 29.13* 29.83* 28.02*
(15.32) (15.66) (16.03)
Securities/Assetst−1 0.240 0.222 0.216
(0.385) (0.391) (0.404)
Tier1 Capital/Assetst−1 -0.196 -0.448 0.0545
(2.771) (2.833) (2.941)
C&I/Assetst−1 0.958 0.934 0.848
(0.637) (0.643) (0.661)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 0.909** 0.913** 0.916**
(0.429) (0.431) (0.442)
Net Income/Assetst−1 0.195 0.162 0.538
(5.673) (5.700) (5.737)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 -0.329 -0.327 -0.311
(0.230) (0.231) (0.231)
Is Part of Multi-BHC? -0.157 -0.104 0.0674
(0.267) (0.254) (0.282)
Is Part of Single-BHC? -0.258 -0.202 -0.0421
(0.252) (0.237) (0.264)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank -0.540** -0.536** -0.459**
(0.218) (0.222) (0.219)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank 0.135 0.133 0.135
(0.0999) (0.101) (0.100)
4I(Small Bank) 0.0831 0.0760 0.0756
(0.0753) (0.0781) (0.0788)
Observations 88,974 87,717 85,669
R-squared 0.259 0.258 0.259
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of real estate booms,
measured by appreciation at the median branch, on small business originations. The first regression uses the entire
sample, the second two exclude areas in the top 95th percentile of real estate appreciation, and the third excludes areas
in the top 90th percentile. Indicator for below median branch includes the median. Sample covers the period between
2001 and 2005.
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Table 14: Median Appreciation: Implied Changes in C&D Loans and Loan Origina-
tions
Year 4 C&D + Unused Cumul. 4 C&D + Unused 4 Loan Originations
Small Banks
2001 $246,061 $246,061 -$1,258,601
2002 $242,442 $488,503 -$2,374,454
2003 $315,262 $803,765 -$1,275,108
2004 $630,044 $1,433,809 -$3,562,762
2005 $629,559 $2,063,369 -$2,181,094
Big Banks
2001 $1,276,315 $1,276,316 -$2,875,137
2002 $1,191,743 $1,437,804 -$3,303,070
2003 $1,313,159 $1,801,662 -$4,025,190
2004 $2,259,089 $3,062,854 -$6,121,165
2005 $3,180,749 $4,614,559 -$5,855,837
Notes: The table lists implied increase in C&D loans plus commitments for
small and big banks with exposure defined by median appreciation. For more
information refer to Table 11.
Table 15: Small Bank Comparison: Median Appreciation
Median Appreciation ≤ 1.4% Median Appreciation > 1.4%
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Average Total Assets (aTA) 762 659819 (572621) 746 945033 (877517)
RE Loans / aTA 762 0.4957 (0.1402) 746 0.5252 (0.1688)
Commercial Loans / aTA 762 0.0996 (0.0672) 746 0.0888 (0.0678)
Consumer Loans / aTA 762 0.0593 (0.0515) 746 0.0475 (0.0659)
Total Loans / aTA 762 0.6792 (0.1254) 746 0.6824 (0.1386)
Loan Loss Allowance / aTA 762 0.0087 (0.0034) 746 0.0088 (0.0039)
Total Investments / aTA 762 0.2382 (0.1249) 746 0.2396 (0.1343)
Other Real Estate / aTA 762 0.0019 (0.0029) 746 0.0010 (0.0021)
Total Deposits / aTA 762 0.7841 (0.0919) 746 0.7792 (0.0979)
FHLB Advances / aTA 762 0.0821 (0.0832) 746 0.0806 (0.0865)
Common and Pref Stock / aTA 762 0.0943 (0.0229) 746 0.0940 (0.0267)
ROE 762 0.1293 (0.0612) 746 0.1334 (0.0659)
ROA 762 0.0117 (0.0051) 746 0.0121 (0.0066)
aTA / aTE 762 11.1510 (2.2262) 746 11.2998 (2.3240)
Total Operating Income / aTA 762 0.0723 (0.0137) 746 0.0698 (0.0189)
Profit Margin 762 0.1766 (0.2918) 746 0.1763 (0.0649)
Operating Expense / aTA 762 0.0561 (0.0128) 746 0.0518 (0.0157)
Interest Expense / aTA 762 0.0224 (0.0089) 746 0.0198 (0.0093)
Non-interest Expense / aTA 762 0.0309 (0.0097) 746 0.0301 (0.0132)
Provision for Loan Loss / aTA 762 0.0028 (0.0029) 746 0.0019 (0.0029)
Non-interest Income / aTA 762 0.0119 (0.0083) 746 0.0114 (0.0154)
Interest Spread Earned 762 0.0396 (0.0081) 746 0.0398 (0.0084)
Loan Charge-offs / Total Loans 762 0.0041 (0.0043) 746 0.0025 (0.0043)
90+ Past Dues Loans / Total Loans 762 0.0020 (0.0029) 746 0.0012 (0.0021)
Non-accruing Loans / Total Loans 762 0.0075 (0.0059) 746 0.0053 (0.0053)
Notes: The table lists asset composition and performance statistics for small banks with
median appreciation ≤ 1.4% and with median appreciation > 1.4%. Information is from
Call Reports.
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Table 16: Real Effects of Fracking Shock
Dependent Variable 4 ln Total Establishments in Zip Code
No Zip Code No Zip Codes No Zip Codes No Zip Codes No Zip Codes
in Fracking within 24mi within 30mi within 50mi within 100mi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Area Average Bank Exposure to New Wells, Small Banks 0.000908* 0.00231*** 0.00239*** 0.00327** 0.00460**
(0.000502) (0.000716) (0.000813) (0.00156) (0.00219)
Area Average Bank Exposure to New Wells, Big Banks -0.000305 -9.27e-05 5.79e-05 -0.000192 -0.000225
(0.000411) (0.000430) (0.000448) (0.000601) (0.00179)
Observations 1,198,465 1,095,673 1,059,251 968,891 759,595
R-squared 0.188 0.192 0.193 0.197 0.208
Zip x Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Industry Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of zip code exposure to banks
with branches in fracking areas. Each of the regressions excludes zip codes in areas with horizontal or directional wells as well
as areas with drilling activity in the previous year. The first regression excludes zip code within areas with fracking activity
(as defined by Hydrological Unit Codes). Regressions (2) to (5) exclude zip codes within the corresponding distance from the
boundary of an area with fracking activity. Each of the samples covers the period form 2001 up to 2007.
Table 17: Zip Codes Statistics: Exposure to Small Banks Exposed to Fracking
Zip Exposure to Small=0 Zip Exposure to Small>0
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Share Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting 6206 2% (5%) 2758 1% (5%)
Share Mining 6206 1% (4%) 2758 1% (3%)
Share Utilities 6206 1% (3%) 2758 1% (3%)
Share Construction 6206 15% (10%) 2758 12% (8%)
Share Manufacturing 6206 6% (5%) 2758 6% (5%)
Share Wholesale Trade 6206 6% (5%) 2758 6% (5%)
Share Retail Trade 6206 16% (7%) 2758 15% (6%)
Share Transportation and Warehousing 6206 5% (6%) 2758 4% (4%)
Share Information 6206 2% (2%) 2758 2% (2%)
Share Finance and Insurance 6206 5% (4%) 2758 6% (3%)
Share Real Estate Rental and Leasing 6206 4% (4%) 2758 5% (3%)
Share Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 6206 8% (6%) 2758 9% (7%)
Share Management of Companies 6206 1% (1%) 2758 1% (1%)
Share Administrative 6206 5% (4%) 2758 5% (3%)
Share Educational Services 6206 1% (2%) 2758 1% (1%)
Share Health Care and Social Assistance 6206 9% (6%) 2758 9% (6%)
Share Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 6206 2% (3%) 2758 2% (3%)
Share Accommodation and Food Services 6206 9% (6%) 2758 9% (6%)
Share Other Services 6206 12% (6%) 2758 11% (5%)
Share Public Administration 6206 0% (1%) 2758 0% (1%)
Population 6141 13209 (15516) 2724 18546 (17580)
Median Age 6141 37 (5) 2724 35 (6)
Median Income 6141 40173 (14568) 2724 43146 (16166)
Income Per Capita 6141 18734 (6909) 2724 20241 (7953)
Poverty Percentage 6140 15% (10%) 2724 15% (11%)
Urban 6140 46% (43%) 2724 63% (41%)
Fraction with Bachelor’s Degree 6140 11% (7%) 2724 13% (8%)
Notes: The table lists shares of establishments by industry and key population statistics for two
categories of zip codes: those serviced by small banks with positive fracking exposure and those
serviced by small banks with no exposure and within 100 miles. The population information is
from the 2000 U.S. Census and the industrial composition is from the County Business Patterns.
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Table 18: Real Effects of Fraction of Branches in the Top Decile
Dependent Variable 4 ln Total Establishments in Zip Code
No Zip Code No Zip Codes No Zip Codes No Zip Codes No Zip Codes
in 90th within 24mi within 30mi within 50mi within 100mi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Area Average Banks in 90th, Small Banks -0.0167*** -0.0131** -0.0127** -0.0162** -0.0155**
(0.00548) (0.00611) (0.00640) (0.00704) (0.00751)
Area Average Banks in 90th, Big Banks -0.00422 -0.00859 -0.00748 -0.00600 -0.00676
(0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0141)
Observations 959,198 912,749 898,049 863,821 802,821
R-squared 0.210 0.211 0.211 0.213 0.218
Zip x Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Industry Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of zip code exposure
to banks with branches in areas with residential booms (90th percentile of appreciation). Each of the regressions
excludes zip codes in areas with horizontal or directional wells as well as areas with drilling activity in the previous
year. The first regression excludes zip code within areas with residential booms. Regressions (2) to (5) exclude
zip codes within the corresponding distance from the boundary of an area with a residential boom. Each of the
samples covers the period form 2001 up to 2005.
Table 19: Zip Codes Statistics: Exposure to Small Banks with Branches in the Top
Decile
Zip Exposure to Small=0 Zip Exposure to Small>0
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Share Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting 3743 3% (6%) 11150 2% (4%)
Share Mining 3743 1% (3%) 11150 1% (2%)
Share Utilities 3743 1% (3%) 11150 1% (2%)
Share Construction 3743 17% (11%) 11150 15% (10%)
Share Manufacturing 3743 6% (7%) 11150 5% (5%)
Share Wholesale Trade 3743 6% (5%) 11150 5% (4%)
Share Retail Trade 3743 16% (8%) 11150 15% (7%)
Share Transportation and Warehousing 3743 6% (6%) 11150 5% (6%)
Share Information 3743 2% (3%) 11150 2% (2%)
Share Finance and Insurance 3743 5% (4%) 11150 5% (3%)
Share Real Estate Rental and Leasing 3743 4% (4%) 11150 4% (3%)
Share Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 3743 8% (6%) 11150 9% (6%)
Share Management of Companies 3743 1% (1%) 11150 1% (1%)
Share Administrative 3743 6% (5%) 11150 6% (4%)
Share Educational Services 3743 1% (3%) 11150 1% (2%)
Share Health Care and Social Assistance 3743 8% (6%) 11150 9% (6%)
Share Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 3743 3% (4%) 11150 2% (3%)
Share Accommodation and Food Services 3743 9% (8%) 11150 9% (6%)
Share Other Services 3743 12% (7%) 11150 12% (6%)
Share Public Administration 3743 0% (1%) 11150 0% (1%)
Population 3605 8518 (11043) 10915 14599 (16095)
Median Age 3605 38 (6) 10915 38 (5)
Median Income 3605 40526 (15804) 10915 45508 (18412)
Income Per Capita 3605 19656 (8021) 10915 22296 (10344)
Poverty Percentage 3595 15% (11%) 10894 13% (10%)
Urban 3600 36% (41%) 10906 56% (43%)
Fraction with Bachelor’s Degree 3600 11% (7%) 10902 14% (8%)
Notes: The table lists shares of establishments by industry and key population statistics for two
categories of zip codes: those serviced by small banks with positive exposure to top deciles and those
serviced by small banks with no exposure and within 100 miles. The population information is from
the 2000 U.S. Census and the industrial composition is from the County Business Patterns.
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Table 20: Real Effects of Median Branches
Dependent Variables 4 ln Total Establishments in ZIP Area
All Exclude Exclude 50 mi Exclude 100 mi
Areas Top 90th from Top 90th from Top 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Area Fraction of Below Median Branches, Small Banks -0.00340*** -0.00277** -0.00286** -0.00263*
(0.00125) (0.00132) (0.00137) (0.00141)
Area Fraction of Below Median Branches, Big Banks -0.000251 -0.000219 -0.000617 -0.000792
(0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00161) (0.00169)
Observations 1,108,536 943,633 829,916 771,159
R-squared 0.208 0.216 0.220 0.224
Zip x Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Industry x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Industry Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of zip code exposure
to at-or-below median branches. Estimation (1) includes all zip codes and estimation (2) excludes zip code with
residential appreciation in the top decile. Estimations (3) and (4) exclude zip codes 50 and 100 miles from areas
with residential appreciation in the top decile. Sample include year between 2001 and 2005.
Table 21: Zip Codes Statistics: Exposure to Small Banks with Below-median
Branches
<50% of Branches Below Median >50% of Branches Below Median
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Share Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting 72578 2% (5%) 31633 2% (4%)
Share Mining 72578 1% (3%) 31633 1% (4%)
Share Utilities 72578 1% (3%) 31633 1% (3%)
Share Construction 72578 15% (10%) 31633 14% (9%)
Share Manufacturing 72578 6% (6%) 31633 6% (5%)
Share Wholesale Trade 72578 6% (6%) 31633 6% (6%)
Share Retail Trade 72578 16% (8%) 31633 16% (7%)
Share Transportation and Warehousing 72578 5% (6%) 31633 5% (6%)
Share Information 72578 2% (2%) 31633 2% (2%)
Share Finance and Insurance 72578 5% (4%) 31633 5% (4%)
Share Real Estate Rental and Leasing 72578 4% (3%) 31633 4% (3%)
Share Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 72578 8% (6%) 31633 8% (6%)
Share Management of Companies 72578 1% (1%) 31633 1% (1%)
Share Administrative 72578 5% (4%) 31633 5% (4%)
Share Educational Services 72578 1% (2%) 31633 1% (2%)
Share Health Care and Social Assistance 72578 8% (6%) 31633 8% (6%)
Share Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 72578 2% (3%) 31633 2% (3%)
Share Accommodation and Food Services 72578 9% (6%) 31633 9% (6%)
Share Other Services 72578 12% (6%) 31633 12% (6%)
Share Public Administration 72578 0% (1%) 31633 0% (1%)
Population 71337 12333 (14404) 31176 12750 (14640)
Median Age 71337 37 (5) 31176 37 (5)
Median Income 71337 42664 (17164) 31176 40783 (15082)
Income Per Capita 71337 20623 (9137) 31176 19815 (8088)
Poverty Percentage 71200 14% (11%) 31144 14% (11%)
Urban 71270 48% (44%) 31162 47% (43%)
Fraction with Bachelor’s Degree 71247 12% (8%) 31154 12% (8%)
Notes: The table lists shares of establishments by industry and key population statistics for two categories of zip
codes: those serviced by less than 50% below-median branches of small banks and those serviced by more than 50%.
The population information is from the 2000 U.S. Census and the industrial composition is from the County Business
Patterns.
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Table 22: Small Business Lending: Asset-based Bank Groups
Dependent Variables 4 ln Small Business Lending
No Branches No Branches No Branches
30mi to Fracking 30mi to Top 90th Above Median
Avg. New Wells × (Assets≤ $1.1 billion) 0.0619***
(0.0199)
Avg. New Wells × (Assets> $1.1 billion) 0.00227
(0.00498)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × (Assets≤ $1.1 billion) -1.707***
(0.449)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × (Assets> $1.1 billion) -0.672**
(0.304)
Appreciation at Median Branch × (Assets≤ $1.1 billion) -9.166***
(3.463)
Appreciation at Median Branch × (Assets> $1.1 billion) -4.943*
(2.646)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 -0.0478 0.144 0.167
(0.0477) (0.123) (0.109)
Deposits/Assetst−1 -0.155 0.0454 0.475
(0.288) (0.440) (0.491)
Cost of Depositst−1 5.552 14.17 30.85*
(9.640) (14.64) (15.75)
Securities/Assetst−1 0.255 -0.139 0.227
(0.229) (0.357) (0.392)
Tier1 Capital/Assetst−1 -0.996 1.086 -0.601
(1.336) (2.427) (2.829)
C&I/Assetst−1 0.255 -0.0642 0.955
(0.372) (0.626) (0.643)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 0.927*** 0.837** 0.921**
(0.331) (0.337) (0.432)
Net Income/Assetst−1 0.115 1.508 0.182
(4.681) (6.082) (5.697)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 0.0465 -0.0801 -0.323
(0.0293) (0.0731) (0.232)
Is Part of Multi-BHC? -0.00375 0.0775 -0.113
(0.0877) (0.146) (0.251)
Is Part of Single-BHC? 0.0307 -0.0466 -0.210
(0.0892) (0.124) (0.235)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank -0.453*** -0.466*** -0.540**
(0.0988) (0.106) (0.222)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank -0.185** -0.0520 0.130
(0.0724) (0.0927) (0.101)
4I(Small Bank) 0.0623 0.105 0.0370
(0.0516) (0.0731) (0.0769)
Observations 230,845 156,166 87,717
R-squared 0.177 0.217 0.258
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of
each of the shocks on the originations. Bank groups are defined based on asset sizes. For variable
definitions and sample restrictions refer to the notes for the baseline results.
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Table 23: The Extensive Margin of Small Business Lending
Dependent Variables 4 ln Number of Small Business Originations
No Branches No Branches No Branches
30mi to Fracking 30mi to Top 90th Above Median
Avg. New Wells × Small Bank 0.00315
(0.0247)
Avg. New Wells × Big Bank -0.00132
(0.00804)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Small Bank -0.888***
(0.324)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Big Bank -0.639
(0.549)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Small Bank -7.255
(4.426)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Big Bank -2.590
(3.572)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 -0.193** -0.0222 0.128
(0.0789) (0.126) (0.142)
Deposits/Assetst−1 0.0749 0.00580 0.831
(0.473) (0.621) (0.895)
Cost of Depositst−1 3.240 -27.29 15.97
(20.30) (39.08) (36.24)
Securities/Assetst−1 -0.0423 -0.660 -0.713
(0.297) (0.616) (0.683)
Tier1 Capital/Assetst−1 -2.102 -5.022** -6.285**
(1.582) (2.496) (2.637)
C&I/Assetst−1 0.844 -0.424 1.015
(0.803) (0.886) (1.160)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 0.933 0.569 0.651
(0.623) (0.585) (0.826)
Net Income/Assetst−1 -6.555 -5.981 -6.403
(6.378) (6.478) (6.704)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 0.0934 0.0316 0.182
(0.0587) (0.0441) (0.285)
Is Part of Multi-BHC? 0.0662 -0.0514 -0.216
(0.110) (0.141) (0.311)
Is Part of Single-BHC? 0.106 -0.152 -0.281
(0.107) (0.137) (0.308)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank -0.378*** -0.470*** -0.397*
(0.144) (0.0845) (0.205)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank 0.0264 0.295 0.451
(0.162) (0.336) (0.293)
4I(Small Bank) 0.157* 0.241 0.287**
(0.0811) (0.158) (0.143)
Observations 230,845 161,574 88,974
R-squared 0.213 0.264 0.320
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of
each of the shocks on the number of originations. For variable definitions and sample restrictions
refer to the notes for the baseline results.
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Table 24: Interactions between Fracking and Residential Booms
Dependent Variables 4 ln Small Business Lending
No Branches No Branches No Branches
in Fracking or 90th in Fracking or 90th in Fracking or 90th
(1) (2) (3)
Avg. New Wells × Small Bank 0.0433** 0.0436**
(0.0201) (0.0197)
Avg. New Wells × Big Bank 0.0204 0.0206
(0.0204) (0.0207)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Small Bank -0.332* -0.337*
(0.178) (0.178)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Big Bank -0.360* -0.360*
(0.193) (0.191)
Bank Controls
ln Assetst−1 0.0209 0.0300 0.0287
(0.0988) (0.0998) (0.0994)
Deposits/Assetst−1 -0.0914 -0.0962 -0.102
(0.385) (0.385) (0.386)
Cost of Depositst−1 19.53 21.20 20.93
(14.64) (15.13) (14.99)
Securities/Assetst−1 0.234 0.197 0.200
(0.362) (0.357) (0.356)
Tier1 Capital/Assetst−1 -1.118 -1.245 -1.207
(2.190) (2.198) (2.187)
C&I/Assetst−1 0.126 0.174 0.204
(0.554) (0.554) (0.560)
Mortgages/Assetst−1 0.729** 0.648* 0.652*
(0.358) (0.348) (0.345)
Net Income/Assetst−1 1.815 1.683 1.525
(5.487) (5.493) (5.497)
Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1 -0.00776 -0.0143 -0.0132
(0.0202) (0.0219) (0.0215)
Is Part of Multi-BHC? 0.0942 0.0945 0.0922
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129)
Is Part of Single-BHC? 0.0219 0.0248 0.0230
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
4 TotalBranches × Small Bank -0.480*** -0.485*** -0.484***
(0.0948) (0.0955) (0.0955)
4 TotalBranches × Big Bank -0.156 -0.151 -0.154
(0.0959) (0.0940) (0.0951)
4I(Small Bank) 0.0620 0.0615 0.0581
(0.0708) (0.0713) (0.0719)
Observations 132,576 132,585 132,576
R-squared 0.210 0.210 0.210
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for the impact of
fracking controlling for fraction of branches in areas with residential appreciation in the top decile.
The sample covers 2001 to 2005. It excludes branches close to fracking and branches in areas with
residential booms.
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Table 25: Network Selection, Headquarter Effect, Distance to Borrower
Dependent Variables 4 ln Small Business Lending
Old Branches Headquarter Effect Distance to Borrower
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Avg. New Wells × Small Bank 0.0431** 0.0466*** 0.0348*
(0.0186) (0.0158) (0.0204)
Avg. New Wells × Big Bank 0.00261 0.00188 0.000837
(0.00543) (0.00510) (0.00505)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Small Bank -1.055*** -1.022**
(0.317) (0.431)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Big Bank -0.599** -0.425*
(0.305) (0.245)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Small Bank -8.515** -6.311*
(3.430) (3.439)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Big Bank -4.054 -2.451
(2.523) (2.598)
Avg. New Wells × Small Bank × Is HQ? -0.0510*
(0.0308)
Avg. New Wells × Big Bank × Is HQ? -0.00165
(0.0109)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Small Bank × Is HQ? -0.917**
(0.431)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Big Bank × Is HQ? 0.0476
(0.252)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Small Bank × Is HQ? 1.081
(1.341)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Big Bank × Is HQ? -0.107
(1.731)
Avg. New Wells × Small Bank × ln(1+Dist) 0.0305
(0.0260)
Avg. New Wells × Big Bank × ln(1+Dist) 0.00803
(0.0259)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Small Bank × ln(1+Dist) -0.315
(0.868)
Fraction of Branches in Top 90th × Big Bank × ln(1+Dist) -0.682
(0.506)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Small Bank × ln(1+Dist) -9.921***
(2.993)
Appreciation at Median Branch × Big Bank × ln(1+Dist) -9.536***
(3.187)
Observations 210,644 230,845 161,574 92,435 230,845 161,574 92,435
R-squared 0.175 0.177 0.213 0.257 0.177 0.213 0.259
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table provides coefficient estimates for specifications that extend the baseline models.
Specifications (1) and (4) allow the main effects to differ at the headquarter and according to the distance to between the branch and
the borrower, for the case of fracking. Estimations (2) and (5), and (3) and (6) do this for the case of fraction of branches in the top
decile and appreciation at the median branch.
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Figure 1: Changes in Number of Horizontal Wells between 2001 and 2007
68
Figure 2: Average Annual Growth of HPI between 2001 and 2005
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Figure 3: Coefficient Plot of Exposure to Fracking and Branch Distribution, Small Banks
70
-2
.
5
-
2
-
1
.
5
-
1
-
.
5
0
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
B
r
a
n
c
h
e
s
 
i
n
 
9
0
t
h
 
C
o
e
f
fi
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
S
m
a
l
l
 
B
a
n
k
s
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Branch Distance to Residential Booms (miles)
-
1
.
5
-
1
-
.
5
0
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
B
r
a
n
c
h
e
s
 
i
n
 
9
0
t
h
 
C
o
e
f
fi
c
i
e
n
t
,
 
B
i
g
 
B
a
n
k
s
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Branch Distance to Residential Booms (miles)
Figure 4: Coefficient Plot of the Effect of Fraction of Branches in Areas with Residential Booms, Small and Big Banks
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Figure 5: Area Exposure to Small Banks with Branches in Fracking Areas, 2004
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Figure 6: Distance of Zip Code from Fracking Areas, 2004
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Figure 7: Coefficient of Area Exposure to Small Banks with Branches in Fracking Areas
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Appendix
A1 - Data Appendix
CRA Census Tract Lending
Each bank that falls under the CRA reporting criteria is required to submit to the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) detailed information
on each of the new small business loans it has originated between January 1st and
December 31st of each year. A small business loan is defined as either a commer-
cial and industrial (C&I) loan or a loan secured by nonresidential real estate with
amount of less than $1 million. The bank is to disclose for each loan the location
of the borrower (census tract) and the amount of the loan that has been extended.
This detailed information is processed by the FFIEC and after extensive review for
accuracy is released to the public. To preserve the privacy of the customers of each
bank the public information aggregates the total gross originations into three cate-
gories – less than $100,000, between $100,000 and $250,000, and between $250,000
and $1,000,000. Only the totals within each category are reported. Additionally, the
bank reports total originations to firms with revenue below $1,000,000. This study
uses all of the small business loan originations by adding the total amounts originated
in each of the subcategories listed above. The geographical information is aggregated
to the county level where separate totals are reported for the metropolitan and the
non-metropolitan area of the county (if applicable). Within the MSA-county and the
nonMSA-county areas further distinction is made between the origination amounts
extended across different income level areas (based on the census tract income level).
Since each bank is required to report the census tracts and the income level at each
census tract where at least one new loan was extended I am able to decrease the level
of aggregation in the public disclosures. This information allows me to eliminate the
census tracts where no loans are originated. The total origination amounts for a given
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MSA-county or nonMSA-county across different income levels are distributed equally
to all of the census tracts according to the particular income level. If there’s only one
census tract with a particular income level within the county area this census tract
gets the precise amount of originations.
Branch Locations
The second source of data for this paper comes from the Summary of Deposits in-
formation maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). FDIC
provides a list of addresses of all active physical branches of all commercial banks
and thrifts that are in operation in a given year. For example, the 2000 file includes
85,493 branches of all banks in operation29. Of the 85,493 locations about 86% have
the precise branch GPS coordinates while the remaining 14% only list an address. The
branches with missing coordinates were geo-coded separately for each year based on
the US address30. Consequently, each of the bank branches in operation for the period
between 2000 and 2009 was associated with a particular GPS-coordinate location31.
Matching Bank Networks Over the Sample Period
The final step in the creation of the dataset has to do with the associations of bank
networks over time. It is customary in this literature to use a method called force-
merging that will account for mergers and acquisitions of banks over the years. This
method merges the balance sheet of two or more banks in the year before the merger
occurs and thus maintain the relative size of the assets and liabilities between the
two years. This paper deviates from this practice. In what is described above, I have
assumed that a given client of a bank receives a loan from the closest super-branch of
that bank. To use the force-merging method I will have to assume that the client of
29This number excludes ATM locations.
30This was done with the geo-coding service SmartyStreets.
31Some of the addresses are not very accurate and this is reflected in the precision of the GPS
coordinates.
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a bank can choose to go to a super-branch of the actual bank that has extended the
loan or to a super-branch of the bank that merges with the first bank in the following
period. This is obviously inconsistent. The method that this paper uses instead is
to match the spatial distribution of a bank network at two different points in time.
The nodes of a network of a bank in one year are matched with only those nodes
that exist in the following year in the same location and belong to the same bank.
The dataset, therefore, only includes observations for networks that report under the
CRA for at least two consecutive years and at least one node of the network is in the
same location between the two years.
Aggregation of Census Tracts to ZIP Code Areas
The CRA information is provided at the census tract level while the CBP information
on the number of establishments is provided at the USPS ZIP code level. The census
tracts are slightly smaller than the ZIP areas so I aggregate the CRA information
to the ZIP code level. To do this I overlay the ZIP areas over the census tracts and
compute the percentage of the area of each ZIP area that is comprised of each census
tract that overlaps with the ZIP area. Average exposure is converted from the census
tract level to the ZIP level using percentage of total area as a weight.
A2 - Model
Each bank, i, has multiple branches, indexed by j. Assuming that each bank has
one branch per credit market, j can also refer to the credit market where the branch
is located. The total number of branches if i are Ni. I assume that the bank is a
monopolist and at each branch, ij, it can:
• Lend to one small business an amount of Lij with a marginal return rLj + rLi −
αLLij,
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• Lend to one land developer an amount of Kij with a marginal return rKj + rKi −
αKKij,
• Collect up to Dij in deposits at no cost.
The marginal returns to each of the loans has a local component, indexed by j, and a
bank component, indexed by i. The bank can also borrow funds from the inter-bank
market of amount Bi at a marginal cost of α
i
BBi.
There are two periods, t and t + 1. After period t the bank experiences three
different branch-specific shocks to:
• The return of the business loan such that the return becomes rLj +rLi −αLLij+ηij,
• The return of the real estate loan such that the return becomes rKj + rKi −
αKKij + κij,
• The deposits such that the branch can collect Dij + δij.
In the first period the bank chooses Ltij and K
t
ij at each branch to maximize profits
subject to its budget constraint:
max
{Ltij},{Ktij}
Πti =
∑
j
LtijR
L
ij(L
t
ij) +K
t
ijR
K
ij (K
t
ij)−BtiRBi (Bti) (1.13)
s.t.
∑
j
Ltij +
∑
j
Ktij =
∑
j
Dtij +B
t
i (1.14)
where RLij(L
t
ij), R
K
ij (K
t
ij) is the interest charged on the two loans and R
B
i (B
t
i) is the
interest paid on external borrowing. There are two sets of FOCs for each loan type.
They require that at the optimal allocation the return to each loan at each branch is
equalized to the marginal cost of bank borrowing. Plugging in the budget constrain
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in the FOCs, I get:
αLL
t
ij + α
i
B
∑
j
Ltij + α
i
B
∑
j
Ktij = r
L
j + r
L
i + α
i
B
∑
j
Dtij (1.15)
αKL
t
ij + α
i
B
∑
j
Ktij + α
i
B
∑
j
Ltij = r
K
j + r
K
i + α
i
B
∑
j
Dtij (1.16)
To solve for the optimal allocation, I express the conditions in matrix, using block-
matrix notation: G αiBJNiJ ′Ni
αiBJNiJ
′
Ni
G˜

Lti
Kti
 =
RLj
RKj
+
rLi JNi
rKi JNi
+
(αiB∑j Dtij)JNi
(αiB
∑
j D
t
ij)JNi
 (1.17)
where Lti and K
t
i are (Ni × 1) vectors that include the respective lending at each
branch. RLj and R
K
j similarly are (Ni× 1) vectors which include the location compo-
nent of the marginal return. JNi is a (Ni × 1) vector of ones. Finally, G and G˜ are
(Ni×Ni) symmetric matrices with αIB entries off the main diagonal. G has (αL+αiB)
on the main diagonal and G˜ has (αK + α
i
B).
To solution for Lti and K
t
i is:
Lti
Kti
 =
 G αiBJJ ′
αiBJJ
′ G˜

−1
RLj
RKj
+
rLi J
rKi J
+
(αiB∑j Dtij)J
(αiB
∑
j D
t
ij)J

 (1.18)
where I have abbreviated JNi with J . This expression fully characterizes the optimal
lending at each of the branches during period t. At the end of period t, the bank
observes the shocks to the return of each of the loans and the deposits and maximizes
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profits by allocating funds to each of the loan types. I get:
Lt+1i
Kt+1i
 =
 G αiBJJ ′
αiBJJ
′ G˜

−1
RLj
RKj
+
η
κ
+
rLi J
rKi J
+
(αiB∑j Dtij + δij)J
(αiB
∑
j D
t
ij + δij)J


(1.19)
where η and κ are (Ni × 1) vectors that include the branch-specific shocks to the
marginal return to both loans and δij are the shocks to the deposits. Taking the
difference, I get:
4Li
4Ki
 =
 G αiBJJ ′
αiBJJ
′ G˜

−1
η
κ
+
(αiB∑j δij)J
(αiB
∑
j δij)J

 (1.20)
To find an expression for small business lending, Ltij, at each branch, I need to
invert the block matrix on the left hand side. I do this by using the formula for an
inverse of a block matrix:
 G αiBJJ ′
αiBJJ
′ G˜

−1
=
 (G− (αiB)2JJ ′G˜−1JJ ′)−1 −αBG−1JJ ′(G˜− (αiB)2JJ ′G−1JJ ′)−1
−αBG˜−1JJ ′(G− (αiB)2JJ ′G˜−1JJ ′)−1 (G˜− (αiB)2JJ ′G−1JJ ′)−1

I focus only on the matrices in the first row since I am interested in characterizing
the optimal small business lending at each branch.
I use extensively the guess and verify method for finding the inverse of matrices
that have one term on the main diagonal and a different term off the diagonal. In par-
ticular, I make a guess that the inverse takes the same form – one term on the main
diagonal and one term off the diagonal – and use the restrictions from GG−1 = I
to find what the two terms in the inverse are. Using this method, one can show
that G−1 is a symmetric matrix with
(
1
αL
− αiB
αL(αL+Niα
i
B)
)
on the main diagonal and(
− αiB
αL(αL+Niα
i
B)
)
off the main diagonal. Similarly, G˜−1 is a symmetric matrix with
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(
1
αK
− αiB
αK(αK+Niα
i
B)
)
on the main diagonal and
(
− αiB
αK(αK+Niα
i
B)
)
off the main diago-
nal. I use the expressions for G−1 and G˜−1 and the guess and verify method to find
that:
(G− (αiB)2JJ ′G˜−1JJ ′)−1 = (a− b)INi + bJJ ′ (1.21)
−αBG−1JJ ′(G˜− (αiB)2JJ ′G−1JJ ′)−1 = a˜JJ ′ (1.22)
where:
a =
1
αL
(
NiαKα
i
B +NiαLα
i
B + αK(αL − αiB)
NiαKαiB +NiαLα
i
B + αKαL
)
(1.23)
b = − αKα
i
B
αL(NiαKαiB +NiαLα
i
B + αKαL)
(1.24)
a˜ = − α
i
B
(NiαKαiB +NiαLα
i
B + αKαL)
(1.25)
I order to make the solution more tractable, I assume that αiB = γ/Ni. This allows
me to express each of the three parameters as:
a =
1
αL
γαK + γαL + αK(αL − γ/Ni)
φ
(1.26)
b = − 1
Ni
γαK
φ
(1.27)
a˜ = − 1
Ni
γ
φ
(1.28)
where γαK + γαL + αKαL = φ. The first parameter is positive while the last two are
negative. Finally, I can use the parameters to provide the explicit solution for 4Lij:
4Lij = aηij − γαK
φ
1
Ni
∑
j
ηij − γ
φ
1
Ni
∑
j
κij +
γ
αL
γαL + αKαL
φ
1
Ni
∑
j
δij (1.29)
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where j refers to the set of branches outside of j. Re-writing we get:
4Lij = aηij − b1 1
Ni
∑
j
ηij − b2 1
Ni
∑
j
κij + b3
1
Ni
∑
j
δij (1.30)
where:
a =
1
αL
γαK + γαL + αK(αL − γ/Ni)
φ
(1.31)
b1 =
γαK
φ
(1.32)
b2 =
γ
φ
(1.33)
b3 =
γ
αL
γαL + αKαL
φ
(1.34)
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Chapter 2
Does It Matter Where You Came
From? Ancestry Composition and
Economic Performance of US
Counties, 1850 - 2010
2.1 Introduction
Over its history, the United States of America has absorbed more immigrants than
all other nations combined [17]. Unlike most countries composed largely of the de-
scendants of immigrants, such as Australia or Argentina, the United States absorbed
immigrants in significant numbers from a wide variety of countries [37, pp. 24-25].
These immigrants came to the United States from different parts of the world with
diverse histories and cultures. Some were brought against their will as slaves; others
decided to come for economic reasons, or seeking religious or political freedom. Once
here, the immigrants and their descendents had to negotiate economic, cultural, and
institutional relationships with other groups who were there before them or settled
after them.
The United States thus provides a unique laboratory for understanding how the
cultural, institutional, and human capital endowments brought by immigrants from
their country of origin and passed on to their offspring shape economic outcomes.
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To understand the importance and role of different groups, we build two unique
new data sets. First, we create the geographical country-of-ancestry distribution
for the United States from 1850 to 2010. Using micro samples from the census and
building iteratively from previous censuses, we construct the fraction of every county’s
population that is descended from ancestors who migrated from a particular country
or region.1 Crucially, we produce a stock measure of ancestry, not of the flow of
recent immigrants, and so we can consider the lasting legacy of immigrant groups and
their descendents beyond the first generation. Our measure is highly correlated with
ethnic mappings based on questions from recent censuses, but unlike such subjective
questions, our mapping goes back in time and does not change based on the prevailing
cultural attitudes towards ethnicity.
Second, we construct a measure of county-level GDP per capita that is consis-
tently measured over the entire period and includes services. While manufacturing
and agricultural output have been available at the county level, such measures miss
the large and growing service sector, and so undervalue urban areas and miss the
important and changing role played by the transportation, distribution, and financial
sectors.
Using this novel county-level panel data set, we investigate whether changes in
the composition of ancestral origin matter for local economic development, and the
channels through which the history of the country of origin affects current outcomes
in US counties. It always a challenge to cleanly identify the effects of institutions,
culture, or other social factors on economic development because such factors typi-
cally evolve endogenously. This is particularly true when only a single cross-section
is available, since it is then impossible to fully control for the unobservable character-
1Since after 1940 the data are reported only for groups of counties, we aggregate the data some-
what to maintain consistency over the entire time period and use such groups as the unit of analysis.
We continue to use “county” for short. There are 1154 such county groups as opposed to 3143
counties. Our county groupings approximately correspond to 1980 Public Use Microdata Areas
(PUMAs), as defined by the census. See Appendix 2.6 for details.
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istics of a place. The clear advantage of our approach is that, by creating a long and
consistently measured panel, we can remove the fixed effect of a place, and so we can
examine unambiguously whether and how what people bring with them is related to
economic development. Moreover, a panel allows us to address possible endogeneity
issues due to ancestry specific movements in response to economic shocks.
We start by documenting that the country-of-origin composition of a county is
significantly associated with county GDP, even after controlling for unobservable
time-invariant county-level effects, state-period effects, county specific trends, race,
population density, and county education. The estimated effects of individual ances-
tries are highly correlated with summary measures of economic development of the
country of ancestry, both today and in the past. Whatever qualities make some coun-
tries more productive are correlated with the impact the descendants of immigrants
from those countries have in the US. Since immigrants necessarily leave the geogra-
phy of their home country behind, these qualities might include their culture, their
institutional experience, or the human capital they brought with them and pass on to
their children. The estimated ancestry effects are positively correlated with measures
of culture such as trust in others and thrift, and negatively with the importance given
to obedience in children, as measured in recent surveys. They are positively corre-
lated as well with measures of state centralization in 1500 [74], although we find little
evidence that political participation at the time of migration has an impact. The an-
cestry effects are also positively associated with the human capital that immigrants
brought with them.
These general conclusions also hold in more parsimonious representations of the re-
lationship between ancestry and local economic development. For each of the variables
capturing the endowment immigrants brought with them, we construct a weighted
average value for each county using the fraction of people from each country of ances-
try as weights. Changes in ancestry-weighted measures of the culture, institutions,
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and human capital are all significantly related to changes in county GDP per capita.
Combining measures, our results suggest that ancestry-weighted cultural attitudes
towards cooperation are those more strongly and robustly associated with local de-
velopment.2 These results do not necessarily show that other endowments are not
relevant, but that attitudes towards cooperation appear to be more important at the
local level.3
Many of theses results are reversed when we do not control for fixed county dif-
ferences, which illustrates the importance of having a panel. This reversal reflects
the fact that over the broad sweep of US history, people from high-income countries
settled both in urban and rural areas while later migrants from poorer countries went
predominantly to cities. For example, the English are disproportionally present in
rural areas in the poor South and Appalachian states, while the Italians and Irish
settled and stayed in metropolitan areas, especially in the Northeast.
While these results establish that the endowment that people bring with them
matters, they do not show the mechanism behind the association. There are two
reasons why changes in ancestry and economic development could be related. The
first is that as people move they bring a set of attributes with them which they then
pass on to their children and these attributes affect the economic performance of a
county. The second is that groups with specific attributes are more willing to move to
a county with given characteristics. If these characteristics are time invariant, then
we already control for them by including fixed effects in our estimation. However, it
could also be that ancestries with certain endowments may be more willing to move
2Where we have historical data that is comparable over time, such as for country-of-origin GDP
and and human capital, we are careful to associate to each group of immigrants the historical
characteristics of the country of origin at the time of emigration. Moreover, in some specifications
we allow for the importance of the ancestral characteristics to decay over time to reflect the changes
that occur during the process of social and economic integration in the US.
3For example, immigrants’ experience of political institutions in the country of origin may matter
at the state or federal level. Furthermore, cultural attitudes, such as trust, may impact development
both directly and indirectly through their effect on the functioning of local institutions and the choice
of growth enhancing public goods such as education. In addition, cultural attitudes themselves may
be the results of the development of historical institutions in the country of origin [82].
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in response to economic shocks. For example, more trusting groups may be more
willing to move to a new area or away from family following the opening up of new
economic opportunities.
To make progress understanding the mechanism through which changes in an-
cestry may affect economic development, one needs to isolate variation in ancestry
that is not caused by contemporary shocks to economic output. To do so we move
to a dynamic model of county per capita GDP to recognize that the effects of an-
cestry are likely to be distributed over time and to remove serial correlation from
the residuals. When the residuals are not auto-correlated, the past distribution of
ancestries, possibly augmented by their growth at the national level, is not related to
county level contemporary shocks to GDP and can be used as an instrument for the
ancestry composition today. Given the centrality of the assumption of the nature of
the residuals, it is essential to test for serial correlation in the estimating equation.4
We pursue an identification strategy based on this idea, both by instrumenting
our ancestry-weighted endowment variables in dynamic models with fixed county
effects and also by relying on GMM approaches to deal with endogeneity issues in
short dynamic panels [59, 14] both in a single and bivariate equation context. Our
results suggest that the evolution of ancestry composition has a significant effect on
county per capita GDP. Moreover, while there is evidence that shocks to county GDP
help to predict ancestry composition, the effect is quantitatively small. Instead, it
appears that the dominant mechanism is for changes in ancestry to have large effects
on economic development that peak after two to three decades, and are long lasting.
The rich time pattern of the effect of ancestry composition reinforces the value of
having a panel at our disposal.
Finally, we provide evidence that suggests that the groups immigrants and their
4Our approach builds on the strategy used in the immigration literature (see, for instance, Card
[32], Cortes [35], and Peri [72]), but with greater attention paid to the serial correlation properties
of the residuals, mostly overlooked in this literature. See section 2.5.5 for a full discussion.
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descendents encounter matter as well. Fractionalization, a measure of the diversity
of ancestries, is positively associated with local development, whereas cultural frac-
tionalization is negatively associated with it. Increases in the diversity of origin are
good for growth as long as the overall cultural attitudes are similar.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we review the related
literature. In Section 3, we describe how we build up the stock measure of ancestry
by county from 1850 to 2010 based on census micro-samples. We also discuss the
evolution of the distribution of the stock of ancestry by county for major immigrant
groups. In Section 4, we outline the construction of GDP per capita at the county
level. More details on the construction of our ancestry mapping and our measure
of county GDP is contained in detailed data appendices. Section 5 contains the
econometric results, while Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
Our results provide novel evidence on the fundamental and recurring question of
whether the US acts as a “melting pot,” quickly absorbing new immigrant groups, or
whether immigrant groups maintain distinct identities in at least some dimensions.5
The significance of our measure of ancestry in explaining local economic develop-
ment provides further evidence against a pure assimilationist view and in favor of
approaches that emphasize the persistence, at least in part, of cultural, institutional,
or human capital traits across generations. If immigrants were quickly and fully in-
tegrated and homogenized into the United States, then it would be very difficult to
make sense of the importance of the ancestry composition of a county, especially with
5Following the seminal contribution by Glazer and Moynihan [51], many authors have argued
that the view of the immigration experience as a process of quick assimilation into the US society
is inadequate. For a review of the theoretical contributions see Bisin and Verdier [23]. For recent
empirical evidence on the persistence of cultural traits beyond the first generation see Borjas [27],
Antecol [13], Giuliano [49], Ferna´ndez [42], Fogli and Ferna´ndez [44], and Giavazzi, Petkov, and
Schiantarelli [48]. On whether immigrants assimilate as individuals or communities, see Hatton and
Leigh [56].
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regard to groups that arrived long ago.
Our work is closely related to the growing literature on the importance of history
for contemporary economic development, as well as studies on migration and its con-
sequences. Recent work has emphasized the importance of institutions and culture
in shaping economic outcomes over the long run.6 As we have argued, there are seri-
ous challenges in identifying the causal effects of culture or institutions on economic
outcomes since they are likely to be co-determined.7 The availability of panel data is
a distinguishing feature of our work since it allows us to better distinguish the char-
acteristics of a place from the attributes of the people who live there and to address
the potential endogeneity of ancestry composition in a dynamic context.
Our paper is also related to the rich literature on the effect of migration on eco-
nomic outcomes in the United States, as well as work examining the determinants and
importance of ethnicity and ethnic diversity.8 Since ethnicity in the United States
6See the comprehensive review by Spolaore and Wacziarg [79] of the evidence on the role of history
in economic development, on the fundamental causes of growth and on the relative importance of
institutions, culture, and human capital. On the importance of of the ancestral composition of
current populations see Spolaore and Wacziarg [78], Putterman and Weil [74], Comin, Easterly, and
Gong [34], and Ashraf and Galor [15]. On the importance of culture see Putnam, Leonardi, and
Nanetti [73], Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [53], Guiso, Zingales, and Sapienza [55], Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales [54], Nunn and Wantchekon [69], Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn [9] and the review by
Ferna´ndez [43]. On the role of institutions across countries see Knack and Keefer [61], Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson [3], Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [4], Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
[2], and Albouy [6]; see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou [64] for the role of institutions at the ethnic
level; and Banerjee and Iyer [16] and Dell [38] for the impact of within country institutions in the
past. For the relationship between culture, institutions and economic performance see Tabellini [81],
Tabellini [82], and the review by Alesina and Giuliano [8]. On human capital see Barro and Lee [19]
and Barro and Lee [20], Gennaioli et al. [47] and Glaeser et al. [50] on the relative role of human
capital versus other factors. A separate literature has argued for the importance of geography see
Diamond [40] and Bloom and Sachs [25].
7A recent literature has examined regions within many countries to help control for unobservable
country-specific effects. See, for instance, Tabellini [82] and Gennaioli et al. [47].
8The literature on the effect of immigration is very large. Goldin [52] and Hatton and Williamson
[57] provide evidence from the age of mass migration. On later migrations, see Borjas [28] for an
early review. See also Card [31], Altonji and Card [12], Card [32], Borjas [29], Ottaviano and Peri
[70], Ottaviano and Peri [71], and Peri [72]. On the relationship between ethnic diversity, on the
one hand, and outcomes such as growth, public goods provision, education, employment, political
participation, or conflict see Easterly and Levine [41] for cross country evidence; Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly [7] Cutler and Glaeser [36], and Alesina and La Ferrara [11] for evidence within the US;
and Miguel and Gugerty [65] for Kenya. Ashraf and Galor [15] focus on the relationship between
genetic diversity and economic development at the cross country level, while Alesina, Harnoss, and
Rapoport [10] present cross country evidence on the effect of birthplace diversity. Ager and Bru¨ckner
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generally reflects a belief about shared ancestry [90], ancestry and ethnicity are closely
related. The immigration literature typically focuses either on the characteristics and
outcomes for the flow of immigrants or on their effects on labor market outcomes of
the residents in the short term. Our focus is instead on the stock of ancestry and
whether the attributes that immigrants brought with them and may pass on to their
children affects outcomes for all residents.
In many ways, our work builds on Putterman and Weil [74] who show that not
accounting for the large population movements across countries since 1500 underval-
ues the importance of culture and institutions. Putterman and Weil [74] reconstruct
the shares of a given country’s ancestors today who came from other countries since
1500 and examine the importance of past history, as modified by migration flows,
on current outcomes. Taking into account these flows enhances the ability of mea-
sures of early technological or institutional development to explain present outcomes.
They conclude that in the cross-section of countries today what matters is not only
the characteristics of the country, but also the characteristics of the populations that
inhabit it. Our work differs from Putterman and Weil [74] because of our focus on
local as opposed to country-level development, and for our use of panel data.
2.3 Ancestry in the United States
The variable at the center of our analysis is an Ancestry Vector (AV), which records
our estimate of the countries of origin of the ancestors of a given county’s population.
We build the AV based on census questions which ask every person the state or
country where she was born. From 1880 to 1970 the census also asked for the place of
birth of the person’s parents. We construct the AV iteratively using the more detailed
information that is available from the census, and starting as far back as possible. For
[5] examine the effect of first generation immigrant flows on fractionalization and polarization within
the US. Putterman and Weil [74] are the only ones that focus on diversity of attributes (as opposed
to ethnic diversity) in a cross country setting.
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first generation immigrants or their children, the ancestry is straightforward since we
know exactly where they came from. If the parents come from two different countries
or states, we assume that they contribute equally to the ancestry of their children.
For example, the child of German and Irish parents is half German, half Irish. If the
parents are born in the US, we assign the child the common ancestry vector among
20-30 years olds in the child’s birth year in the state of birth of the parents. The
AV for each period therefore depends on the AV in the past, since internal migrants
bring their ancestry with them when they move from state to state and pass it on to
their children. Accumulating this information over time for a geographic area, the AV
gives, in expectation, the fraction of the people in a given area whose ancestors come
from a given country. Therefore, the AV is not just the fraction of first generation
immigrants as in Ager and Bru¨ckner [5], but instead keeps track of the ancestry of
everyone, accounting for internal migration, age structure of the population, and local
variations in where people from different countries originally settled. We give details
for how we construct ancestry in the US in Appendix 2.6.
We can construct ancestry at the county level until 1940. Starting in 1950, the
census only reports data for somewhat larger county groups, whose definition changes
slightly over time. Because of this aggregation, our analysis centers on the 1154 county
groups that allows us to maintain a consistent geographical unit of analysis from 1850
to 2010. The Data Appendix provides additional details. We continue to use county
to refer to county groups, except where the specific number of groups is important.
Since both the contributions of African Americans and the legacy of slavery are
so central to understanding ancestry in the United States, our analysis includes race.
The census recorded racial characteristics since 1850. We allow for distinct ances-
tries within racial groups, and so recent Nigerian immigrants or immigrants from the
West Indies, for instance, are distinct from African Americans who are descendents
of former slaves. We emphasize that any finding we make regarding African Amer-
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icans cannot distinguish African culture and institutions from the brutal history of
slavery before the Civil War, and the cultural, economic, and political repression that
continued for more than a century following Reconstruction.
While nativity was a central concern in the early censuses, other distinctions
within country of origin, such as religion or regional origin within a country, were
not generally recorded. Therefore, we cannot distinguish sub-national groups, even
though the distinctions between them may be very important. For example, many
Russian migrants were Jewish, but since we cannot distinguish these migrants, all
Russians are recorded as a single group. Similarly, the census does not distinguish
among the African countries of origin of the slave population in 1850.
2.3.1 Ancestry in the US over space and time
There have been immense changes in the United States in overall ancestry and its
geographic distribution since 1850. Our ancestry measure is representative at the
county level and can be combined to give a representation of ancestry in the US as a
whole or any sub-region. Since any attempt to construct ancestry at a national level
that did not start with the micro-samples and did not keep track of the internal mi-
gration and local population growth would be deeply flawed, we believe our estimates
are the first consistent estimates of the stock of ancestry over time for the United
States at both the national and county level.
American ancestry has become increasingly diverse. Figure 1 illustrates this grow-
ing diversity by showing the shares of the groups that make up more than 0.5% of
the population for 1870, 1920, 1970 and 2010. The descendents of the original En-
glish settlers still made up more than half of the population in 1870, but 1870 is the
last decade that they were in the majority. African Americans represented a little
over 10% of the population. The Irish population had swelled from a recent wave
of migrants, and a large wave of new German immigrants had increased the already
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substantial German population from colonial migrations. Descendants of immigrants
from Scotland and the Netherlands made up most of the remaining population.
Successive waves of immigration, starting particularly in the 1870s, rapidly trans-
formed the ancestral makeup of the United States. Older ancestral groups were still
expanding, but not nearly as fast as the newer groups, and so, in a relative sense,
the older groups declined substantially. The share of descendants from England fell
continuously and rapidly until the 1920s when the borders were largely shut for a
generation. Similarly the share of African Americans fell, not because their overall
numbers declined, but because other groups entered. The new migrants were more
diverse than is commonly recognized, with large groups from southern Europe (partic-
ularly Italy), from eastern Europe (particularly Poland and Russia), from northern
and central Europe including the Austrians and Germans, and from Scandinavian
countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.
After 1920, immigration slowed substantially until the 1960s, and so changes
mostly represent internal differences in population growth and demographic struc-
ture. Starting in the 1960s, new groups from Mexico, Central America, and South
America started to arrive. Immigrants from Asia arrived as well. By 2010 the United
States had become much more diverse with substantial populations from countries in
Asia, Europe, Africa, and Central and South America. Of particular note, the share
of Irish ancestry in 2010 implies that there was more than three times the number of
people of Irish descent in the United States than in Ireland in 2010. Despite the rela-
tively small total migration from England, due to relatively rapid population growth
there are around the same number of people of English descent in the United States
as there are people in England.
Although the overall evolution of diversity of the United States is notable, its
geographic diversity is even more interesting. Figures 2 and 3 show the ancestry
shares across the United States for select groups in 1870, 1920, 1970 and 2010. Of
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course, it is possible to construct such maps for all groups in every decade, but some
groups are too small or too concentrated to appear on a map. We show six groups that
are historically important or that can be seen visually on a map: African Americans,
Germans, Irish, Scandinavians, Italians, and Mexicans. The maps tend to visually
emphasize large and sparsely populated areas, and therefore, miss the rich diversity
of the East Coast and its cities. We combine Norway and Sweden, whose inhabitants
settled distinct areas, in order to make the Scandinavian homeland more visible.
Groups tend to settle together and then slowly spread out. Internal migration has
continuously reshaped the ancestral geography of the United States. For example,
one can observe the German presence in New York, around Milwaukee and Pennsyl-
vania, and the subsequent spread to the entire Midwest and West, as well as the the
heavy German migration to Texas. The original settlement and diffusion of Scandi-
navian immigrants in the upper Midwest and West is also notable. The Irish, initially
concentrated in the cities of the Northeast, dispersed widely throughout the entire
US. Italians, who initially settled in New York and Boston, spread to the Northeast
but not far beyond, although they retain a presence in California, and a smaller one
around New Orleans. Curiously, in 1870 the Italians and Irish made up a large frac-
tion of some counties in the West which had very low populations, implying that
relatively small shifts in immigrants can produce large changes in an area’s ancestry
composition.
The Great Migration of African Americans from the South to the cities through-
out the country can be clearly seen by comparing 1920 in Figure 2 to 1970 in Figure
3, although since the maps do not depict cities well, the importance of the Great
Migration is less obvious. African Americans are still highly concentrated geographi-
cally, and have not experienced the slow diffusion that characterizes the descendants
of the Germans and Irish.
By construction, our Ancestry Vector (AV) is an attempt to measure something
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that could in principle be measured and known exactly: the fraction of the people
in a county who come from or are descended from people who came from a given
country of origin. While ancestry, as we define it, is objective, ethnicity and race are
generally considered social constructs [67]. The concept of ethnicity is continually
evolving as groups define themselves and are defined by other groups. Ethnicity not
only changes over time, but need not be the same concept across the country even at
a given time. The social construction of ethnicity does not make it any less powerful,
but is necessarily an endogenous measure, responding to circumstances, rather than
something than can explain other outcomes on its own.
Ancestry is not the same as ethnicity, although the two are clearly linked. In-
stead, we view ancestry as one of the inputs used to construct ethnicity. Indeed, in
the United States, it appears to be the primary input [90]. Our measure of ances-
try is highly correlated with self-reported ethnicity or ancestry in the 2000 census.
Across counties in 2000, the correlation between the fraction that say they are of
Irish ancestry in the census and the AV is 0.79; for Italians it is 0.91; for Germans
0.89; for Mexicans (who are often first generation) 0.98; for Norwegians 0.95; and for
Swedish 0.92 (combined, Swedish and Norwegian have a correlation of 0.96 with the
combined AV). For African-American the correlation is 0.99. English ethnicity is the
most complicated since there is no longer much self-identification of English ethnicity,
but when we include those who report themselves to be “American” the correlation
is 0.93.9
9 In the 2000 census, only 5.9% self-report an English ethnicity, while 7.2% give their ethnicity as
“American,” 19.1% do not report, and 1.4% report “White/Caucasian.” Combining all of these other
categories with the English and British self-reported ethnicities, there is a 0.93 correlation between
our measure of English in the AV and the ethnicities reported in the census. One interpretation
of this evidence, consistent with the constructivist approach to ethnicity, is that the dominant
ethnicity is English and so all other ethnicities are defined as different from English. Then many
whose ancestry is English do not think of themselves as having an ethnicity since they have the
dominant ethnicity.
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2.4 County GDP from 1850-2010
To understand the impact of ancestry on economic performance, we construct a
county-level measure of GDP per capita. Starting in 1950 measures of income per per-
son are available at a county level. Prior to 1950, however, the census only recorded
limited information on manufacturing and agriculture output at a county level. While
these measures may be useful for comparing rural counties, as in the study of national
banks from 1870-1900 in Fulford [45], they are inadequate for comparing urban areas
where many immigrants settled. The problem is that if some groups disproportionally
settled in urban areas where physical output measures systematically underestimate
output by ignoring services, then we will underestimate the contribution of these
groups. We therefore need to engage in county income accounting to recreate a mea-
sure of gross domestic product at a county level. To our knowledge this measure
is unique in including services as well as manufacturing and agriculture at a county
level. The full details for how we construct this measure of county-level GDP are in
appendix 2.6, but we describe it briefly below.
Using information on manufacturing inputs in each county, we construct the nom-
inal value added in manufacturing. The census recorded agricultural output at a
county level, but not intermediate inputs. We use historical aggregate statistics at
the national level on total output, intermediates and value added in agriculture to
obtain a measure of value added in agriculture at the county level, assuming that the
ratio of value added to total output in agriculture is the same in each county.
Services are the most difficult to value. We use the employment and occupation
information collected by the micro-samples from the census for each year to construct
employment by broad service category (trade, transportation and public utilities, fi-
nance, professional services, personal services, and government). We then calculate
nominal valued added per worker in each service category based on national accounts.
Our choice of the broad service categories is driven by the availability of value-added
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estimates that are comparable for long periods. We then multiply nominal value
added per worker at the national level by the county-level employment in each cate-
gory. This approach allows New York City, with a substantial service sector composed
of finance, to have a much higher income from services than a small rural county where
services might be mostly employed servants. Since we are using national value added,
however, a lawyer in New York City has the same value added as a lawyer in the
rural county. We follow the same procedure used for services to obtain value added in
mining and construction. Excluded from our measure is any value from the existing
housing stock, although new housing is captured through construction employment.
The census reports personal income at the county level starting in 1950, and no
longer reports manufacturing and agricultural output in the same way. Using the
overlap in 1950 between our measure of nominal GDP by county and income per
capita in each county from the census, we construct a ratio of GDP to income at a
county level. We apply this county-level ratio to the income series from 1960 to get an
estimate of GDP. Effectively, we use the growth rate of personal income at the county
level to approximate the growth rate of county-level GDP. We then calculate GDP for
the same county groups used in constructing the Ancestry Vector. Finally, we convert
nominal GDP to real GDP using the price deflator from Sutch [80]. In our analysis
we will always allow for common year effects which absorb any common changes such
as in national prices, but we include state-year effects in some specifications which
absorb any state-specific changes in the GDP deflator.
Our goal is for each decade to create a measure that correctly captures the relative
GDP per capita of different counties for the period of 1850-2010. Throughout this
analysis we include time effects to absorb overall temporal variation. Yet our measure
does surprisingly well at capturing aggregate changes. Figure 4 shows real GDP per
capita as constructed by Sutch [80], which includes services, and our measure of county
GDP summed over all counties and divided by population. Figure 4 suggests that our
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measure is a good approximation of the level of aggregate output and captures the
change over time. Part of the reason for this close relationship is that the construction
of the historical GDP at the national level relies on many of the same sources we
have used at the county level such as the national estimates of manufacturing and
agriculture output.
Figure 5 illustrates the importance of including services rather than simply using
the more readily available output numbers for manufacturing and agriculture. The
figure shows the share of value added using our measure for each industry. Even
in 1850, services represented around 20% of value added and its share grew rapidly.
Moreover, the value added from services tended to be highly concentrated. When we
map the share of services in the local economy the share is frequently above 70% for a
highly urban area, which can be surrounded by rural areas where the share is less than
30%. Figure 5 also shows that by 1950 our measure matches the sectoral shares in
the National Income and Product Accounts nearly exactly (and shows similar trends
before that).
2.5 Does ancestry matter and why?
Combining our measure of the ancestry makeup of each county with our measure of
county income, we ask whether ancestry matters for local economic development and
which attributes brought by the immigrants from the country of origin play an im-
portant role. What is crucial about this exercise is that, unlike most other studies of
ethnicity or ancestry, we have at our disposal a panel of consistent data. The availabil-
ity of panel data allows us to evaluate the association between ancestry composition
and economic development controlling for time invariant county characteristics. We
start by asking whether the evolution in ancestry composition is significantly related
to changes in county GDP. We then examine which characteristics of the country of
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origin help to explain this association, develop summary measures of the endowments
brought by immigrants from the country of origin, and assess their correlation with
local economic development.
Even after controlling for fixed county effects, there remains the potential for
endogeneity issues in assessing the effect of ancestry on development if people move
in response to economic shocks in addition to time-invariant county characteristics.
To address this concern, we propose an instrumental variable strategy based on the
past distribution of ancestries. The absence of auto-correlation in the error process
of the GDP equation is essential for this strategy to be justified and this motivates
the importance of allowing for a rich dynamic specification, and of testing for serial
correlation.
Throughout the analysis, we limit the sample to 1870-2010 for two reasons: (1)
the US Civil War (1861-1865) changed the economic landscape, making comparisons
between the pre-war and post-war period difficult; and (2) the iterative construction
means that in 1870 the ancestry vector is based on more decades of micro-sample
information.
2.5.1 Is ancestry composition associated with economic de-
velopment?
We begin by investigating whether ancestry is correlated with local economic devel-
opment in the context of a fairly unrestricted econometric model that allows the effect
of each ancestry to be captured by a different coefficient. Our Ancestry Vector (AV)
for a given county c and time t, is an estimate of the share of that place’s popula-
tion whose ancestors came from a particular country-of-origin ancestry a out of all
possible ancestries A. Denote these shares by piact and note that they sum to one in
each county by definition. In the text, we continue to use “county” for the county
groups that are our unit of analysis. We start with a series of estimates of the effect
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of ancestry on log county GDP per capita yct of the form:
yct = θc + λt +
A∑
a=1
αapi
a
ct + γXct + ct, (2.1)
which include county fixed effects θc and year effects, λt, and allow each ancestry to
have its own effect αa. Some specifications include additional controls Xct such as
population density to reflect time-varying urbanization rates, the lagged dependent
variable, and measures of education. In more general specifications we will also allow
for state-specific period effects λst, for county-specific trends, and for the lagged
dependent variable. We normalize the ancestry effects by setting the coefficient on
the English to zero.10 The remaining coefficients can then be interpreted as whether
replacing the English with that ancestry is associated with a change in GDP per
capita. Our basic question is whether, even after controlling for observables and
unobservables, the individual ancestry coefficients are different from zero.
The results of many variations of equation 2.1 are shown in Table 1. The first set
of regressions in columns 1 through 3 of Table 1 do not have variables other than the
fraction of each ancestry and different combinations of county, year, state effects, and
county trends. The table shows the F-statistic for the joint test that all αa are zero
(each ancestry matters equally for GDP). We also separately test the hypothesis that
all ancestries other than African American and Native American are zero to examine
whether the results are purely driven by race. Below each F-statistic we report its
p-value. They are all zero to more decimal places than can fit in the table.
Every form of the estimation, therefore, strongly rejects that ancestry does not
matter, in the sense of not being associated with economic development. All estimates
include county fixed effects, so the fixed characteristics of the place of settlement is
controlled for. We can also ask whether regional trends—which might reflect evolv-
10Since very small ancestries cannot be precisely estimated, we include only the ancestries that
make up at least 0.5% of the population in 2010, which accounts for 93% of the population.
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ing factors, such as industrial structure, that may be related both to county GDP
and ancestry composition—may affect our answer. However, the inclusion of state-
specific period effects or county-specific trends leaves the significance of the ancestry
composition intact. Our conclusion that ancestry matters is also robust to the adding
county GDP in the previous period yc,t−1 as a regressor. One might be concerned that
ancestry matters only because it reacts to current shocks, yet ancestry matters even
when we include it only at a decade lag. We will address this issue more at length in
Section 4.5. The last several columns also include other possible explanatory variables
such as population density and county-level education (measured first by literacy and
then, after 1940, by average years of education). These variables represent potential
channels why ancestry may be related with economic development. For example,
some groups may tend to put more emphasis on education than others. Similarly, an
increase in density may reflect a higher level of urbanization of the county, resulting
in a differential attraction for different immigrant groups. The ancestry coefficients
continue to be significant even after including these controls, and so ancestry matters
beyond its relationship to education or urbanization.
2.5.2 Why is the association significant? Correlating the an-
cestry coefficients with country-of-origin characteris-
tics.
We next examine whether the coefficients on the ancestry shares are related to char-
acteristics of the country of origin. We divide the analysis into four broad categories:
past economic development, institutions, social capital or culture, and human capital.
Together with geography, these categories are the fundamental drivers of economic
growth that have been proposed in the literature. Geography of the country of origin
is necessarily left behind when migrating, and so can only express itself indirectly
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through what immigrants bring with them. The main limiting factor in the analysis
is the availability of information for a broad range of countries over different time
periods. Unlike our data on ancestry and county GDP, which we have carefully con-
structed based on micro data to be consistent across time and space, the cross-country
data, particularly in the distant past, is not always available or reliable.
Immigrants arrived at different times and we would like to capture what immi-
grants brought with them by the conditions in their country of origin at the time of
immigration. Doing so requires knowledge of the conditional density of immigration
over time so that, for example, the Irish coming in the 1850s reflect a different expe-
rience than the Irish in the 1890s, both of whom are different from the Italians in the
1910s. Our ancestry measure captures very well the stock of people whose ancestors
came from a country of origin. Since it is a stock, however, changes in it reflect
both increases from migration (external and internal), and also natural changes from
births and deaths. We therefore turn to immigration records that contain the number
of migrants arriving from different countries starting in the 1820s [39] at a national
level. Before that, we create an approximate density of arrival times for the stock
of migrants based on Daniels [37]. The full procedure is described in Appendix 2.6.
With a density of arrival times, we can construct country-of-origin measures that are
weighted by the time of arrival. For example, we calculate the difference between log
GDP per capita in the country of origin and log GDP in the US at the time of arrival
(yaτ − yUSτ ). For a given ancestry, the arrival weighted log GDP is then:
y˜at =
t∑
τ=0
(yaτ − yUSτ )(1− δ)t−τF at (τ) (2.2)
where F at (τ) is the arrival density of group a up to time τ , which is is 0 for τ > t,
and δ is the rate of depreciation of the importance of origin GDP. Of course, this
procedure is only possible if we observe country-of-origin measures that change over
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time. For arrival-weighted variables we consider the endowment of the country of
origin relative to its value in the United States on arrival. We use the relative value
because, for example, we want to take into account that the original English settlers
came from a country that was poorer in real terms in the 1700s than the countries of
some of later immigrants, but the English were much closer to the production frontier
at the time.
The ancestry effects appear to be closely related to economic conditions in the
country of origin as measured by GDP per capita in 1870, or historical GDP weighted
by the arrival density in Figure 6. The relationship between the ancestry effect and
measures of country-of-origin GDP is positive both for the mainly European ancestries
that were important sources of immigration flows before 1924 (see Figure 1) and for
all large ancestry groups.11 We think of GDP in the country of origin as a summary
measure of all of the cultural, institutional, and human capital elements that lead to
economic success at a given time. Migrants from an origin where these elements are
present may have brought whatever mix is important for success with them.
However, we want to go beyond GDP of the country of origin as a synthetic
measure of the endowment brought by immigrants to the US. In the bottom row
of Figure 6 we plot the relationship between the ancestry coefficients and different
measures of institutions at the national level. For institutions we use state history
from Putterman and Weil [74] and the difference in political participation from the
United States, weighted by time of arrival, using the measures of historical political
participation created by Vanhanen [88].12 State history reflects how long a particular
state has had centralized government in 1500 and shows a strong positive association
11The slope coefficients are estimated using Weighted Least Squares to down-weight the ancestries
that are less precisely estimated. We use analytic weights defined as the inverse of the estimated
standard deviation for each ancestry coefficient. The relationship is similar using other measures
of country-of-origin GDP including GDP in 2010 and by allowing some degree of depreciation of
arrival GDP.
12Our choice of institutional variables is largely driven by availability. Measures of executive
constraints from Polity IV do not have coverage for key countries going far enough back. The
version produced by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2] only covers select European countries.
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with the ancestry coefficients. Political participation is only positive for the mainly
European ancestries before 1924. Political participation, however, may not reflect the
differing experiences of immigrants. Political participation was low for most countries
with large migrations before 1924, and the institutional experience of Italian peasants
from its south might have been very different from the Swedish immigrants, even if
neither group could vote. Moreover, while country-of-origin institutions may affect
the design and functioning of federal or state institutions, which we control for in the
regression through time and county fixed effects, national institutions in the country
of origin may be a poor proxy for the ability to develop local institutions and make
them work effectively.
Immigrants also brought with them a set of cultural attributes from the mother
country that can affect their ability to function productively in the area where they
settle. If those attributes are passed down, at least in part, to their descendents,
this would contribute to explaining the significance of the ancestry vector. We focus
on those values and beliefs that facilitate cooperation, which are often referred to as
“social capital” and have been at the center of previous investigations [55, 82]. To
measure cultural attributes we use the World Value Survey which asks a representative
sample of respondents in numerous countries a wide variety of questions about their
attitudes and beliefs. Optimally, we would want a measure of the culture at the time
of departure, but these surveys are available for a large number of countries only
starting in the 1980s or 1990s. For recent surveys to tell us anything about past
culture, one needs to assume that the relative ranking of countries in more recent
decades captures, albeit imperfectly, their relative position in earlier times. This
would be true, for example, if some cultural attitudes are fixed or very slow changing,
or if they responded to common factors that made them move at a similar pace in
different countries. Moreover, one may also want to allow for county-of-origin regional
differences in cultural attitudes. However, the census does not provide information
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on immigrants’ region of origin. We combine the surveys since 1981 and use the
answer to several questions that Tabellini [82] and others have proposed might be
important for economic development: generalized trust (Trust), tolerance and respect
for others as an important quality that children should have (Respect), obedience as
an important quality in children (and possibly a negative characteristic in a world
requiring independence (Obedience), and a feel of control over one’s life as an inverse
proxy for a fatalism (Control). We will also experiment with measures of thriftiness
(Thrift).13 Following Tabellini [82], we construct the principal component at the
individual level of Trust, Obedience, Respect, and Control as a summary measure of
cultural values important for cooperating with others.
We plot the relationship of the coefficients of the Ancestry Vector with Trust,
Obedience, the principal component of culture, and Thrift in Figure 7. The coeffi-
cients are positively and significantly associated with Trust, the principal component
of culture, and Thrift, and negatively and significantly associated with Obedience.
The correlation with Respect and Control is weak, and so we do not show them
separately, but will include them later in a more parsimonious approach.
Figure 7 also shows the ancestry coefficients’ relationship with two measures of
education: (1) the ratio of the immigrants’ education to the overall education in the
United States at the time of arrival based on information on literacy and, later, on
years of education contained in the census (see Appendix 2.6 for a detailed discussion);
and (2) the ratio of the average years of education in the country of origin relative
to the United States at the time of arrival using the data in van Leeuwen and van
Leeuwen-Li [87]. The education of migrants weighted by arrival density has a positive
relationship with ancestry. The ratio of the years of education in the country of
origin relative to that of the US is positively related to the ancestry coefficients for
the ancestries before 1924, but shows only a small relationship for all ancestries.
13The World Values Survey data and variable construction are described in details in the data
appendix section 2.6.
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The relatively weak relationship with average years of education in a country of
origin may be because the human capital of the immigrants is different from the
average, or because differences in human capital rapidly disappear in a new setting.
Of particular note is the difference between the education level of recent immigrants,
such as Indians, and the lower average level of education of their countries of origin.
2.5.3 A parsimonious parametrization of ancestry composi-
tion
In this section we examine the association between ancestry composition and economic
development in a more parsimonious manner by assuming that the effect of each
ancestry is proportional to some attribute of the country of origin. More specifically,
we take some characteristic za for country-of-origin a and define:
zct =
A∑
a=1
piactz
a. (2.3)
We can think of zct as the expected or predicted value, across countries of origin, of
the endowment of a given characteristic zaτ for county c at year t, where the italics
denote the endowment variable weighted by the ancestry vector, and upright case
letters the endowment characteristic itself.14 For example, take the simplest form of
country-of-origin level of development, the Log GDP per capita in 1870 and form
its ancestry-weighted value Log GDP per capita in 1870. Since the GDP in 1870 is
constant for any given country, its ancestry weighted value varies only because the
ancestry composition varies over counties and over time. We can think of it as offering
a prediction of county income based on the incomes in 1870 of the country of origin
of the county’s population. Similarly, our measures of culture, which come only from
14Putterman and Weil [74] form a similar construct at the country level in 2000 for state central-
ization in 1500 and years since the introduction of agriculture, using population shares adjusted for
migration flows since 1500.
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recent surveys, vary only because of the ancestry composition in a county.
Some characteristics, such as the GDP in the country of origin at the time of
arrival, vary both with time and ancestral composition. In this case, we form the zct
variable using the ancestry-weighted average in equation 2.3, but allow the country-of-
origin characteristic zat to vary over time. We construct z
a
t by weighting the difference
between the country-of-origin characteristic and the United States using the density
of arrival times up to time t as in equation 2.2. We also construct some variables as
ratios of the country-of-origin and the United States at the time of arrival.15
Our typical regression asks how well we can predict county GDP per capita us-
ing the ancestry composition and country-of-origin characteristics, and so takes the
general form:
yct = θc + λst + βzct + γXct + ct, (2.4)
where we include county group (θc) and state-year effects (λst) or common year ef-
fects. In some specification, zct will be a vector of the ancestry-weighted values of
the endowment of several characteristics. Note that, implicitly, we are imposing the
restriction that the ancestry coefficient in the unrestricted model is proportional to
one or more elements of the endowment vector. Given the more parsimonious rep-
resentation of the effects of ancestry, we will be able to experiment more fully with
the dynamic specification of the equation by including a richer lag structure for the
dependent variable and for the ancestry-weighted endowment zct. Moreover, since the
ancestry vector contains multiple elements, we can construct more complex functions
that reflect other aspects of the endowment distribution, such as fractionalization in
the characteristics of the country of origin.
15We form the migrant-education to US-education ratio, and country-of-origin education to US
education ratio in this way. The formula for ratios is: zat =
∑t
τ=0(z
a
τ/z
US
τ )
(1−δ)t−τF at (τ) where F
a
t (τ)
is the arrival density of group a up to time τ , and δ is the rate of depreciation of the importance of
that characteristic. This formula gives the average ratio of country-of-origin characteristic by time
of arrival. When the depreciation rate is greater than zero, the ratio converges to one as the time
of arrival gets further away, and so the immigrant group converges to the US.
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Changes in ancestry composition and economic development
Table 2 shows a series of regressions of the form of equation 2.4 where each estimate
is from a separate regression. For each ancestry-weighted variable we present three
specifications, each of which include county fixed effects: (1) with year effects, (2)
with state-year effects, (3) with state-year effects and including the fraction African-
American, Native American, and the log population density. Including state-year
effects allows each state to evolve independently over time and so only relies on
variation within state. Since much of the variation in the effect of ancestry is likely
to be felt across regions, including state-year effects removes much of the variation,
but ensures that the estimates are not driven purely by differential regional trends.
We allow African Americans and Native Americans to have an unrestricted coefficient
since the information at the country-of-origin level for African Americans and Native
Americans is necessarily speculative.16 We include population density to allow the
urban-rural composition of a county to change over time. Of course, if density grows
at the same rate for all counties then its effect is completely captured by the county
fixed effects and common year effects. We discuss the last three columns of Table 2
later.
The coefficient on the ancestry-weighted Log origin GDP/US on arrival is positive
and significant at the 1% level in column 1 with just fixed effects, as well as in column
2 with both fixed effects and state-year effects, but is insignificant in column 3 with the
additional controls. Using the estimate in column 2, a change in the composition of a
county so that the Log origin GDP/US on arrival is one percent higher is associated
with a 0.53% increase in the county’s current GDP per capita. Since the estimates
include county fixed effects, this estimate is identified as the composition changes over
16 Where available, we assign the values of Ghana, a West African country that was at the heart
of the slave trade, to African Americans, and typically use overall US values for Native Americans.
The results are nearly identical if we also allow those with African ancestries from the West Indies
to have their own independent effect as well.
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time, not just from the cross-section. The results are similar in terms of significance
when using the ancestry-weighted Origin-GDP-to-US ratio or 1870 GDP.
Ancestry-weighted State History in 1500 from Putterman and Weil [74] captures
the familiarity with centralized state institutions and shows a pattern of effects on
county GDP similar to those of the origin GDP measures. The effect is significant and
positive in all specifications, except the one with state-year effects and the additional
controls.17 Ancestry-weighted Political participation as of the time of arrival (mea-
sured as the difference between the fraction eligible to vote in the country-of-origin
and the US weighted by the arrival density) does not predict county GDP, except
in the specification with only common year effects, and has a negative coefficient in
some specifications. Since few large origin countries had a widespread franchise at
the time of migration in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the fraction of
people voting may not well capture differences in institutions or political participa-
tion. The role of the endowment of human capital is less robust and it depends upon
how it is measured and upon the exact specification, although it is mostly positive
when included without controls.
Measures of cultural attitudes towards working with others, such as the ancestry-
weighted variable Trust, are strongly related to higher county income. Trust is pos-
itive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications. Since our measure of trust
from the World Values Survey is the fraction of the population in a country of origin
who report that other people can generally be trusted, the coefficient suggests that an
increase in the mix of ancestries that increases Trust by one percentage point (0.01)
is associated with an increase in the income of a county by 2.6%.
The important role of generalized Trust is possibly due to its ability to capture
and summarize those cultural characteristics that enhance the capacity to cooperate,
17The state history variable is constructed as an index varying from 0 to 1. So a 1 percentage
point (0.01) increase in the index brings approximately the same increase as a 1% (0.01) increase
in 1870 GDP. We use the Putterman and Weil [74] measure version 3 with a depreciation of 5% of
state history in the past.
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sometimes called social capital. These characteristics affect the functioning of local
institutions, but may also capture the experience of good institutions in the mother
country and the ability to transport them to the areas where immigrants settle, as
good and effective institutions may foster the creation of trust. For this reason, Trust
is likely to capture the effect on economic development of both good culture and good
local institutions of the country of origin.
Ancestry-weighted Obedience has a precisely estimated and negative effect in three
out of the four specifications. Respect and Control display positive coefficients that are
marginally less precisely estimated. Thrift is positively and very significantly related
to local development in three out of four specifications. Following Tabellini [82],
we have formed the principal component of Trust, Control, Respect, and Obedience
from the individual data, and then taken the average across the respondents of the
principal component for each country. The ancestry-weighted principal component is
positively and significantly associated with county GDP in all specifications.
Rich ancestries in poor places
Perhaps surprisingly, over the broad sweep of US history since 1850, people from
high-income countries tend to live in lower income counties on average. Column 4
in Table 2 show that the coefficients on our ancestry-weighted variables most often
take the opposite sign when fixed effects are not included. This pattern holds for Log
origin GDP on arrival, for example, which is positive in column 1 with fixed effects
and negative in column 4 without them (state-year effects are included to sweep out
time varying state differences).
What explains this negative correlation, which is not what one would expect if
prosperous areas attract prosperous people? The primary driving force behind this
correlation is the historical legacy of settlement, particularly among the English.
While the English are a large portion of much of the US, they are disproportionally
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present in rural areas in the poor South and Appalachian states which received little
migration after their first settlement. Later migrants, such as the Italians or Irish,
while poor when they arrived, went to cities and prosperous areas, especially in the
Northeast. Finally, the Great Migration of African Americans shifted them from the
poor rural South to growing urban areas.
The differences between the estimates that use the variation over time within each
county and those that rely mostly on on the cross-sectional variation suggest that the
availability of panel data is very important for understanding the effects of ancestry.
Much empirical work on culture or ancestry cannot distinguish between the effect of
the place and of the people that live there. The negative cross-sectional relationship
between Trust or Log origin GDP and county GDP is likely specific to the settlement
patterns in the United States and what part of the frontier was open when a large
migration occurred or where a group was forcibly resettled. However, the point that
estimates based on cross-sectional variation do not disentangle the effects of factors
inherent in a place is more general.
2.5.4 What matters most?
In Section 2.5.3, we examined country-of-origin characteristics in isolation, with the
goal of showing several elements of the endowment vector brought by immigrants
are associated with per capita county level GDP. But which component of the en-
dowmentis most strongly associated with local economic development? As we have
discussed, the panel nature of our data allows us to address this issue controlling for
a rich set of unobservables by including county fixed effects and state-year effects.
Doing so necessarily removes any effect of national or state institutions and of their
evolution. Similarly, we cannot directly estimate whether there is a “founder” effect
of the groups who first settled a county since such an effect is absorbed by the fixed
effect.
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With these caveats in mind, Table 3 combines a selection of the most important
measures from Table 2 to examine which measures remain significant once they are
included together as explanatory variables. We use the ancestry-weighted variables
Trust, State History, the Migrant Education-to-US ratio at time of arrival created by
census records, and Thrift.18 Since many important differences appear across states
rather than within them, we show the results both with common year effects, and
with state-specific year effects. Finally, since the country-of-origin endowments used
for African-American and Native Americans are speculative, we included in some
specifications the fraction of each of these groups, as well as the population density
to allow for differences between urban and rural areas.
The effect of culture, as measured by ancestry-weighted Trust, is robustly signifi-
cant and about the same size across all columns, while the other possibly important
variables are not. Thrift is also significant, but only in the specification with state-
period effects. State History is significant without state effects, but not with them.
Culture may summarize the role of both social capital and the quality of local insti-
tutions in the country of origin, as we have argued before. Conversely, the experience
of a centralized state represented by State History may be less relevant in capturing
the development and functioning of local institutions, and any effect it has on state
or national institutions is absorbed by the state-year and fixed effects.
Puzzlingly, the ratio of education of the migrants to the US education at the time of
arrival has either an insignificant or negative and significant coefficient when including
state-year effects. This relationship does not depend on the speed of depreciation of
the difference (δ), and also holds using the country-of-origin years of education as
well. By itself, arrival education is mostly positively related to county GDP in Table
2. The negative relationship may come from colinearity between the education and
the other included endowment variables.
18We obtained very similar results using the principal component of culture instead of Trust, but
report the results for Trust since it is more straightforward to interpret.
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Including the fraction of African Americans and Native Americans still leaves the
coefficient of ancestry-weighted Trust significant and of about the same size. The
values we assign in constructing the endowments for these groups are necessarily
imprecise, and it is important to point out that the results are not coming just from
these groups. West Africans today have low trust as measured by the World Values
Survey, at least partially as a consequence of the slave trade [69]. The long-term
consequences for trust on the descendents of those actually enslaved may be even
worse. While we report the coefficients on the fraction African Americans and Native
Americans, since the groups also appear within each of the ancestry-weighted variables
the coefficients are not informative about the groups themselves.
The size of the coefficients matters as well as their statistical significance. The
interquartile range across counties for Trust is 0.064, for State History it is 0.095,
and for the ancestry-weighted migrant education ratio at the time of arrival it is
0.081. Moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile county in Trust raises
GDP per capita by nearly 25.5%, using the estimated coefficients reported in column
1. The effect is of similar size across all specifications. A similar change for State
History is associated with a 6.9% increase in county GDP per capita. For migrant
education, a change from the 25th percentile to the 75th is associated with an statis-
tically insignificant increase in GDP per capita of 2.3%, using the results in column
1, or a decrease of 15%, using the results in in column 2. Trust, therefore, is the
most robust, statistically significant, and economically important correlate of local
economic development.19
19In the next section, we will construct instruments for these variables and consider the importance
of allowing for a dynamic specification by including lags of county GDP. While we mostly focus on
examining just one variable at a time, when we include multiple endowment variables we reach the
same overall conclusions in the dynamic model with instruments and fixed effects as in this section:
Trust is highly significant with a sizable coefficient, State History is less significant but still matters,
while the Migrant Education-to-US ratio at the time of arrival is insignificant and with a coefficient
close to zero.
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2.5.5 Sorting and endogeneity
The previous sections have documented a robust association between ancestry and
income. In this section we examine the possible mechanisms underlying this relation-
ship. The association could come from two sources: (1) when people with certain
characteristics move to a county, its GDP changes, or (2) people with certain char-
acteristics are attracted to a county whose GDP is changing. It is worth noting that
there is only a reverse causality problem if people move immediately in response to
shocks. If it takes a decade for them to move then, if the error term in the GDP
equation is not serially correlated, there is no simultaneity bias. Moreover, even if
people move immediately, the direction of any bias in estimating the effect of ancestry
on GDP is ambiguous. For example, it could be that a booming county dispropor-
tionately attracts immigrants who are poorer, since they are the ones with greater
incentives to move. The cross-section results shown in the fourth column of Table 2
supports this observation that people from poorer countries end up in richer counties
on average. A counter argument is that the most mobile people may be those with
the highest education and geographically diverse social networks.20
The estimates in the previous sections allow for county fixed effects. The fixed
effects removes and controls for all fixed unobserved characteristics of a place. In
trying to identify the effect of ancestry composition on local GDP, it is not a problem,
for example, if the poor immigrants tend go to cities with ports that require manual
laborers, as the presence of a port is largely fixed. Similarly, if Norwegians go to
places in the Upper-Midwest whose cold ecology they are familiar with, the fixed effect
removes climate and geography. As we have shown in Section 2.5.3, it is extremely
20Note that the problem with selection is not that the poor, or rich, within each ancestry are the
ones that are more likely to move if ancestries are equally affected, for instance, because they have
the same income distribution.. Instead, the problem is that ancestries with specific characteristics
may be more mobile on average. For example, suppose ancestries with low trust are more willing
to move since they have lower attachment to a local community. Since trust is positively correlated
with local development, but low trust ancestries are more likely to move to booming counties, the
within estimates will tend to underestimate the impact of trust on local development.
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important to control for county fixed effects since people from richer countries tended
to settle in relatively poorer counties. Yet, the fixed effect estimates do not address
the possible correlation between shocks to county level per capita GDP and ancestry
composition.
In this section, we propose possible strategies to identify the effect of ancestry
composition on economic development. We construct an instrument for the Ancestry
Vector and the ancestry-weighted endowment variables using the past distribution of
ancestries, augmented by the national growth rates, building on the basic strategies
of the recent immigration literature.21 We first instrument for the ancestry-weighted
endowment variables in the model with fixed effects, including two lags of the de-
pendent variable. Then we examine more fully the issue of the dynamic specifica-
tion of the model and address the endogeneity issues in the context of short panels
[59, 14], starting from a single equation framework. Finally, we model explicitly both
county GDP and ancestry-weighted endowment variables in a bivariate panel vector
auto-regression and present estimates of the impulse response functions, based on a
Cholesky decomposition of the residuals, under different assumptions on the ordering
of the variables. The absence of autocorrelated residuals is essential for our identifi-
cation strategy and this requires the specification of rich enough dynamic models and
testing for serial correlation in the estimating equation.
We conclude that, while there is some evidence that there is an attraction that
draws people of certain characteristics to booming counties, the ancestry composition
matters in a causal sense for local economic development even after accounting for
this attraction. The effect is significant, sizable, and long lasting. We focus on the
21See, for example, Cortes [35] and Peri [72]. Peri [72] allows for a dynamic specification of the
estimating equation by including the lagged dependent variables. They build on Card [32], who
estimates a static model, although he briefly discusses the importance of lack of serial correlation
in the estimating equation. A related strategy is also used in the local development literature to
instrument for labor demand shocks. See Bartik [22] and Blanchard and Katz [24]. Although
the absence of serial correlation in the residuals is an essential condition for the use of the past
distribution of immigrants as an instrument, this literature often fails to conduct such tests.
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effects of ancestry-weighted Trust, since it appears to have the most robust role, but
also show results for the Log origin GDP/US on arrival in the appendix as a summary
measure of the potential economic endowment of immigrants.
Instrumenting for ancestry and expected endowments
Immigrants tend to go where there are already immigrants from their country [21].
Growth of native groups similarly occurs in places where there are already popula-
tions of that ancestry since it takes Germans to make Germans. We build on these
observations to create an instrument for ancestry based on the stock of ancestry in
the past. This approach is similar to using lags of the ancestry-weighted variables
as instruments, but brings in information for the overall growth of ancestries at the
national level.
We start with the population P ac,t−1 of ancestry a in county c at time t − 1 and
construct its predicted value at time t if in each county the population grew at the
national rate for each ancestry, gat , to obtain P˜
a
c,t = P
a
c,t−1(1 + g
a
t ). Summing over
all the ancestries we can obtain the predicted growth rate of the total population in
each county, P˜c,t. The projected share of ancestry a’s population in each county p˜i
a
c,t
is then:
p˜iac,t =
P˜ ac,t
P˜c,t
= piac,t−1
1 + gat∑A
a=1(1 + g
a
t )pi
a
c,t−1
. (2.5)
Note that p˜iac,t does not use any county specific information from decade t. If there
is no serial correlation in the error term of the GDP equation, then p˜iac,t, or simply
piac,t−1, can be used instead of pi
a
c,t to construct an instrument for the ancestry-weighted
endowment variables. The absence of serial correlation in the local GDP equation is
essential for this identification strategy to be valid. We therefore include past values
of GDP and test whether there is any evidence of residual serial correlation. We also
make the very reasonable assumption that no single county plays a dominant role in
attracting people of a given ancestry.
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As an intermediate step, we first show the effect of including two lags of county
GDP in the second to last column of Table 2 (marked DYN FE for dynamic fixed
effects). Since the regression now includes lags of county GDP, the reported coef-
ficients are the effect of a change in the endowment within a decade. The sum of
the lags of county GDP are generally around 0.6, indicating that the long-run effect
of a permanent increase in Trust, for example, is around 2.5 times larger than the
short-run effect.22
The last column of Table 2 (denoted IV DYN FE) shows the results of using the
predicted shares p˜iac,t to construct an instrument for each expected endowment variable
in equation 2.3 in the dynamic equation that includes two lags of the log county income
to remove serial correlation. In all cases, including two lags is sufficient to remove
serial correlation using the Arellano and Bond [14] test based on differences of the
residuals. For reasons of space, we report only the tests for the specifications using
Trust in columns 6 and 7 of Table 4, and using Log origin GDP/US on arrival in
columns 6 and 7 of Table A-1. The first stage regressions suggest that our instrument
has strong explanatory power for the corresponding ancestry-weighted endowment
variables.23
In all cases in which it was significant in the static specification, the coefficient
of the ancestry-weighted endowment variables remains significant in the dynamic
specifications, whether it is instrumented or not. The estimates of the impact effect
with the instrument are in general slightly larger than those for the dynamic fixed
effect results. The long-term effects of a permanent change are again around 2.5 times
22The long-run effect, in a single equation context, is α/(1 − ρ1 − ρ2) where α is the coefficient
of each ancestry-weighted endowment variable, and ρ1 and ρ2 are the coefficients on the lags of
county GDP. Column 6 in Table 4 shows the full estimates for Trust, while column 6 in in Table A-1
show the same results for Log origin GDP/US on arrival. The coefficients of the lagged dependent
variables in each regression are typically very similar. Using the values for Trust, to get the long-run
effect multiply the coefficients in the DYN FE column by 2.4=1/ (1-0.525-0.054).
23For instance, the t-statistic for the first stage instruments constructed using p˜iac,t has P-values
that equal zero to the fourth decimal point. Most of the explanatory power is due to the variation
in piac,t−1 since replacing p˜i
a
c,t with pi
a
c,t−1 in constructing the instruments has nearly the same first
stage significance and very similar second stage results.
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larger than the short-term effects. Some of the anomalies observed before disappear;
in particular, now ancestry-weighted Migrant education/US at arrival has a positive
and significant sign as does Arrival political participation. We will discuss further the
dynamic effects of changes in ancestry-weighted endowments in the next section.
We have also examined the effect of including the average log GDP of each county’s
neighbors in the preceding decade in a specification that is otherwise the same as the
IV dynamic fixed effects results in column 6 to allow for possible spatial correlation.
The results are essentially identical, and therefore we do not report them separately.
The coefficient on the past neighbor’s GDP is generally small, typically below 0.01,
and mostly statistically insignificant.
Instrumenting for ancestry in short dynamic panels
The instrumental variable results presented in the previous section rely on including
the lagged dependent variable to remove serial correlation. With a relatively short
panel (T=15), including the lagged dependent variable with fixed effects can gener-
ate inconsistent estimates [68]. In this section, we address both this issue and the
problem of endogenous migration by using the GMM approach to the estimation
of short dynamic panels with large N proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen
[59] and Arellano and Bond [14]. The basic idea is not to use the within transfor-
mation, but other transformations, such as first differencing or forward orthogonal
deviations, that allow one to use lagged values of the regressors or other variables as
instruments.24 Note that using lagged values of the ancestry-weighted variable as in-
struments is identical to using lagged ancestries in the construction of the instrument
when the country-of-origin characteristic is not time varying, like Trust. In addition,
we estimate a bivariate panel vector auto-regression (VAR) for log county GDP and
24The forward orthogonal deviation transformation subtracts from the value of a variable at time
t the forward mean (and rescales the results appropriately). This transformation has the property
that if the original errors are i.i.d., they maintain this characteristic after the transformation.
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ancestry-weighted Trust that allows us to examine the extent that shocks to county
GDP attract migrants of a certain type. We continue to focus on ancestry-weighted
Trust as an example because it seems to be the variable most robustly correlated with
county GDP, but include the results for Log origin GDP/US on arrival as a useful
summary measure of the endowments brought by immigrants in the appendix.
Table 4 shows a series of GMM estimates of the effect of the ancestry-weighted
Trust on county GDP per capita (Table A-1 in the appendix shows the same table
for Log origin GDP/US on arrival). Column 1 estimates the effect using orthogonal
deviations to remove the county fixed effect, while column 2 uses the first difference
transformation. Appropriately lagged values of the regressors are used as instruments
with the precise lags used indicated in the table. In both cases we test for serial
correlation in the first differences in the error term using the Arellano and Bond
[14] test for serial correlation of the residuals in differences. In first differences one
expects first order serial correlation if the error term in the level equation is white
noise, but not second-order serial correlation. Second order serial correlation would
invalidate the use of once-lagged variables as instruments with orthogonal deviations
or twice-lagged variables as instruments with first differences. With two lags of county
GDP, we do not find evidence of second order serial correlation, which is necessary for
the validity of our instruments.25 Moreover, the test of overidentifying restrictions
(Hansen test) does not suggest model misspecification in any of the equations. In
column 3, we include multiple lags of Trust as well. While the individual coefficients
change size, their sum is nearly identical, and so the long-run effect of a change in
Trust is nearly the same. In column 4 we include as an additional instrument the
one constructed in the previous section based on the past stock of ancestry and the
25Note that our instrumenting strategy can also deal with the issue of measurement error in the
ancestry-weighted variables. The lack of second order serial correlation in differences suggests that
there is no substantial measurement error component in county GDP or a moving average component
in the ancestry variable. Had we found such components, they could have been dealt with by further
lagging the instruments.
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growth rate of each ancestry at the national level in equation 2.5. The results are
nearly identical to column 1 which means that the constructed instrument does not
add much additional information relative to simply using a lag of the Trust as an
instrument.26
For comparison, columns 6 and 7 show the results of estimating the same dy-
namic model with two lags of county GDP, using the within transformation but no
instruments in column 6, and our constructed instrument in column 7. The sum of
the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables is somewhat larger in the GMM
estimates that with the fixed effects, as one would expect in relatively short pan-
els [68], but the difference is small. More importantly, the coefficients on the effect
of ancestry-weighted Trust remain highly significant. Note that, although the im-
pact effects differ, the long-run effect of a permanent change in Trust (defined as
5.14=1.347/(1-0.624-0.114)), using the GMM results of column 1 of Table 4 is very
similar to the long run effect of a permanent change in Trust in the fixed effects
estimation with two lags of county GDP in column 6 (5.20), and in the fixed effect
estimation of the same model when Trust is instrumented in column 7 (5.63) using
the past distribution of ancestries from Section 2.5.5. The estimated coefficient of
Trust in the static fixed effect model of Table 2 (2.5) is in-between the GMM esti-
mates of the short and long-run effects in the dynamic model, and is closer to the
impact effect. It is also very close to the estimated impact effect of the dynamic fixed
effect model, with or without instruments.
Finally, we examine the co-evolution of county GDP per capita and ancestry-
weighted Trust in columns 8 and 9 of Table 4 using a bivariate panel vector auto-
regression. This approach allows county GDP to affect Trust as well as for Trust
to affect county GDP and makes no structural assumptions beyond the number of
lags. While the previous columns deal appropriately with the potential endogeneity of
26Including a one decade lag of the average neighboring counties’ log GDP as an additional re-
gressor leaves the results unchanged. Its coefficient is miniscule and not significant.
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Trust, they do not explicitly model its evolution. Instead of estimating the structural
model for county GDP, as in columns 1-7 of Table 4, we now estimate the reduced
form of the model for both log county GDP and Trust. The coefficient of the first lag
of Trust is again highly significant in the GDP equation. County GDP also has an
effect on Trust in column 9. Indeed, when we test for Granger Causality we strongly
reject both that Trust does not Granger cause GDP and that GDP does not Granger
cause Trust, with p-values very close to zero. However, the effect of GDP on Trust is
very small.
We consider the co-evolution explicitly by calculating the impulse responses func-
tions of log county GDP and Trust obtained from a Cholesky decomposition under
two different assumptions about the ordering of the variables: (1) that county GDP
affects Trust only with a lag, and (2) that Trust affects county GDP only with a
lag. Since it takes people time to move in response to a boom, we think that the
first assumption may be more reasonable. The impulse responses for a one standard
deviation shock to log county GDP and Trust are shown in Figure 8 (for Log origin
GDP see appendix Figure A-1). The overall shape of the impulse responses are very
similar for both decompositions. The short-run response is sizable and significant
(either immediately or after one period), peaks after four periods and then slowly
declines. For instance, when Trust is assumed to respond to GDP only with a lag,
a one standard deviation shock to Trust leads to an increase in GDP of 1.5 percent-
age points on impact, peaking at somewhat above two percentage points after four
decades.. The effect is significant and large (around 1.5 percentage points) even after
ten decades. The reverse effect of a shock to county GDP on Trust is statistically
significant but it is always small (note the different scale of the vertical axes for the
Trust and GDP responses). For instance, it peaks at 0.002 or 0.004 (depending upon
the ordering of the variables), which is a rather small number given that 90% of the
observations of Trust vary between 0.22 and 0.40.
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2.5.6 Ancestry and diversity
Until now we have examined the average of the attributes people in a county might
have received from their ancestors. However the diversity of ancestries may be as
important as the weighted average of those attributes. In this section, we conduct an
initial exploration of this issue in the context of the static model with fixed effects.
We use several measures of diversity. One is the standard fractionalization index that
measures the probability that any two individuals chosen from a population will not
be of the same group:
fracc,t = 1−
A∑
a=1
(piact)
2.
Recent work has generalized this index by allowing it to incorporate measures of
distance (for reference, see Bossert, D’Ambrosio, and La Ferrara [30], who generalize
early work and provide an axiomatic treatment). We define a measure of similarity
based on the difference of some country-of-origin measure z between group j and
group k as sjkct = 1− |zj − zk|/r where r = maxj∈{1...A} zj −minj∈{1...A} zj is the range
of values that z can take. As two groups become more similar along the z dimension,
their similarity approaches one. Then a generalized fractionalization index is:
fracwc,t = 1−
A∑
j=1
A∑
k=1
pijctpi
k
cts
jk
ct
where the w stands for a “weighted” fractionalization.27 The standard fractional-
ization index is just the weighted fractionalization index when members of different
groups are assumed to be completely dissimilar (sjk = 0 for i 6= j). We show results
based on fractionalization weighted by country-of-origin Trust, but obtain similar
27Note that the fractionalization index could also be defined using measures of dissimilarity be-
tween groups j and k. If djkct = |zj − zk|/r then fracwc,t =
∑A
j=1
∑A
k=1 pi
j
ctpi
k
ctd
jk
ct since the sum over
the AV is 1. Although the discussion assumes a fixed xj for each ancestry, the country-of-origin mea-
sure can change over time as well. For example, it is possible to use the density of arrival weighted
country-of-origin GDP to calculate the fractionalization at any given time. The double sum over
ancestry makes weighted fractionalization somewhat complicated and computationally intensive to
calculate weighted fractionalization over the full county-decade panel.
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results using fractionalization of origin GDP.
In Table 5 we report the results obtained when we include measures of fraction-
alization and Trust weighted fractionalization using the fixed effects estimates of the
static equation 2.4 when ancestry-weighted Trust, State History and the Migrant-
education-to-US ratio are all included. An increases in county diversity of country-
of-origin as captured by fractionalization is associated with an increase in county
GDP per capita. An increases in Trust weighted fractionalization is associated, in-
stead, with a decrease in GDP. The coefficient on the level of ancestry-weighted Trust
is very similar to the estimates without fractionalization (see column 1 of Table 3).
Since fractionalization and weighted fractionalization are both indices that vary from
0 to 1, the estimated effects are large: an increase in the Trust fractionalization by
one percentage point (0.01) decreases county income by 2.7%.28 The estimated effects
of Trust, fractionalization, and Trust fractionalization are robust to many different
specifications such as including state-year effects, the fraction of Native Americans
and African Americans, population density, and county education levels. The posi-
tive impact of fractionalization and negative impact of Trust fractionalization does
not come just from diverse and high income cities and is not just a racial effect.
These results capture two different views of diversity. The positive effect of frac-
tionalization is consistent with the notion that it is beneficial for people with new skills
and ideas to come into a county, particularly if these complement the skills and ideas
of the existing population. Moreover if they bring different tastes, the newcomers may
open up new opportunities for trade. Yet if those new groups are substantially differ-
ent along important dimensions such as trust, this may create conflict and lead to a
decrease in the ability to agree on growth enhancing policies at the local level. One
28The mean fractionalization across all county groups is 0.73, with an interquartile range of 0.215,
while for the fractionalization of Trust the mean is 0.155 and the interquartile range is 0.105. Going
from the 25th to the 75th percentile for fractionalization is associated with a rise in GDP per capita
of 25%, while going from the 25th to the 75th percentile of Trust fractionalization reduces GDP per
capita by 29%.
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can imagine, for example, that a low-trust group moving into a high-trust area may
not only bring down the average trust level (as captured by the ancestry-weighted
Trust), but also make the high-trust group less willing to cooperate.
These results help make sense of a tension in the literature that examines ethnic
diversity. In the cross-section, both across countries [41] and within them [7, 65, 36]
ethnic diversity is related to lower output growth or investment in public goods.
Yet diversity can have positive consequences. For example, Alesina, Harnoss, and
Rapoport [10] present cross country evidence of a positive relationship between birth-
place diversity and output, TFP per capita and innovation. Ashraf and Galor [15]
find that the relationship between genetic diversity and country level economic de-
velopment is first increasing, then decreasing, resulting in an interior optimum level
of diversity. Ager and Bru¨ckner [5] demonstrate that increased fractionalization of
first generation migrants in the United States is positively associated with output,
while a tendency towards polarization—when there is an even division between two
groups—is negatively associated with output. Putterman and Weil [74] find that the
Standard Deviation of state history generated by the post-1500 population flows is
positively related to the income of countries today.
Given the evidence that fractionalization has both positive and negative effects,
and that its effects overall may be non-linear [15], in columns 5-8 of Table 5 we include
the square of fractionalization and Trust weighted fractionalization, allowing the effect
to be non-linear. The square of fractionalization has a consistently negative effect,
indicating that the positive marginal effect of increased fractionalization is decreasing.
Increasing diversity in an already diverse place has a smaller positive effect than
in a homogenous place. The square of Trust fractionalization has a positive effect,
suggesting that the negative marginal effect of Trust fractionalization gets smaller the
more diversity in Trust there is. Increasing the diversity of Trust has a larger negative
effect in more uniform societies. The quadratic form implies that there is potentially
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an optimal level of diversity and worst level of Trust diversity. The maximum and
minimum, however, fall very close to the limits of the range of diversity of our counties;
while diversity has a non-linear effect, we do not find that it has u-shaped effect within
the very diverse United States.29
2.6 Conclusion
Using micro-samples from the US census since 1850, we have mapped the ancestral
distribution of population of US counties, and combined it with consistent estimates
of county level GDP per capita. This panel has allowed us to assess whether the en-
dowments of people’s ancestors are related to local economic outcomes. The changing
ancestry composition of US counties is significantly associated with their economic
success, even after controlling for county fixed effects, common or state-specific year
effects and other time varying observable county level factors. The cultural, insti-
tutional, and human capital endowments that migrants brought from their country
of origin explain this association. We find that cultural variables reflecting values
and beliefs about cooperation tend to play the most robust role relative to other fac-
tors. We address the potential endogeneity of ancestry due to geographical sorting
through an instrumental variable strategy in a dynamic setting and find that changes
in ancestry-weighted characteristics of the country of origin affect local economic
development. The effectsD are sizable, significant, and long lasting.
The diversity of the characteristics of the country of origin are important as well.
Our results suggest that ancestry fractionalization is positively related to economic
development. However, measures of the fractionalization of the cultural endowment
brought by immigrants is negatively related to county level GDP. It matters not only
29For a quadratic ax + bx2 the maximum or minimum occurs when x = −a/(2b). The optimal
fractionalization (using column 5) is 0.99, while the least valuable Trust fractionalization is 0.37. The
90th percentile of our county groups is 0.88 for fractionalization and 0.26 for Trust fractionalization,
and so the maximum and minimum fall at the very top end of possible values.
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where you came from, but also whom you came in contact with once you arrived.
The complex mosaic of ancestry in the United States has changed profoundly over
the past and it is still evolving as new migrants enter and people move internally. Our
novel data set on the stock of ancestry and GDP has allowed us to provide new evi-
dence on the relationship between ancestry composition and economic development.
However, this is just the start; the multifaceted role of ancestry diversity and its
relationship with economic outcomes deserves a deeper look, and many more issues
can be investigated using our data. For instance, how are inherited values and beliefs
modified by surrounding groups? How are group identities such as ethnicity formed
from the building block of ancestry? And what are the mechanisms through which
the cultural, institutional, and human capital endowments of immigrants affect social
and economic development? We leave the answer to these and other questions to
future work.
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Figure 1: Ancestry share in the United States: 1870, 1920, 1970, and 2010
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Notes: Shows the aggregate ancestry shares in the US for ancestries with greater that 0.5% of the
population. Ancestry shares are created by summing the share in each county weighted by county
population in each year. See Section 2.3 and Appendix 2.6 for the ancestry construction.
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Figure 2: Select ancestries in the United States: 1870 and 1920
Notes: Scandinavian is the combined Norway and Swedish ancestries. See Section 2.3 and Appendix
2.6 for the ancestry construction.
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Figure 3: Select ancestries in the United States: 1970 and 2010
Notes: Scandinavian is the combined Norway and Swedish ancestries. See Section 2.3 and Appendix
2.6 for the ancestry construction.
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Figure 4: GDP and aggregate county GDP per capita: 1840-2010
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Notes and sources: Historical GDP per capita from Sutch [80]. The constructed aggregate GDP per
capita and aggregate county income per capita are created by totaling the county measures for each
year then dividing by population.
Figure 5: Constructed sectoral shares 1850-2010
Services (inc. gov.)
Manufacturing
Agriculture
Mining
Construction
Constructed aggregate county shares NIPA shares0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Sh
ar
e 
of
 n
at
io
na
l i
nc
om
e
1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
Year
Notes: The shares from 1850 to 1960 are based on our estimates of county GDP totaled over all
counties. The National Income and Product (NIPA) shares on the right are the dashed lines in 1929
and the overall shares after 1960 and are based on Carter [33].
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Figure 6: Ancestry and country of origin: Economic and Institutions
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Notes: Shows the relationship between economic variables in the country of origin and the coefficients
estimated for large ancestry groups on log county GDP per capita including fixed effects in equation
2.1. The construction of origin GDP is described in Appendix 2.6. Arrival density is based on author
calculations from Department of Homeland Security [39]. State History is from Putterman and Weil
[74] and excludes origins that were heavily settled by migrants (the Americas). We use their version
3 with a discount of 5%. Political participation is the percent that could vote in national elections
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time of arrival with a depreciation rate of 0.2%.
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Figure 7: Ancestry and country of origin: Social capital, culture, and human capital
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estimated for large ancestry groups on log county GDP per capita including fixed effects in equation
2.1. The questions are based on the World Values Survey, see appendix 2.6. Human capital is the
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Department of Homeland Security [39].
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Figure 8: Impulse response of log county income and ancestry weighted trust
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Notes: Shows impulse responses corresponding to columns 8-9 in Table 4 estimated together as a
panel VAR using pvar [1]. The impulses are calculated using two Cholesky decompositions: (1) No
immediate effect of GDP on TRUST, but TRUST can immediately affect GDP, (2) No immediate
effect of TRUST on GDP, but GDP can immediately affect TRUST. The size of the impulse is the
standard deviations of the residuals in each equation. Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals
based on Monte Carlo simulation.
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Table 1: County GDP per capita and individual ancestries
Dependent Log(County group GDP per capita)
variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Log(GDP p.c.) 0.401*** 0.254*** 0.381***
at t-1 (0.00653) (0.00700) (0.00674)
Literacy 0.555*** 0.463*** 0.321***
(0.0335) (0.0332) (0.0342)
Years education 0.0718*** 0.0314*** 0.0234***
(0.00454) (0.00481) (0.00421)
Log(density) 0.0896*** 0.0292***
(0.00395) (0.00382)
F(All ancestry =0) 136.5 53.86 26.14 33.85 13.27 14.52 46.47 51.91 30.54
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F(non-AA anc. =0) 80.27 45.12 23.62 20.78 12.04 12.07 42.98 43.15 20.96
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State X Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County group trends No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
Lag Ancestry No No No No No Yes No No No
R2 (within) 0.962 0.972 0.979 0.980 0.984 0.981 0.972 0.973 0.980
R2 (between) 0.517 0.632 0.00872 0.831 0.0446 0.0265 0.703 0.769 0.881
Observations 18,444 18,444 18,444 17,295 17,295 17,404 18,216 18,207 17,061
County groups 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,148 1,148
Notes: The F-tests test the joint hypothesis that all ancestries (except English, the excluded group) are jointly zero. The Non-AA F tests whether
all ancestries except African Americans and Native Americans are jointly insignificant. All regression contain fixed effects for year and county group.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2: County GDP per capita and country-of-origin characteristics
Ancestry weighted Log(County group GDP per capita)
Variables Each cell from a separate estimation
One at a time FE FE FE NO FE DYN FE IV DYN FE
Log origin GDP/US 0.223*** 0.532*** -0.101 -0.255*** 0.279*** 0.327***
on arrival (0.0547) (0.0478) (0.0683) (0.0714) (0.0220) (0.0116)
Origin GDP/US ratio 0.113** 0.646*** -0.328*** -0.441*** 0.343*** 0.428***
on arrival (0.0555) (0.0728) (0.0888) (0.121) (0.0322) (0.0186)
1870 GDP weighted 0.304*** 0.735*** -0.111 -0.343** 0.363*** 0.430***
by county AV (0.0817) (0.0745) (0.116) (0.143) (0.0315) (0.0177)
Migrant education/US -0.151 1.215*** -1.676*** -0.784* 1.170*** 1.305***
ratio at arrival (0.195) (0.169) (0.296) (0.397) (0.103) (0.0501)
Origin education/US 0.411*** 1.144*** -0.462** -0.484** 0.646*** 0.743***
ratio at arrival (0.120) (0.141) (0.184) (0.188) (0.0627) (0.0304)
State history in 1500 0.968*** 2.281*** -0.474 -0.870*** 1.183*** 1.482***
(0.234) (0.248) (0.310) (0.272) (0.118) (0.0601)
Arrival political 0.0104 0.0631*** -0.0371*** -0.0419*** 0.0310*** 0.0356***
participation (0.00720) (0.00673) (0.0126) (0.00898) (0.00224) (0.00146)
Trust 2.524*** 4.254*** 1.573*** -0.801** 2.190*** 2.425***
(0.430) (0.394) (0.538) (0.398) (0.186) (0.0792)
Obedience -2.175*** -2.944*** -2.894*** -0.607** -1.522*** -1.584***
(0.216) (0.293) (0.391) (0.269) (0.129) (0.0541)
Respect -0.532 4.379*** -2.474*** -5.196*** 2.538*** 3.568***
(0.543) (0.961) (0.683) (1.927) (0.469) (0.235)
Control -0.687*** -0.289 -0.275** -0.779*** -0.249*** -0.203***
(0.139) (0.206) (0.129) (0.101) (0.0701) (0.0356)
Principal comp. 0.946*** 1.505*** 1.035*** -0.230* 0.787*** 0.860***
culture (0.137) (0.134) (0.194) (0.129) (0.0564) (0.0271)
Thrift 3.781*** 1.935** 2.113*** 3.449*** 1.401*** 1.414***
(0.506) (0.868) (0.426) (0.892) (0.291) (0.146)
Observations 16,713 16,713 16,704 16,713 14,419 14,393
Year X State FE Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes
Lags of county GDP Yes Yes
Count group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County groups 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151 1151
Notes: Other controls include the fraction African American, the fraction Native American, and the
log population density. All regressions include county group effects and either state-year or state
and year effects and errors are allowed to cluster at the state level (except in the IV regressions).
All independent variables are constructed at the county group level by weighted country-of-origin
characteristics by the ancestry vector as in equation 2.3. The Dynamic Fixed Effects column includes
two lags of Log county GDP. In the IV column, the instrument is the variable constructed using
ancestry based on settlement patterns in the past, and each regression includes two lags of the
dependent variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: County GDP per capita and combined country-of-origin characteristics
Dependent Log(County group GDP per capita)
variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Trust 3.980*** 4.303*** 3.259*** 2.636*** 3.842*** 4.005*** 3.370*** 2.951*** 5.420***
(0.500) (0.655) (0.746) (0.798) (0.476) (0.590) (0.788) (0.825) (0.519)
State history 0.724** 0.540 0.626* 0.136 0.634* 0.124 0.632* 0.0579 0.351
in 1500 (0.325) (0.352) (0.350) (0.263) (0.340) (0.319) (0.346) (0.261) (0.332)
Migrant educ./US -0.283 -1.883*** -0.337 -1.908*** -0.181 -1.676*** -0.286 -1.748*** -0.979***
ratio at arrival (δ = 0) (0.206) (0.243) (0.203) (0.239) (0.223) (0.251) (0.215) (0.243) (0.294)
Thrift 0.946 2.514*** 0.396 1.573*** -2.081
(0.620) (0.389) (0.627) (0.396) (1.944)
Log pop. density 0.0343* 0.0589*** 0.0340* 0.0556***
(0.0179) (0.0113) (0.0182) (0.0112)
Frac. African American -0.411 -0.969*** -0.313 -0.656**
(0.323) (0.309) (0.317) (0.325)
Frac. Native American 0.586*** 0.524** 0.603*** 0.616***
(0.214) (0.215) (0.219) (0.216)
Observations 16,713 16,713 16,704 16,704 16,713 16,713 16,704 16,704 16,536
R-squared 0.962 0.973 0.962 0.974 0.962 0.974 0.962 0.974
State X Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Instrument No No No No No No No No Yes
County groups 1151 1151 1148 1148 1151 1151 1148 1148 1151
Notes: Italics indicate the variable is ancestry weighted at the county group level as in equation 2.3. All regressions include county group effects and
and standard errors are allowed to cluster at the state level.. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: GMM estimates of the dynamic effects of ancestry weighted Trust
Single equation GMM FE IV Bivariate VAR
Dependent Log(County group GDP per capita) GDP Trust
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Trust 1.347*** 1.630*** 4.552** 1.387*** 2.190*** 2.425***
(0.204) (0.390) (2.204) (0.198) (0.0680) (0.0792)
Decade lag -2.609 1.271*** 1.276*** 0.807***
Trust (1.832) (0.222) (0.226) (0.0258)
Two decade lag -0.182 0.0225 -0.0108 0.0486**
Trust (0.200) (0.168) (0.152) (0.0218)
Decade lag 0.624*** 0.608*** 0.595*** 0.626*** 0.637*** 0.525*** 0.520*** 0.591*** 0.00643***
log county GDP (0.0178) (0.0273) (0.0305) (0.0179) (0.0165) (0.00767) (0.00786) (0.0192) (0.00105)
Two decade lag 0.114*** 0.0705*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.0540*** 0.0493*** 0.0943*** -0.00157**
log county GDP (0.0122) (0.0154) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.00700) (0.00707) (0.0115) (0.000698)
Long-run effect 5.14 5.07 6.01 5.25 5.11 5.20 5.63
Observations 13,268 13,257 13,211 13,268 13,227 13,268 13,242 13,223 13,223
County groups 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147
Add. Inst Past Past
Transform FOD FD FOD FOD FOD FE FE FOD FOD
GMM instruments 1/2 2/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
AB AR(1) in diff. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AB AR(2) in diff. 0.146 0.240 0.207 0.233 0.291 0.134 0.0748
Hansen over id. 0.938 0.889 0.892 0.491 0.323
Notes: Italics indicate the variable is ancestry weighted at the county group level as in equation 2.3. All regressions include year effects and remove
county group fixed effect either by Forward Orthogonal Deviations (FOD), First Difference (FD) or Fixed Effect (FE). The lags of the instruments
are reported in the table under GMM instruments. All endogenous variables have the same instruments. AB AR(1) and AR(2) report the p-values
of the Arellano and Bond [14] test for serial correlation in first and second differences. The Hansen over id. reports the p-value for the Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions when the equation is over-identified. The Additional Instrument is the past ancestry augment with national level
ancestry growth as discussed in Section 2.5.5. Columns 1-5 are estimated in Stata as single equation GMM using xtabond2 with the collapse option
[75], column 6 is estimated using the within estimator, column 7 the within estimator and two stage IV, while columns 8-9 are estimated together as
a panel VAR using pvar [1]. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: County GDP per capita and diversity
Dependent Log(County group income per capita)
variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Trust 2.075*** 2.832*** 3.126*** 2.758*** 2.154*** 2.821*** 2.504*** 2.238***
(0.442) (0.452) (0.598) (0.579) (0.407) (0.454) (0.687) (0.590)
Fractionalization 1.153*** 1.350*** 1.402*** 1.242*** 3.718*** 2.453*** 3.927*** 3.246***
(0.185) (0.180) (0.248) (0.248) (0.762) (0.638) (0.727) (0.556)
Trust weighted -2.791*** -2.304*** -3.286*** -2.295*** -4.979*** -1.546* -4.751*** -1.424
fractionalization (0.481) (0.357) (0.503) (0.410) (1.168) (0.858) (1.246) (0.879)
State history 0.227 0.000957 0.632* 0.125 0.174 -0.0398 0.378 -0.156
in 1500 (0.321) (0.281) (0.356) (0.263) (0.343) (0.286) (0.372) (0.256)
Migrant educ./US -0.161 -1.645*** -0.0746 -1.567*** -0.446** -1.672*** -0.434* -1.735***
ratio at arrival (δ = 0) (0.190) (0.212) (0.222) (0.199) (0.204) (0.225) (0.220) (0.219)
Fractionalization2 -1.882*** -0.905** -2.038*** -1.735***
(0.558) (0.426) (0.583) (0.431)
(Trust weighted 6.793** -2.130 5.788** -1.623
fractionalization)2 (2.673) (2.294) (2.810) (2.245)
Observations 16,713 16,713 16,704 16,704 16,713 16,713 16,704 16,704
R-squared 0.964 0.974 0.965 0.975 0.965 0.975 0.965 0.975
State X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
County group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
County groups 1151 1151 1148 1148 1151 1151 1148 1148
Notes: Italics indicate the variable is ancestry weighted at the county group level as in equation 2.3. All regressions include county group effects and
standard errors are allowed to cluster at the state level. The creation of fractionalization and weighted fractionalization is described in section 2.5.6.
Other controls include the fraction African American, Native American, and log population density. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
151
Appendix for:
Does It Matter Where You Came From?
Ancestry Composition and Economic
Performance of US Counties, 1850 - 2010
Scott L. Fulford, Ivan Petkov, and Fabio Schiantarelli
Not for publication
Appendix A: Constructing the Ancestry Vector
Appendix B: Constructing County GDP
Appendix C: Creating a density of arrival times
Appendix D: Constructing country of origin measures
Additional Tables and Figures
152
Constructing the Ancestry Vector (AV)
The AV for those who are not African American or indigenous
Approach for 1790-1840 when information is limited. The first census in 1790 col-
lected some information by state on “nationality” but none of the censuses until 1850
collected such information. We use the 1790 census to create the initial state level
nationality vector. The census did not collect nationality information again until
1850, so for the initial step we simply allocate the AV for each year between 1800 and
1820 based on the nationality in 1790. One nationality in 1790 is “Hebrew” although
it is very small in all cases. We combine Hebrew with German.
From 1820 to 1830 and 1830 to 1840 the government started collecting information
on immigrants, their country of origin and the state where they moved [18]. We use
these values to update the 1790 ancestry vector to account for the immigration flows
during these two decades.
Approach for 1850, 1860, 1870, 1980, 1990, and 2000 when no parent data exists,
but we have individual data on nativity. Starting in 1850 the census asked the country
of birth for those born outside the United States and the state of birth for those born
within. Samples from the records have been collected and digitized and are stored in
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) collected by Ruggles et al. [76].
For most years the sample was 1 in 100 but larger samples (5%) exist for some years
and we use those where possible.
For each person in the microsample, we create an ancestry vector. The person
receives a one for the place of birth if he or she is from that foreign country. Starting
in 1880 the census also recorded the place of an individuals parents. We describe how
we use this information below. Without the parent information, for non-immigrants
we use the demographic structure attributing to an individual the AV for the age
group between 20 or 30 in the place of birth at the time of her birth. Using those who
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are 20-30 year older means we attribute to a person the AV of the age group most
likely to be her parents. For a non-immigrant who lives in the same state as she was
born, we attribute to her the AV for those who were 20-30 in the county where she
lives now as of the closest census to her birth. This age group is in their most fertile
years and so are the most likely to be her parents. We give non-immigrants who have
moved the AV for 20-30 year olds from their state of birth as of the closest census to
their birth.
During a period of rapid immigration keeping track of the changing demographics
matters. For example, consider someone who was 30 years old in the 1870 census
and was born in Suffolk county, Massachusetts which contains Boston. We would not
want to give a large probability that she had an Irish ancestry, since there was not
yet a large Irish presence in 1840. On the other hand, a 10 year old in 1870 would be
much more likely to have an Irish ancestry The combination of more Irish, and more
Irish in the 20-30 age group makes Irish ancestry more likely. We create the county
average over all individuals to give AV for county and state in that year, as well as the
the AV for those age 20-30 (the “parent” AV). Since we have only state level variation
until 1850, 1860 is the first year where the parent AV will differ by county. In later
years as we move forward with additional microdata, counties become increasingly
diverse.
Approach for 1880 to 1970 using parent nativity. From 1880 to 1970 the census
also collected information on the birthplace of the parents of each person in the
census. We use the same procedure when only the individual birth place is known
for the parents, and then give the individual one half of each parent’s AV. So AVi =
0.5AV (Motheri) + 0.5AV (Fatheri). For the foreign born parents we assign them an
AV with 1 for the country of birth and zero elsewhere. For native parents, we assign
the parent the AV for the age group 20-30 in each parent’s state of birth in the closest
census of birth. If the parent is born in the same state the individual is living in now,
154
we assign the parents the county AV for those 20-30 in the birth year. It is common
for both parents to be from the same country, in which case the AV is just 1 in the
country of origin of both parents.
Approach for 1890 when no individual data exists. Because a fire wiped out all
of the individual level 1890 records, we have to use aggregate data published by the
census for this year. The NHGIS [66] has collected county level information for a wide
range of variables in a number of census years, including 1890, from the published
census volumes. These record the place of birth of the foreign born population. For
each county the AV is: AV (County) = (Fraction Foreign) ∗ AV (Foreign Born) +
(Fraction Native) ∗ AV (Natives).
Forming the non-immigrant AV is more difficult, since the place of birth is only
available at the state level. We use the demographic structure by state in 1880 aged
by 10 years to assign weights for birth years—the fraction of the native population
born closest to the 1880 census, the 1870 census and so on. Then we assign the native
AV over all states as the double sum over state s birthplace (BPL) and year of birth
for each age group d:
AV (Native born in statej) =
S∑
s=1
D∑
d=0
fs,jfd,jAV (s, birthyear of d)
where fs,j is the fraction of the native population in state j born in state s and fd,j
is the fraction of birth group d in state j as constructed from 1880.
Approach for 1940. The 1940 census introduced for what appears to be the first
time supplemental questions that were asked to only a subset of the population. We
will use the question about ancestry in the supplement. The Public Use Microdata
Sample then took a sample from the people who answered the supplemental question
and their households. Since that would tend to over-sample large households, they
first sampled people who had been selected to answer the supplemental question, and
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then selected the households of that person with probability equal to the inverse of
household size. It is an elegant solution since it gave a representative sample of the
entire population and ensured that every household had one person who had answered
the supplemental questions. The procedure means that selecting only those who have
answered the supplemental questions is no longer representative. We use the sample
weights to adjust for the sampling procedure.
African Americans and indigenous peoples
Race is a very important and sensitive issue in the US, and the evidence suggests
that it is not nearly as fixed a concept as is sometimes believed. Since we are pri-
marily interested in the relationship that culture and institutions have with economic
outcomes, forced migration and slavery are one potential source of a particular set
of culture and institutions. We therefore treat self-identified “black” and “white” as
non-mixing groups which contains separate ancestries within them. Within “blacks”
we then distinguish between the descendants of ancestors who were brought from
Africa as slaves—whom we refer to as African American—and later African migrants
from countries such as Nigeria or “black” migrants from the Caribbean. African
Americans represent by far the largest group.
Treating the combined African ancestries as a separate non-mixing group ignores
many complexities of race in America, but we think it is closer to capturing the
experience of race in US history. In the long and racist history of the United States,
the societal rules have tended to make “black” an absorbing state and actively worked
to prevent intermarriage. The rape of slave women was widespread [62, pp. 124-5],
and so many African Americans are the partially descendants of slave holders. Yet
children of “black” mothers were still considered “black” and were still slaves [58].
After the Civil War, interracial marriage was still illegal in 17 states in 1967 when the
US Supreme Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws [60, p. 62]. Such laws had
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the unseemly consequence that made it legally necessary to define who was prohibited
from marrying whom by virtue of their “blood” [77]. The strictest rule held that “one
drop” of blood of African ancestry made someone “black,” although the enforcement
was not universal and less strict rules also existed [60]. Partly as a consequence
of this history, intermarriage between “blacks” and “whites” were uncommon until
very recently. Intermarriage among all races represented just 3.2% of marriages in
1980 and 8.4% in 2010 [89]. Further, intermarriage is not necessarily a problem in
constructing aggregate county ancestry if the children of mixed race couples do not
systematically report themselves as one race or the other.
Similar to African Americans, we treat Native Americans as their own ancestry
group. Partly due to the legacy of forced settlement into reservations, some counties
have a large presence of Native Americans. They are not always recorded well in the
early censuses. Where possible, we take self-identified natives as their own ancestry
group and assume no mixing. Except for counties with reservations, they are typically
a small portion of the population, so this assumption is not particularly important.
On mixing
Our procedure does not distinguish between complete ancestry mixing and the full
separation of ancestries that share the same geography. For example, in a population
half German and half Irish, the second generation will have an AV half German
and half Irish whether or not all of the Germans marry Germans and all of the Irish
marry Irish or there is inter-marriage between Irish and Germans. The AV is thus the
appropriate estimate of the expected ancestry of any individual from that population,
but does not provide a measure of cultural mixing, only of co-location. For African
Americans the use of race assumes that they are fully African American.
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Aggregation and PUMAs
To protect anonymity, from 1950 onwards the microdata does not typically give coun-
ties for the individual records. Usually there is some geographic identifier that com-
bines several counties, although in 1960 only state level information is available. We
therefore use the somewhat larger units available in each year to update the county
level, but maintain the county as the basic unit of observation. The basic idea is
that counties within a group will have a different history and different AV from when
we can fully identify them from 1940 and earlier. The new information from each
post-1940 census is the same within each group but is applied to an already existing
AV. Finally, we aggregate the constructed county level data up to the 1980 Public Use
Micro Areas (PUMAs) since these are the most consistently used areas after 1950.
In keeping with the terminology starting in 1950, we refer to these somewhat larger
aggregates as county groups.30
30See https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/tgeotools.shtml for a description of the geographic
identifiers used over time.
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Constructing county GDP
County manufacturing and agricultural value added 1850-1940
The census recorded for each county the total value of agricultural output and the
value of manufacturing output and costs of inputs. We construct nominal value added
of manufacturing by subtracting the cost of inputs from the total output. In 1850,
the census did not collect manufacturing inputs. We use the average of the 1860 and
1870 county level ratio of outputs to inputs in manufacturing to create inputs. This
approach assumes that at a county level the same ratio of inputs to outputs is used
in 1850 as in 1860 and 1870.
For agriculture during this period the only local measures that exist are of output,
not value added. No good measure at the county level exists of the costs of inputs
in agriculture over a long period. Agriculture does have intermediate inputs such as
fertilizers as well as agriculture inputs used in the production of other agricultural
outputs such a feed corn for cattle and seed. To account for these inputs, we con-
struct a national measure of the ratio of value added to total output by subtracting
intermediate inputs from total agricultural output using series K 220 -250 from U.S.
Census Bureau [86]. While intermediate inputs were small early on at about 6% in
1850, increasing to nearly 12% by 1900, by 1940 they were nearly 40%. Adjusting for
intermediate inputs hastens the relative decline of agriculture after 1900. We apply
the ratio between nominal value added and output at the national level to the value
of county level agricultural output to obtain an estimate of agricultural value added
at the county level.
The census did not collect manufacturing data in 1910, although estimates of
it exist at a national level. To create county level manufacturing, we interpolate
between 1900 and 1920 using the national growth in manufacturing value added and
allocating growth to each decade in the same way we allocated growth in services so
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that manufacturing value added grows in each decade in each county at the same rate
it does at the national level.
Using county employment 1850-1940 to construct value added
in services, mining and construction
The micro-samples of the decadal census collect information on the occupation codes
of the individuals. We allocate the occupations to correspond to the broad NIPA
categories, and so create a measure of the total workers employed in a give industry
in each decade. Then we create county level measures of services value added by
multiplying county level employment for each service category (trade, transportation
and public utilities, finance, professional services, personal services, and government)
by the national measure of value added per employee,the construction of which is
detailed below. We follow the same procedure for construction and mining.
There are several important difficulties with creating county employment: occu-
pations change over time and some occupations such as legal services that may be
classified as a service for an individual are part of manufacturing value added when
performed for a manufacturing firm.
In addition, the sexism and racism inherent in the early censuses poses additional
difficulties. In 1850 women were not coded as having an occupation. While many
women did work solely in domestic production, some women were employed outside
the home. Similarly, in 1850 and 1860, slaves were not listed as having an occupation.
While both slaves and women were enumerated for political purposes, we do not have
information on their occupation. Many, but not all, of the slaves would have been
employed in agricultural production, either directly or indirectly so we are not missing
their output entirely, only undervaluing the skilled services they did provide.
Since the physical census records from 1890 were largely destroyed by fire, there is
no micro-sample from 1890. We linearly interpolate for each county the employment
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by industry category in 1890 using 1880 and 1900.
Measures of services, mining, and construction at the national
level 1850-1960
The construction of value added for services, mining and construction varies by sub-
period depending on the information available
Value added per worker by services category 1840-1900. Gallman and Weiss [46]
construct measures of services value added and employment for eight categories at a
national level from 1840 to 1900: trade; transportation and public utilities; finance
professional services, personal services, government, education, and “hand trades.”
Hand trades are composed of smithing, shoe repair, and tailoring. These activities are
technically manufacturing (they are constructed by hand or manus), but by the time
formal national accounts were constructed in the 1950s had become part of services.
Since the census includes output from the hand trades as manufacturing, we exclude
them to avoid double counting. Combined with the Gallman and Weiss [46] estimates
of the labor force in each category, we create a measure of the value added per worker.
Value added per worker by services category 1930-1960. The National Income and
Product Accounts [83] break down by industry the product (p. 104) and “persons
engaged in production” (p. 122) which includes full time employees, part-time em-
ployees, and the self-employed. Since the census samples we use at the county level do
not distinguish between full and part-time work or self-employment, the broad mea-
sure best matches the county data we use. We use the equivalent tables in United
States Department of Commerce [84] to construct nominal value added per person
engaged in production for the post-war period.
Constructing value added for services in 1910 and 1920. No estimates connect the
Gallman and Weiss [46] and United States Department of Commerce [83] estimates
of services value added by category. Since our goal is to correctly capture the relative
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value of different services, and their relationship to other productive activities, we
interpolate the national value added of service categories in 1910 and 1920 based on
1900 and 1930. Since both prices and real activity increased rapidly over the period,
the interpolation method matters. Linear interpolation, for example, is not a good
choice because overall growth rates differ by decade. Linear interpolation of current
dollar values between 1900 and 1930 tends to overstate growth from 1910 to 1920 since
overall real GDP grew faster from 1900 to 1910 than 1910 to 1920 while prices grew
faster from 1910 to 1920. So we first convert value added by each service category to
real values using the GDP price deflator from Sutch [80]. Then we allocate growth
in each decade in each service category from 1900 to 1930 to match the growth of
real GDP per capita 1900 to 1930.31 Note that we do not require the growth in
service categories to be the same (some categories had almost no real growth over the
period), only that where there is growth the proportion that takes place between 1900
and 1910 be the same as for overall growth. We finally obtain nominal quantities of
(national) service value added for 1910 and 1920 by multiplying by the GDP price
deflator from Sutch [80].
Value added for construction and mining. We use the values of mining and con-
tract construction from the National Income and Product Accounts in 1930 and 1940
to construct national value added per worker. From 1880 to 1920 we also use the
estimates of Wright [91] for mining. From 1850 to 1870 we use the ratio of the value
added per worker in mining to the value added in transportation in 1880 times the
value added per worker in transportation in 1850, 1860, and 1870. This approach as-
sumes that the value added in transportation and mining grow at the same rate from
1850 to 1870. An important part of the value of mineral and fuel extraction comes
31Let y1900 be real national GDP per capita in 1900. Then a fraction f
y
1910−1900 = (y1910 −
y1900)/(y1930 − y1900) of that growth took place between 1900 and 1910. We assume the same
fraction of growth in each service category took place between 1900 and 1910. So for some service
category s we observe value added per person ys1900 and y
s
1930 then we calculate y
s
1910 = f
y
1910−1900 ∗
(ys1930 − ys1910).
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from transporting it to populated areas. Transportation value added per worker grew
at close to the same rate as overall national product per person during the period.
Our approach for construction is similar but involves even stronger assumptions. Con-
struction value added per worker before 1930 is simply its ratio to national income
per person in 1930 and 1940. This approach assumes that construction value added
grows at the same rate as the national economy, and that employment in construc-
tion is a good measure of the distribution of construction activity. Construction is
a relatively small component of GDP—it composed only 5% of national product in
1950 and our estimates suggest it was smaller before that—and this approach puts a
reasonable value on construction.
Income per capita 1950-2010
Starting in 1950 official statistics report measures of personal income per capita at the
county level. We combine the county level income data from the County Data Books
[85] with the county income from the census in 1980, 1990, 2000, and the combined
2008-2012 American Community Survey collected by Minnesota Population Center
[66]. In 1950, the census only reported median household income at the county level,
while in other years we have mean income per person. To account for this discrepancy
we multiply the 1950 median household income by the mean income to median income
ratio in 1960 for each county. This approach is exactly correct if growth from 1950 to
1960 was entirely mean shifting, leaving the distribution unchanged, and family sizes
did not change.
County output 1950 and 1960
Starting in 1950, the census micro-samples no longer report the current county of res-
idence so it is no longer possible to construct county employment shares by industry.
The City and County Databooks [85] provide measures of employment in 1950 and
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1960, as well as manufacturing and agricultural products sold.
The manufacturing values in the the Databooks are reported as value added in
1947, 1954, 1958, and 1963. Rather than taking the linear average, which misses the
rapid growth during the period, we take the average growth rate in each county from
1947 to 1954, and use the county specific growth rate for three years starting in 1947.
We use the same method to update 1958.
The agriculture values in the Databooks give the total value of farm products sold
in 1950 and 1959 which we use to construct agriculture in 1960 by multiplying the
county value by the nominal national increase in the total output in agriculture from
1959 to 1960 in series K 220-239 in U.S. Census Bureau [86]. Since these values do
not include farm products consumed by farm households, we adjust both for value
added and consumption using series K 220-239 in U.S. Census Bureau [86]. Own
consumption was slightly more than 6% of total farm output in 1950. Of much larger
importance is the value of intermediate inputs which were close to 40% of total output
in 1950.
The Databooks report “Mining Industries Employees” in 1939 which we use for
1940 without adjustment, and 1958 and 1963 which we apply to 1960 by taking the
county specific linear average. The Databooks report a value added measure of mining
in 1963, but we continue to use the employment based measure for consistency with
earlier estimates.
In 1950 and 1960, the Databooks report the employees in construction; man-
ufacturing; transportation and public utilities; wholesale and retail trade; finance,
insurance, and real estate; and overall employment. The reporting in the Databooks
for some counties is problematic, since some counties have more employment listed
in a given category than overall. To create a less error filled employment variable,
we take the larger of civilian and total employment (total employment is not always
larger). Personal and professional employees are only reported in 1950, and govern-
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ment employees only in 1970. We use overall employment to construct a residual
government and personal employment in 1950 and 1960 by subtracting out the other
categories and setting the residual to zero if it would be negative. The residual in
1960 contains both government and personal services, we divide between them using
the fraction of personal in personal and government services in 1950.
With employment totals we find a value added of services using the same method
as for 1940 and earlier. Using Tables 6.1B for national income by industry and 6.8B
“Persons engaged in production” in United States Department of Commerce [84] gives
an average product per employee per industry which combine with employment by
industry in each county to create a measure of value added by county by industry.
Combining income and output measures
From 1850 to 1960 we have created something close to GDP per capita for each
county. Starting in 1950 we have an income based measure from the census. These
two measures are not the same; in each decade from 1950 to 2010, the sum of county
aggregate incomes from the census is less than GDP from the national accounts. In-
come leaves out a number of categories such as owner occupied rent that are included
in GDP. A a county level, moreover, income, which can include profits from activities
elsewhere, need not be the same as a measure of the gross domestic product produced
in a county. We use the overlap of our income measure and GDP measure in 1950 to
combine the two series to create a measure of GDP per capita over the entire time
period. We use the ratio of GDP to income in 1950 and update using the county in-
come after that. Effectively, we use the growth rate of personal income at the county
level to approximate the growth rate of county level GDP after 1950. Some counties
have GDP-to-income ratios that are extreme because the constructed value of county
GDP is low. We replace the five counties with a GDP-to-income ratio less that 0.3
with their state average ratio.
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Finally, we deflate our constructed measure of county level nominal GDP by the
GDP deflator in Sutch [80], updated using Bureau of Economic Analysis tables on
GDP and the GDP deflator.
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Creating a density of arrival times
Immigrants arrived at different times and we would like to reflect what immigrants
brought with them by the conditions in their country of origin at the time of immigra-
tion. Doing so requires knowledge of the conditional density of immigration over time
so that, for example, the Irish coming in the 1850s reflect different experiences than
the Irish in the 1890s, both of whom are different from the Italians in the 1910s. Our
ancestry measure captures very well the stock of people whose ancestors came from
a country of origin. Since it is a stock, however, changes in it reflect both increases
from migration, but also natural changes from births and deaths. We therefore turn
to immigration records that contain the number of migrants arriving from different
countries starting in the 1820s [39] at a national level. In 1850 we create a density
of arrival times for the stock of migrants in 1850 based on Daniels [37]. The division
is appropriately coarse given the limited information, and so only divides between
arrivals in 1650, 1700, 1750, 1800, and 1850. For example, we allocate all of the
Netherlands arrivals to 1700, and divide the English migrants to between 1650 and
1750 to reflect the later migration of lowland Scots and Scotch-Irish. Using our an-
cestry vector and county population, we create a stock of total population of ancestry
a in time t: P at . The immigration records then record the number of migrants I
a
t+1
from country a over the decade from t to t+ 1. The density F at (τ) gives the density
of arrival times τ of the descendents of the population of ancestry a at time t (which
is by definition 0 for all τ > t since it is a conditional density). We update it based
on immigration records using:
F at+1(τ) =
(P at+1 − Iat+1)F at+1(τ) + Iat+11(τ = t+ 1)
P at+1
, (2.6)
where 1(τ = t+ 1) is an indicator which is one if τ = t+ 1. This formula updates the
density at t by the fraction of new migrants between t and t+1 compared to the total
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stock. For example, the density changes only slightly for the English between 1880
and 1890, despite more than 800,000 migrants because the stock is so large, while
the 1.4 million German immigrants significantly shift the arrival density of Germans
because of the smaller stock.
We modify this approach slightly for smaller immigrant groups. Immigration
records group some countries together and information is not available for all coun-
tries. We assign the density of arrival times to similar countries, or from the overall
group. For example, we assign the arrival times of “Other Europe” in the immigra-
tion records to Iceland. However, the total migration from all of “Other Europe” is
larger than our estimates of the population descended from Iceland migrants in most
years. We assume that the arrival of migrants is proportional to the larger group (or
similar country), and scale the number of migrants so that the population implied by
the immigrant records is no larger than the population implied by the census records.
In particular, define a projected population that would come from immigration and
natural increase from growth rate g:
Pˆ at =
−∞∑
τ=t
(1 + g)t−τIaτ .
Pˆ at is the population that would occur if all immigrants came and then grew in
population at growth rate g. Then define:
ωa = max
t
Pˆ at
P at
as the maximum ratio of the projected population based on the (too large) immi-
gration records and the population descended from group a. We then define the
scaled immigration of the particular group as Iˆat = I
a
t /ω
a which scales the number of
migrants to the overall population of that group.32
32The procedure is slightly more complicated for small countries where measurement error in either
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Austria-Hungary and its constituent countries pose a special problem. At least
some Czech and Slovak migration (which are record together as Czechoslovakia) ap-
pears to be part of the Austrian migration in the immigration records since our an-
cestry calculations suggest a substantial Czechoslovakia presence from 1900 to 1920,
while the immigration records show few migrants. Similarly, Poland was divided
among Austria, Hungary, Germany, and Russia in the decades ending in 1900, 1910,
and 1920 during a period of peak migration. We assign a fraction of Austrian migra-
tion to Czechoslovakia, and a portion of German, Hungarian, and Russian migration
to Poland. The fractions are approximate based on the relative populations in 1910.
Several groups have a special set of arrival times that are more or less by assump-
tion. We assign African Americans an arrival of 1750. Significant groups of Native
Americans are first counted in the census or forced to move to new areas after 1850.
We assign them an “arrival” of 1840, acknowledging that giving an indigenous group
an arrival time is problematic, but think of it as representing an approximate density
of the start of substantial contact with other groups, with all of its many, often neg-
ative, consequences. Puerto Rico similarly represents a complicated situation since
Puerto Rican’s have been US. citizens since 1917, but the data used to track Puerto
Rico the same way as the rest of the US counties is only sporadically available. We
allocate a small mainland migration in 1910 and a much larger one in 1960 to match
the ancestry population totals.
While the density is approximate it still provides very useful information that
matches immigration narratives. For example, the 2010 density gives the average
decade of arrival for each ancestry living in 2010. Most Irish are descended from
immigrants who arrived in the 1840s, with substantial populations in the 1850s and
our measure based on samples from the census, or immigration statistics can produce very large ωa.
We define ωa as the maximum ratio of projected to census population when the census population
is at least 100,000. If the ancestry never reaches 100,000, we still use the overall maximum. Finally,
if this procedure produces an immigration flow larger than our projected population, we set the
density equal to 1 in that year.
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1860s, but few afterwards compared to the large population. Based on these calcula-
tions, more people of Chinese ancestry are descended from people who migrated from
1860 - 1880 than the second wave of Chinese migration from 1970-2010. Far more mi-
grants came later, but the early migrants had already established a population which
grew over time and which we track geographically with the census calculations. Other
Asian migrants have come mostly since 1970, except the Japanese who are mostly
descended from early migrants.
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Constructing country of origin measures
Origin Country GDP
This section briefly details how we fill in the gaps left in origin country GDP per capita
in the Bolt and van Zanden [26] update of Maddison [63]. Some crucial countries of
origin are not available for all dates going back although some information is available.
We fill in missing data by making reasonable assumptions about the likely relationship
within other countries or the same country on surrounding dates. The most important
of these is Ireland which did not obtain independence until 1921, and has only spotty
estimates of income separate from the United Kingdom. We use the ratio of Irish to
UK GDP in 1921 to fill in dates from 1880 to 1920, and the ratio of Irish to UK in
1870 to fill in dates before that. While this approach will clearly miss Irish specific
events such as the potato blight, our goal is to get the relative incomes appropriately.
Little information is available for countries in Africa. Ghana, a British colony,
has estimates in 1913 and 1870 and yearly starting in 1950 (Ghana was the first
African country to achieve independence in 1957). We linearly interpolate between
1870, 1913, and 1950, but since the value in 1870 is close to subsistence (439 in 1990
$ ) we set 1850 and 1860 to 439.
The West Indies is a birthplace for a substantial portion of the population in some
areas early on. We use the post-1950 Maddison numbers for the Caribbean. We take
the ratio of the Caribbean to Jamaica between 1913 and 1950 when there are no
overall Caribbean numbers listed, interpolate between years 1900 to 1913, and again
use the ratio of Caribbean to Jamaica between 1900 and 1870, and again prior to
1870.
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have some early migration (small overall). They
are combined where there is data on them separately, but we use the ratio with overall
Eastern Europe to go back earlier.
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Puerto Rico has a special status. It has been a US possession since 1898, and
after 1950 there was significant migration to the mainland. We treat Puerto Rico as
a separate ancestry recognizing its distinct culture. The ancestors of Puerto Ricans
appear to be a combination of Spanish, Africans brought as slaves, and a mix of other
immigrants. We assign Puerto Rico its own GDP after 1950, but before that give it
the Caribbean GDP adjusted for the Puerto Rico-to-Caribbean ratio in 1950.
The Pacific Islands (a birthplace in the census) as well as American Somoa repre-
sent a similar problem to Puerto Rico. We create a Pacific Islands (including Somoa)
GDP per capita by taking the ratio of Fiji and Indonesia in 2010 (source: World
Bank, 2010 International $PPP) and using the Indonesian GDP going back in time.
We create Latin America GDP before 1870 as the ratio of Argentina, Brazil, and
Colombia in 1870 times their average before that. Mexico is always separate, so Latin
America excludes Mexico as an ancestry.
Israel is complicated in the past since it had substantial migration to create the
modern state. We assign the Lebanon GDP to Israel/Palestine before 1950. Note
that Jewish migration from Europe to the US is measured as the country of origin in
Europe.
Afghanistan has the India GDP in 1870, and its own after 1950.
For smaller countries (with comparably small migrations) where information is
missing we assign them to a comparable larger country. We assign Lichtenstein,
Monaco, and Andorra the French GDP; San Marino, Vatican City, Malta, and Cyprus
the Italian GDP; Gibraltar the Spain GDP; Lapland n.s. the Finland GDP. All of
Eastern Europe n.s., Central Europe n.s., Eastern Europe n.s., and Southern Europe
n.s. get the Eastern Europe overall GDP.
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Culture Measures from the World Values Survey
We construct measures of several cultural attitudes from the European Values Sur-
vey and the World Values Survey. We use an integrated version of the survey that
combines both sources and utilized each of the six waves available between 1981 and
2014. The cultural endowment is inferred from the answers to six survey questions:
Trust: A measure of generalized trust is estimated from the responses to the
question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” We calculate the proportion
of the total respondents from a given nationality that answer that “most people can be
trusted.” An alternative response to this question is that one “can’t be too careful.”
Control: As a measure of the attitude towards one’s control over personal circum-
stances we use the answer to the question: “Some people feel they have completely
free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has
no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means ”none at
all” and 10 means ”a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control
you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” In particular, we take the average
response by nationality for all countries in our dataset.
Respect, Obedience, and Thrift: To measure the attitude toward authority and
towards saving behavior we use the following question from the survey: “Here is a
list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any,
do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.“ There are
17 possible qualities listed. We estimate the proportion of people by nationality
that respond that “tolerance and respect for other people” is important to measure
Respect and the proportion of people that respond that “obedience” is important to
measure Obedience. To measure the importance of saving we estimate the proportion
of people that respond that “thrift saving money and things” is important.
Holiday: To measure the attitude towards leisure we use the response to the
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question: “Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please
look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job?”
Similarly to the questions regarding important qualities in children this question has
18 different aspects. We use the fraction of people that respond that “generous
holidays” is an important aspect in a job to proxy for the attitude towards leisure.
Following Tabellini [82] we also form the first principal component of the combined
attitudes Trust, Control, Respect, and Obedience at the individual level, and then
take the average of the principal component for each country.
Immigrant Education
In this section we describe how we measure immigrant education, attempting to cap-
ture the human capital compared to the United States at the time, of the immigrants
when they arrive. Combined with the density of arrival times, the measure of new
immigrant education gives an average arrival weighted education.
The census records the birthplace, so we know the education of immigrants, but
does not record the year of arrival. For example, although the census records the
Italians who were in the US. in 1910, we do not know which of them arrived between
1900 and 1910. We make the assumption that recent migrants are those who were
born in a foreign country and are between 20 and 30 as of the age census. Most of the
large waves of migration were primarily among young people, although some migrants
brought their families and so came as children. Taking the 20-30 year olds thus mixes
some people who came recently with some who may have come as children and so
received an their education in the United States. In 1850 we assign the literacy of
the 30-40 years olds migrants to the 20-30 year olds migrating in 1830-1840. For 1890
when the census micro-samples were destroyed we assign the literacy of the 30-40 year
olds in 1900. For African Americans we use the education level as of 1900 since there
were rapid gains in literacy after the civil war which slowed after 1900. For Native
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Americans we use the literacy levels as of 1900 which is the first year that Native
Americans are recorded extensively.
The micro-samples from the census record the education as well as the birthplace.
Before 1940 the census only records literacy, while after that it records years of educa-
tion. Since we want to create a measure that captures the average relative education
of migrants, we must combine these disparate measures so that we can compare the
relative education of later migrants with early ones. We take the ratio of the 20-30
migrant literacy for each ancestry to the non-migrant US education of 20-30 year olds
before 1940, and use years of education starting in 1940.
With no adjustment this procedure assumes that the ratio of years of education
is the same as the ratio of literacy. Rather than make this strong assumption, we
instead adjust the literacy ratio so that it gives the linear prediction of the years of
education ratio. To do this we take the demographic groups that are age 30-40, 40-50,
and 50-60 in 1940 for whom we observe their education, and compare the literacy of
the same ancestry groups who were 20-30, 30-40, and 40-50 in 1930. Regressing the
ratio of each age-ancestry groups years of education to the US (measured in 1940)
on the same ratio for literacy (measured in 1930) then gives a prediction of how the
ratio to US literacy converts to the ratio to US years of education on average. We
use this prediction to adjust the literacy ratios before 1940.
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Table A-1: GMM estimates of the dynamic effect of ancestry weighted arrival origin GDP
Single equation GMM FE IV Bivariate VAR
Dependent Log(County group GDP per capita) GDP Origin GDP
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [7] [7] [8] [9]
Log origin GDP/US 0.226*** 0.159*** 0.107 0.225*** 0.279*** 0.327***
on arrival (0.0244) (0.0390) (0.137) (0.0243) (0.00995) (0.0116)
Decade lag 0.0286 0.106*** 0.0869*** 0.755***
Log origin GDP (0.108) (0.0286) (0.0282) (0.0203)
Two decade lag 0.0729*** 0.0860*** 0.0706*** 0.0802***
Log origin GDP (0.0242) (0.0226) (0.0212) (0.0167)
Decade lag 0.622*** 0.644*** 0.632*** 0.626*** 0.633*** 0.548*** 0.541*** 0.598*** 0.0163***
log county GDP (0.0165) (0.0230) (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0152) (0.00760) (0.00775) (0.0172) (0.00586)
Two decade lag 0.126*** 0.0828*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.116*** 0.0701*** 0.0669*** 0.105*** -0.0175***
log county GDP (0.0114) (0.0139) (0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.00702) (0.00709) (0.0111) (0.00463)
Long-run effect 0.90 0.58 0.83 0.90 0.76 0.73 0.83
Observations 13,268 13,257 13,211 13,268 13,227 13,268 13,242 13,223 13,223
County groups 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147
Add. Inst Past Past
Transform FOD FD FOD FOD FOD FE FE FOD FOD
GMM instruments 1/2 2/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
AB AR(1) in diff. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AB AR(2) in diff. 0.0215 0.535 0.122 0.0346 0.138 0.680 0.608
Hansen over id. 0.00828 0.0345 0.752 0.0206 0.510
Notes: Italics indicate the variable is ancestry weighted at the county group level as in equation 2.3. All regressions include year effects and remove
county group fixed effect either by Forward Orthogonal Deviations (FOD) or First Difference (FD). The lags of the instruments are reported in the
table under GMM instruments. All endogenous variables have the same instruments. AB AR(1) and AR(2) report the p-values of the Arellano and
Bond [14] test for serial correlation in first and second differences. The Hansen over id. reports the p-value for the Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions when the equation is over-identified. The Additional Instrument is the past ancestry augment with national level ancestry growth as
disused in Section 2.5.5. Columns 1-5 are estimated in Stata as single equation GMM using xtabond2 with the collapse option [75], column 6 is
estimated using the within estimator, column 7 the within estimator and two stage IV, while columns 8-9 are estimated together as a panel VAR
using pvar [1].
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Figure A-1: Impulse response of log county income and ancestry weighted trust
.
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Notes: Shows impulse responses corresponding to columns 8-9 in table A-1 estimated together as a
panel VAR using pvar [1]. The impulses are calculated using two Cholesky decompositions: (1) No
immediate effect of GDP on GDP1870, but GDP1870 can immediately affect GDP, (2) No immediate
effect of GDP1870 on GDP, but GDP can immediately affect GDP1870. The size of the impulse
is the standard deviations of the residuals in each equation. Shaded areas are the 95% confidence
intervals based on Monte Carlo simulation.
177
178
Chapter 3
Culture: Persistence and Evolution
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
Learning how a person’s values and beliefs are formed and transmitted from one
generation to the next is the first step towards understanding the more general prob-
lem of how persistent a society’s values and beliefs are – an issue on which there is
abundant disagreement. Some contributions argue that values and beliefs are deeply
rooted in the country or ethnic group to which a person belongs — being related for
example to history or geography — and evolve slowly over time.1 Others, instead,
suggest that cultural attitudes can change rather quickly in response to changes in
economic incentives and opportunities, in technology, and in institutions.2 Both views
of culture (slow versus fast moving) have truth in them, in the sense that while some
cultural traits certainly go back to the distant past and affect today’s economic and
institutional outcomes, it is also true that many values and beliefs evolve in response
to changes in technology, economic environment, and in political institutions.
1See Putnam (1993), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006, 2007, 2008), Tabellini (2008a,b),
Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), Durante (2009), and Roland (2004). See Alesina and Giuliano
(2013) for a recent review.
2See Gruber and Hungerman (2008), Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007), Di Tella, Galiani and
Schargrodsky (2007), Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), Fernandez (2011), Fehr (2009), and Bowles
(1998).
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An important distinction in understanding the process through which a person’s
values and beliefs are formed is that between “vertical” and “horizontal” transmission.
Inside the family, parents shape their children’s preferences balancing the desire to
share common values with them, with the concern for teaching traits that will make
it easier for their children to function in the social environment in which they will
live: this is vertical transmission. But children are also exposed to the world outside
the family and thus are subject to a process of social imitation and learning external
to the family: this is horizontal transmission.3 Two different models of cultural
transmission are thus at work, as in the models of evolutionary biology4: vertical
transmission, like genetic inheritance, tends to be relatively more conservative, giving
rise to slow evolution of culture; horizontal transmission, as in an epidemic, may result
in a rapid change in the number of people who adopt a new cultural characteristic
particularly if it is attractive to the receiver. This can happen, not in historic time,
but in the space of a few generations.
Thinking about these issues, it is reasonable to consider immigrants an ideal group
to study. The incentives that give rise to vertical transmission could be particularly
strong among immigrants, as early-generations immigrants may want their children
to share some of the values that they, or their own parents, brought with them from
their country of origin. But some of these inherited values may be at odds with the
culture of the new country in which they are living, possibly hindering productive
interaction with other groups, and may be modified by the social interactions in
the new environment: horizontal transmission could thus also be particularly strong
among immigrants.
In this paper we investigate the speed of evolution of a wide range of cultural
attitudes for different generations of European immigrants to the United States. We
3The transmission that occurs from a member of the previous generation who is external to the
family to a member of the present generation is often called oblique. We consider it as a part of
horizontal transmission.
4See Cavalli-Sforza (1981) and (2001, ch.6), Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005).
180
look at a variety of attitudes, rather than a single one because we surmise there
is substantial heterogeneity across cultural traits and immigrant origins in the speed
with which attitudes evolve across generations. We study the transmission of attitudes
through four generations (a century) because it is possible that some attitudes may
appear to be quite persistent within a couple of generations but change significantly
by the fourth generation. We use data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to
analyze the evolution of cultural attitudes about religion, family, gender, sexuality,
cooperation, redistribution, etc., distinguishing between first, second, third and fourth
(or higher) generations of European immigrants to the US. The focus on European
immigrants is largely imposed on us by the availability of sufficient data for multiple
generations distinguished by country of origin. We use data contained in 21 waves
(the exact number varies across attitudes) of the GSS survey collected between the
end of the 1970’s and 2012. Although the GSS is far from being perfect, it is the only
data source that allows a systematic investigation of the evolution of cultural values
for multiple generations, multiple countries of origin and for multiple traits.
Immigrants provide a particularly useful laboratory for the study of the evolution
of values and beliefs because, as mentioned above, their cultural attitudes are likely
to bear the mark of the country from which they, their parents or their grandparents
emigrated.5 However, they are also influenced by their exposure to US society and
its social, political, and economic institutions, often very different from those of the
country of origin. They thus provide an interesting quasi-experiment for the effect on
inherited cultural attitudes of a change in the economic and social environment. The
conditions under which this leads to integration of immigrants or to the emergence
of immigration clusters in which separate cultural traits persist has been debated in
the theoretical and empirical literature.6
5See Fernandez (2008).
6See the seminal paper by Lazear (1999) on the incentives to and conditions for integration in
heterogeneous populations and the inter-temporal extension in Konya (2005). Bisin and Verdier
(2000), (2001) provide conditions under which heterogeneity in cultural values may be a stable
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In order to provide some structure in discussing the results, we develop a simple
model of socialization and identity choice. The model builds largely on the contribu-
tions by Bisin and Verdier (2001) on the choice of socialization by parents, and on
Lazear (1999) and Konya (2005) for a child’s choice of her cultural identity. Parents
derive utility form the child retaining their original cultural trait, but also consider the
possibility that this may hinder the child’s ability to interact productively with the
majority. The child plays an active role in the model and chooses her identity weigh-
ing the expected transaction gains from assimilation and a switching cost that partly
depends upon the parents socialization effort, and which also contains a component
that is randomly distributed across the population. Parents choose the optimal level
of socialization taking into account of the child’s optimization problem, knowing the
distribution of the switching cost, but not the realization for their child. The model
yields two possible type of equilibria: one with complete assimilation and another
with the minority group not assimilating. The occurrence or not of assimilation, and
its speed when it happens, depends upon a set of parameters that are likely to vary
across different cultural traits and across countries of origin, such as the child’s net
transaction gains and the switching costs from assimilating, the utility benefit to the
parents from the child maintaining the original trait, together with the costs of the
socialization effort, and, finally, the discount factor parents apply to the child’s utility.
In studying how a person’s values and beliefs are formed and transmitted from
one generation to the next, and whether or not they converge, we face a number of
empirical challenges. First and foremost, immigrants, even from the same country of
origin, differ, depending on when the first generation of the “dynasty” they belong to
arrived in the US. Irish immigrants who arrived in the 1890s, for example, are clearly
equilibrium in an optimizing model of cultural transmission under imperfect parental empathy. See
also Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004), Tabellini (2008b), and Bisin and Verdier (2010) for a review. See
also Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) for a model of transmission of beliefs, Fernandez (2013) for
a model of beliefs formation, and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) for a model of endogenous preference
formation.
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different, in terms of the values they brought with them, from post World War II first
generation Irish immigrants. One has to account for this in empirical work, in order to
separate convergence of values across generations of immigrants from convergence of
values over time across countries of origin. For this reason we study the transmission
of values and beliefs within a single dynasty, starting with first generation immigrants
born before World War I. We follow the cohort of the children of this generation, and
the cohorts of their grand children and of their grand-grand children.
Finally, one should not forget that our results are specific to, say, Irish immigrants
and cannot be extended to all Irishmen, including those who never left Ireland, since
emigrants are not a random sample of the population. We will discuss how selection
issues within first generation immigrants, between those who decide to stay and those
who return to the original countries leads to an underestimate or overestimate of the
speed of change of culture.7
We are certainly not the first ones to analyze these issues8. However, most existing
contributions focus on the persistence of cultural traits for second generation immi-
grants and on their effect on economic and social outcomes. For instance, Giuliano
(2007) presents evidence that cultural heritage is important for living arrangements,
Fernandez (2007) for female labor force participation, and Fernandez and Fogli (2009)
for female labor force participation and fertility outcomes, all using US census data.
Fernandez and Fogli (2006), using the GSS, finds results that are also supportive
of an effect of the culture of the country of ancestry on fertility outcomes for US
immigrants, although no distinction is made between second and higher generation
7The speed at which attitudes evolve may depend upon the community within which a person
lives. Italians immigrants who were brought up in New York’s Little Italy neighborhood are likely
to lose their “country-of-origin” attitudes more slowly than Italians who settled in the mid-West.
Sample sizes in the GSS do not allow us to address fully this issue. We will leave it for future
research.
8Earlier contributions in the sociological literature use early waves of the GSS, and focus on the
assimilation process of specific groups, such as Italian immigrants in Greeley (1974, ch.4) and Alba
(1985, ch.6). The results in Greeley are based on a sample of males only. Both studies emphasize the
change, as opposed to the persistence of cultural attitudes, but do not distinguish among different
generations.
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immigrants.9 Exceptions, in the sense that they use generations beyond the second,
are Antecol (2000) – who finds that culture matters for the gender gap in labor force
participation, for both the first, second and higher generations of US immigrants,
although less for the latter – and Borjas (1992) who shows that ethnic capital (mea-
sured as average ethnic-specific education, professional achievement or wages) has a
greater effect on children’s education, occupation and wages for both the second and
the third generation, although the effect tends to be higher for the second.10
The paper has three main findings. First we provide evidence of heterogeneity
across cultural traits in the speed with which they evolve across generations and con-
verge to the prevailing norm. We document the persistence of family values (parental
control on teenager’s access to contraception, ease of divorce, and frequency of social
events with relatives, the role of women in society at large and in politics), political
views, and deep individual religious values (as reflected in the answers to questions
regarding belief in the frequency of prayer and approval of prayer in public schools).
As a result, the values of immigrants of fourth-or-higher generation still bear strongly
the imprint of their ancestors, who migrated to the United States many decades ear-
lier. We also show that attitudes towards cooperation (the trustworthiness, helpful-
ness and fairness of others), children’s independence, and sexuality converge, instead,
more quickly, as successive generations adapt to the norms of the new society in
which they live. The same is true – namely relative fast convergence – for the fre-
quency of attendance to religious services. The latter reflects the social dimension
of the religious experience and behaves differently from the other slow moving per-
9See also Algan, Bisin, Manning and Verdier (2012) and associated authors for a study of the
pattern of cultural and economic integration of immigrants in Europe, and how they differ by
immigrant communities, religious beliefs and host countries. The empirical evidence is based on
the European Social Survey, complemented by other data sources, and the focus is on the first
and second generation’s indicators of social and cultural integration (family arrangements, fertility,
education, labor market outcomes, religion, language spoken, etc.).
10Rice and Feldman (1997) distinguish the level of civic attitudes for Italian immigrants on the
basis of the number of grandparents born in the US and reach the surprising conclusion that the
descendants of earlier immigrants are more likely to give less civic responses than the descendants
of later immigrants.
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sonal religious values mentioned above. Finally, results concerning cultural attitudes
towards women’s role outside the home imply a faster convergence of attitudes to-
wards women in the workplace, such as the perceived cost of market work for the
mother-child relationship, compared to attitudes about the general role of women in
politics.
These results are largely consistent with one prediction of our simple model in
the sense that faster convergence is observed for attitudes that are likely to generate
larger transaction gains from assimilation, such as attitudes towards cooperation,
compared to those for which transaction gains are likely to be smaller, such as the
frequency of prayer and approval of prayer in public schools. Convergence is also
slower for attitudes for which the utility gain to the parents from the child retaining
the original trait is likely to be higher, such as some family values. Interestingly,
the relatively faster convergence of attitudes towards women’s work in the market, as
opposed to their role in politics, can be explained by the large economic gains from
having women participating in market work.
Our second important result is that time since the original immigration of the an-
cestors matters and that the results obtained studying higher generation immigrants
differ from those obtained limiting the analysis to the second generation. Thus, find-
ing that the attitudes of second generation immigrants still closely reflect those of
the country of origin, does not imply per se that attitudes are very persistent. For
instance, the beliefs that shape trust of second generation immigrant towards other
members of society still bear strongly the mark of the country of origin and are dif-
ferent for immigrants from different countries of origin. However, such differences
become smaller when one considers fourth or higher-generation immigrants.
Finally, we find that persistence is “culture-specific” in the sense that the country
from which one’s ancestors came matters in defining the pattern of integration (or
lack thereof) with respect to the entire set of cultural traits. Moreover, the strength
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of the family in each country of ancestry and the degree of difficulty in learning
English are (negatively) correlated with the fraction of attitudes for which we observe
faster convergence. These results could also be interpreted in the light of our model:
switching costs, for instance, are likely to be related to language proximity and to the
strength of family ties. However, given the small number of countries involved, this
results must be taken with a grain of salt.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate a simple model of
parents’ socialization and children’s identity choice. In section 3 we discuss how we
measure cultural attitudes in the GSS, how we define generations and ethnic origin,
and which European countries (or groups of countries) we use in our analysis. In Sec-
tion 4 we describe how we recover the country of origin effect for different generations,
dynasties and time periods, while in Section 5 we illustrate our measure of cultural
“convergence”. In Section 6 we present and discuss our main empirical results. Sec-
tion 7 contains several robustness checks and extensions. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Why Persistence Can Differ Among Cultural
Traits and Countries of Origin : A Model of
Cultural Transmission
This section contains a simple model that will help interpret our main empirical
findings, namely that different cultural traits may converge at varying speed, or not
converge at all. Moreover, the dynamics of cultural convergence may differ across
cultures i.e. in terms of our empirical work, across countries of origin. The model
is based on the idea that a person’s traits evolve through two parallel processes:
vertical transmission within the family and horizontal transmission associated with
social interactions outside the family. The model draws on the vast literature carefully
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reviewed in Bisin and Verdier (2011).11
The model is set up as follows. Assume there is one cultural trait in the popula-
tion that can take two values: one associated with the minority, denoted by m and
the other associated with the majority, denoted by M . Think of the two traits as
representing, for instance, the attitude towards pre-marital sex, one of the attitudes
whose evolution we study in our empirical analysis. Recent immigrants (the minority)
might still carry their cultural attitudes of the country of origin, which could be quite
different from those of the majority in the United States, the new social environment
in which they live.
We normalize the population to 1 and assume that the initial size of the minority is
q. Consider a second-generation immigrant belonging to the minority group. Personal
attitudes are shaped by two forces: “vertical” transmission within the family and
“horizontal” transmission from social interactions outside the family. Traits are first
transmitted inside the family from parents to their children. As children interact
with people outside the family, they may realize that the traits acquired from their
parents are not ideal (in a sense that we shall make precise in a moment) for social
interactions outside the family. For instance, if the norm in society (the norm of the
majority) is that young people live together before deciding whether or not to get
married, excluding pre-marital sex will make it more difficult for the child to find a
partner and get married. However, breaking with a more traditional view of sexual
morality may also generate a costly conflict with one’s family, the more so the greater
the parents’ effort to educate the child.
We shall proceed in three steps. First we study the child’s identity choice problem:
what determines her decision whether or not to “assimilate”, that is to abandon the
minority trait and acquire the majority trait.12 Building on Lazear (1999) and Konya
11See also Pichler (2010), Vaughan (2012), and Panebianco (2014).
12See also the seminal paper on identity choice by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), as well as Bisin et
al (2011).
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(2005), we assume that switching from the old to the new trait allows a minority
member to interact more productively with the majority. However, it also generates
a transaction cost in dealing with members of the minority. Moreover, abandoning the
original family trait implies a utility cost for the child that, in part, depends upon the
effort the parents have put in educating her. Then we shall go back and analyze the
parent’s socialization problem: parents prefer children with their own cultural trait
and hence educate them to this trait, as in Bisin and Verdier (2001). The parent
however also “empathizes” with her child, in the sense that she understands that the
trait she is trying to transmit may hinder the child’s opportunities in the new society.
Her educational decision will balance these two incentives.
To keep the problem simple, we assume that each individual lives two periods. In
the first period, after having been educated by her family, she interacts with others
of the same cohort in society. In the second period she becomes the single parent of
a child and decides how much effort to put in socializing the child to her own trait
– for instance spending time teaching her ancestors’ values. Finally, having analyzed
the child’s decision whether or not to assimilate, given the education received by her
parent, we shall study how the size of the minority evolves over time, given that the
cost of assimilation is distributed randomly in the population.
We show that there are two possible equilibria: one in which no child assimilates
and the size of the minority group remains constant at the initial level, and one in
which instead children assimilate and the minority trait eventually disappears from
society. Which of these two equilibria occurs and the speed of convergence to the full
assimilation equilibrium depends upon a set of parameters that capture the cost and
benefits for the child and for the parent of assimilating or not, and that are likely to
vary across cultural traits, and also across countries of origin.
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3.2.1 The Child’s Identity Choice Problem
The child’s problem is a simple variant of Lazear (1999)13: V i, (i = m or M) denotes
the surplus produced by a social interaction between two people both belonging to
the same group–minority or majority. We assume that the two surpluses are identical
(V m = V M = V ), a simplifying assumption which is irrelevant for our results. The
interaction between two persons with different cultural traits implies a loss. More
specifically, V (1 − θM) is the surplus produced by a social interaction between a
person, whose parents belong to the minority and who has not assimilated, with
another person belonging to the majority, with 0 < θM < 1. V (1 − θm) is the
surplus of the interaction between a person whose parents belong to the minority and
who has acquired the majority trait, with another person from the minority, with
0 < θm < 1. We will assume that θM > θm because it is plausible that the child of
a minority parent retains some ability to interact with members of the minority even
if she assimilates. There is no loss in the transaction when two people have the same
trait, that is in this case the surplus is V . The proportion of the minority group in
the population is q < 1
2
(we omit the time subscript here to keep the notation light).
d(τ, ti) is the utility cost for a member of the minority for abandoning the parent’s
trait: it is increasing with the parent’s socialization effort τ and also includes an
additive stochastic component ti that can be interpreted as the cost of learning the
new (majority) trait, so that d(τ, ti) = d(τ) + ti, with d(τ)
′
> 0. We assume ti to be
distributed randomly in the population according to the distribution function G(.).
The child knows ti, while the parent does not observe it, but knows its distribution
G(.).
The child’s meets at random individuals from the minority or majority groups
with probability q and 1−q respectively. Following Lazear (1999) we assume that the
child decides whether or not to assimilate at the beginning of the period, knowing the
13See also Konya (2005) for a dynamic extension.
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probability of meeting a minority or a majority member, but before having actually
met them. Her expected utility is therefore equal to qV + (1 − q)(1 − θM)V when
the child does not assimilate, and to q(1 − θm)V + (1 − q)V − d(τ) − ti when she
assimilates. Children are myopic, in the sense that they do not look ahead to when
they will become parents. A child i assimilates if the expected gain from assimilation
is higher than the expected gain from non-assimilation:
(1− q)V θM − qθmV − d(τ)− ti ≥ 0 (3.1)
Defining the cumulative density of ti, with support [t, t¯], the proportion of minority
individuals that assimilate after a draw of ti is given by:
G
(
(1− q)V θM − qθmV − d(τ)) (3.2)
If (1−q)V θM−qθmV −d(τ) > t¯ the child will always decide to assimilate (G (.) =
1). If (1 − q)V θM − qθmV − d(τ) < t the child will never assimilate (G (.) = 0).
When t ≤ (1 − q)V θM − qθmV − d(τ) ≤ t¯ , the child will assimilate with some
probability. Assume for simplicity that ti is uniformly distributed on [t, t¯]. In this
case the probability of assimilation and the proportion of minority individuals who
assimilate is given by:
Prob
(
ti ≤ (1− q)V θM − qθmV − d(τ)
)
=
∫ (1−q)V θM−qθmV−d(τ)
t
1
t¯− tdt =
(1− q)V θM − qθmV − d(τ)
t¯− t
(3.3)
3.2.2 The Parent’s Socialization Problem
Each family is a single-parent family and produces only one child. As in Bisin and
Verdier (2001) the parent can socialize the child at a cost c(τ), increasing in τ , and
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she derives utility ϕ(τ) if the child maintains the family trait, which occurs with a
probability she can affect through her educational effort. The parent also cares about
her child’s utility and how it is affected by her actions that contribute to determining,
through d(τ), the probability of assimilation, and, hence, how productively the child
will relate with the majority (and the minority). The extent of empathy is described
by β: for β = 0 the parent doesn’t care about the child’s utility and only cares about
her wish that the child does not assimilate. We abstract from the components of the
parent’s utility that do not depend upon the costs and benefits of educating the child.
Finally we also assume that the parent only cares about her immediate descendants.
Thus the parent maximizes her expected utility w(τ) given by:
w(τ) = −c(τ) + ϕ(τ)Prob(no child assimilation) +
+βProb(no child assimilation)
[
qV + (1− q)V (1− θM)] (3.4)
+βProb(child asssimilation ) [q(1− θm)V + (1− q)V − d(τ)]−
−β
∫ (1−q)θMV−qθmV−d(τ)
t
ti
t¯− tdti
Let us assume that c(τ) = c
2
τ 2 , ϕ(τ) = ϕ0, and d(τ) = dτ .
14 The parent’s optimal
socialization effort is determined by the following first order condition:
cτ + βd
(1− q)θMV − qθm − dτ − t
t¯− t =
ϕ0d
t¯− t (3.5)
The interpretation is simple: the left hand side is the marginal cost to the parent from
varying τ , composed by the marginal direct socialization/education cost and by the
expected change in the assimilation cost for the child, discounted by β (the parent’s
imperfect empathy parameter); the right hand side is the change in the expected
direct benefit for the parent from non-assimilation. Solving for the optimal level of
14We could allow ϕ0 + ϕ1τ, ϕ1 > 0 but this would complicate the algebra without improving the
intuition.
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τ , τ ∗, one obtains:
τ ∗ =
ϕ0 − β[(1− q)θMV − qθmV − t]
c(t¯−t)
d
− βd
(3.6)
For concavity of the objective function ∂
2w
∂τ
= −c+ βd2
t¯−t < 0 and hence the denominator
in (3.6) is positive. We assume that ϕ0 − β[(1− q)θMV − qθm − t] > 0 to guarantee
that the parent’s effort is non negative. The comparative static for τ ∗ is intuitive.
The parent’s effort is increasing in ϕ0, her benefit if the child does not assimilate. It
is instead decreasing in c, the cost of the effort put into educating the child. It is also
increasing in θM , the penalty for the descendant of a minority parent in interacting
with members of the majority, if she holds on to the family trait, and decreasing in θm,
the penalty for the descendant of a minority parent in interacting with members of the
minority, if she adopts the majority trait. In the former case the benefit of assimilating
for the child increases, while in the latter it decreases. A strong educational effort
by the parent is thus a hindrance for the child, the more so the larger is θM and the
smaller is θm. The empathic parent internalizes this and reduces her socialization
effort the larger is θM and increases it the smaller is θm.
For given values of θM and θm, an increase in q has a positive effect on the
parent’s socialization effort because it decreases the probability of meeting a member
of the majority, diminishing the expected penalty for descendants of minority parents
associated with interacting with the majority (when not assimilated) and increases
the cost of interacting with members of the minority (when assimilated). Note that
our model does not display the “cultural sustainability property” of Bisin and Verdier
(2001), whereby a minority parent makes a greater effort at socialization when q is
small.
The effect on the parent’s socialization effort of an increase in the total surplus
from transactions is negative, as we have assumed that q < 1
2
and θM > θm, so that
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the transaction net gains from assimilation are positive and the (partly) empathic
parent takes this into account, therefore reducing τ ∗. The effect of the parameter d,
that captures the cost for the child of assimilating, and that depends on the parent’s
educational effort, is positive: the higher is d , the more effective is the socialization
technology and this induces the parent to use it more intensely (increasing her effort).
The effect of the discount factor β is ambiguous and the reason is simple: if β increases,
it means that the parent gives more weight both the the child’s net transaction benefits
of assimilation ((1 − q)θMV − qθm) and to the switching cost of assimilation (dτ).
The first effect leads the partly emphatic parent to decrease τ ∗, so that the child
can reap those benefits; the second leads to an increase in τ ∗. Hence the effect of β
is ambiguous. Finally, for a given spread of the distribution, t¯ − t, a decrease in t,
which generates a leftward shift of the distribution, decreasing its mean, but keeping
the variance constant, is associated to a decrease in τ ∗15: again, this is because
the probability of assimilation increases, which increases the penalty for the child of
dropping the family trait, a penalty that is greater the larger the parent’s educational
effort. Given t, an increase in t¯− t has the opposite effect by a similar logic.
3.2.3 Assimilation and Non-Assimilation Equilibria and Dy-
namics
Let us assume that that t ≤ (1 − q(0))θMV − q(0)θmV − dτ ∗ ≤ t¯ , where q(0) is
the initial proportion of the minority group in the population, so that there is an
incentive to assimilate for at least some members of the minority. In this case the
15Recall that the mean of the uniform distribution is t¯+t2 , while the variance is
(t¯−t)2
12 .
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probability of assimilation evaluated at the optimal parent’s effort, τ ∗, is16:
G
(
(1− qt)θMV − qθmV − d
(
ϕ0 − β[(1− qt)θMV − qtθm − t]
c(t¯−t)
d
− βd
))
(3.7)
This is also the proportion of minority members in the population that assimilate.
It is easy to see that this proportion is unambiguously increasing in V and θM , and
decreasing in d, θm and q. This is the result of the direct effect of these parameters
on G (.) and their effect through τ ∗. The effect of the remaining parameters mimics
the effect on τ ∗ with the opposite sign: the proportion of minority members that
assimilates, increases in c and decreases in ϕ0; the effect of the discount factor β is
again ambiguous; for a given spread of the distribution, t¯− t, a decrease in t, which
generates a leftward shift of the distribution, decreasing its mean, but keeping the
variance constant, is associated with an increase in G(.); given t , an increase in t¯− t
, instead, decreases G(.).
The decrease in the proportion of the minority between t + 1 and t , −(qt+1 −
qt) equals the proportion of the minority that assimilates between these two dates
G
(
(1− qt)θMV − qtθmV − dτ ∗t
)
, times the size of the minority at t, qt
17:
qt+1 − qt =−G
(
(1− qt)θMV − qtθmV − dτ ∗t
)
qt (3.8)
=− (1− qt)θ
MV − qtθmV − dτ ∗t − t
t¯− t qt
with τ ∗t defined in (3.6). Equation (3.8) represents the dynamics of the system
when t ≤ (1−qt)θMV −qtθmV −dτ ∗t ≤ t¯ . When (1−qt)θMV −qθmt V −dτ ∗ ≤ t nobody
16If (1−q(0))V θM−q(0)θmV −dτ∗ > t¯ , the model would generate an uninteresting and implausible
dynamics with instant full assimilation.
17Assuming that no member of the majority acquires the minority trait is equivalent to assuming
that qθm,MV − (1 − q)θM,MV − dMτM < tM , where the superscript M (second superscript for
the θ parameter) denotes the parameters for the majority. In other terms, for all members of the
majority, the gain from more efficient transactions is exceeded by the combined costs of acquiring
the minority trait.
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assimilates, G(.) = 0 and qt+1 − qt = 0. This observation allows us to determine the
possible steady state equilibria (where qt+1 − qt = 0) and their stability properties.
Consider first the value of qt, q˜, such that (1− q˜)θMV − q˜θmV −dτ∗ = t so that there
is no gain from assimilation. For greater (smaller) values of q the net gain is negative
(positive). It is easy to show that (see Appendix 2 for details on the dynamics and
on the steady-state equalibria):
q˜ =
θMV − ϕ0d2
c(t¯−t) − t
θMV + θmV
(3.9)
Moreover, 0 < q˜ < 1. If q˜ < q0 <
1
2
, then the initial proportion of the minority is an
equilibrium because there is no net gain from assimilation. Recall that the equation
of motion assumes that no member of the majority adopts the minority trait, which
is reasonable if indeed we are dealing with a minority (q0 <
1
2
). If q0 < Min(
1
2
, q˜),
the steady state equilibrium implies full integration (q = 0). The full integration
equilibrium is locally stable with the minority in this case gradually shrinking in
size. All this is summarized in Figure 1a and Figure 1b, where the steady state(s)
and dynamics of the system are represented. The phase line is upward-sloping and
convex and it intersects the 45 degree line at 0 and q˜. In Figure 1a we present the
phase diagram for the case in which q˜ < 1
2
, so that two type of equilibria exist,
one with full integration and one with no integration (associated, for instance, with
an initial size of the minority equal to qa0 and q
na
0 respectively). In Figure 1b, we
present the case in which q˜ ≥ 1
2
so that only the full integration equilibrium exists.
Finally, it is easy to see that q˜ increases, and hence the range of initial values of q0
for which the full assimilation equilibrium occurs becomes larger, with the loss for a
non assimilated person in her dealing with the majority, θM , with the size of the total
surplus from the transaction, V , with the cost to the parents for the socialization
effort, c, with an increase in t¯ − t for a given t (so that both its mean and variance
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increase). q˜ instead decreases with the penalty for an assimilated child of a minority
parent from dealing with members of the minority , θm, with the effectiveness of
the socialization technology, d, with the direct benefit to the parent of the child
maintaining the original trait, ϕ0, and with a shift to the right of the distribution
of ti (so that the mean increases for a given spread of the distribution). Note that
the parent’s discount factor, β, has no effect on q˜. This is because at q = q˜, the
probability of assimilation is zero, so the second term on the left hand side of the first
order condition for τ , equation (3.5), is zero, i.e. there is no expected cost for the
parent from the child assimilating. As a result, at q = q˜, β does not matter for τ ∗
and, hence, for q˜.18
Summarizing, our simple model can help us to think about the different speed
of convergence of various attitudes, as they are shaped by vertical and horizontal
transmission. Cultural attitudes differ in the advantage that assimilation confers to
the child in transacting with the majority and in the costs that assimilation implies
for him, partly shaped by the parent’s socialization effort. They also differ in the
utility gain they imply for the parent when a child retains the minority cultural trait
and in the cost that the parent’s educational effort entails. Attitudes, such as trust,
are likely to imply a large transaction gain for the child from assimilating. For other
traits, such as deep religious attitudes, the transaction payoff from converging to the
majority trait is likely to be smaller. Attitudes, such as those towards family values or
18In the model we have considered the decision whether or not to assimilate along a single dimen-
sion, that is a single attitude. The results however directly extend to the contemporaneous choice of
more than one trait, provided we exclude interactions across attitudes. Assume there are two traits
a = 1, 2, each one of them dichotomous, as we have assumed so far. Assume that costs and benefits
are additive and that there is no interaction between the two trais, that is socialization c(τ1)+c(τ2)
costs for the parents are and direct socialization benefits are ϕ(τ1) + ϕ(τ2). Assume that switching
costs are also additive for the child, d(τ1) + d(τ2)), and, to avoid multivariate distributions, that the
two stochastic terms t1 and t2 are independent. Finally assume that the net benefits associated with
each attitude are θM∗a (1− qa)Va− θm∗a qaVa− d(τa)− ta, a = 1, 2 again assuming lack of interaction.
In this simple case the conditions for τ1 τ2 are identical to those we have derived and simply need
to be indexed by a = 1, 2. Of course the model would be more complicated if we allowed for cross
affects across attitudes, but this is not central to our paper and we leave this extension for future
research.
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gender roles, may imply large gains for the parents if the child maintains the minority
trait, or a large cost for the child if he abandons her family’s traditional values and
beliefs. However, maintaining some of this traits or beliefs may come to a large
cost for the child if they are not conducive to an active participation in the labor
market. The model also suggests that patterns of integration may differ depending
on the country of origin of each immigrant group because of cross country variation,
for each cultural attitude, in the costs and benefits of integration. For instance, cross
country variation in the strength of the family may be reflected in differences in the
perceived benefit for the parents from the child not dropping the trait transmitted
within the family. Similarly, the cost for the child of acquiring a new trait may differ
across countries. We will use these insights in discussing the empirical evidence on
the heterogeneity across attitudes in the speed of convergence of values and beliefs of
successive generations of immigrants to the US, and how it varies across countries of
origin.
3.3 Measuring Cultural Attitudes and Defining Gen-
erations and Country of Origin in the GSS
Our measurement of cultural attitudes is based on the General Social Survey (GSS).
We use multiple (22) waves of the GSS, starting in 1978 and ending in 2014. Each
wave includes a core set of questions that remains in the survey in each year in
which it was conducted. This core includes personal information such as age, income,
region of residence, and family origin, as well as information on personal views on a
variety of topics such as family values, gender roles, religious beliefs, sexual behavior,
cooperation, role of government, etc..
One of the advantages of the GSS is that it allows us to analyze a wide variety of
attitudes over several generations of immigrants. We have selected the attitudes for
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which data were available over a relatively long span of time, up to three decades (or
slightly more). For ease of interpretation, we have grouped attitudes (or questions)
into several broad categories. The list of categories, variables, and coding choices
is provided in Table 1. Group A deals with views on social life, social interactions,
and cooperation. It includes questions about trustworthiness (trust), fairness (fair),
and helpfulness of others (helpful). Group B includes attitudes towards government
intervention – should the government redistribute income (eqwlth), provide a safety-
net for the poor (helppoor) – and overall political views (polviews). Group C surveys
different religious attitudes such as the frequency of attendance to religious services
(attend), the frequency of personal prayer (pray), the strength of affiliation with one’s
religion (reliten), the belief in afterlife (postlife), and the approval of prayer in public
schools (prayer). Group D includes attitudes about family and children. Questions
in this group elicit views on the degree of parental consent in teenage access to birth
control (pillok), on the restrictiveness of divorce law (divlaw), on the co-residence of
multiple generations (aged) – i.e. whether one approves of children living with their
parents beyond a certain age, and on the frequency of evenings spent with relatives
(socrel). Furthermore, this group includes views on preferred qualities in children
such as obedience (obey) and independence (thnkself ). Group E surveys views on
gender roles. Participants in the GSS are asked to express their opinion concerning
various statements describing the role of women in the labor market, in politics and
at home: should a woman work even if the husband can support her (fework)?;
can working mothers have a warm relationship with their children (fechild)?; women
should take care of running the home while men run the country (fehome); women
are not suited for politics (fepol). Group F reports views on legalized abortion for
any reason (abany) or restricted to cases of risk for the mother’s health, defects in the
fetus, or rape (abrisk). Group G covers attitudes towards sexual behavior such as pre-
marital sex (premarsx ) and homosexual sex (homosex ). Finally, Group H elicit views
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on whether social mobility is a result of hard work versus help or luck (getahead).
The premise of our study is that values and beliefs are formed in part as a result
of one’s upbringing, and in part through the influence of factors external to the family
such as peers, institutions, and economic circumstances. Consequently, values and
beliefs depend both on the country of origin of a person’s ancestors, as well as on her
generation (to be defined below). The country of origin is an important determinant
of culture as it encodes the history of a people, encompassing past technological,
economic, institutional and cultural environments. The generation of a person is
important given that the temporal “distance” from the country of ancestry may
be associated with a dilution of the original cultural trait because of exposure to
a different set of economic and social opportunities, to different institutions, and
cultural influences.
We consider the evolution of attitudes over multiple generations (up to the fourth).
As a result, we are constrained by data availability to focus on immigrants to the US
from a limited number of European countries and from Mexico. We focus on countries
for which we have relatively numerous observations: Great Britain (GB), comprising
England, Wales and Scotland, Germany, (GER), Poland (POL), Ireland (IRE), Italy
(ITA) and Mexico (MEX). In addition we consider Scandinavian immigrants from
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland as a single group (SCA) on the basis of a
relatively common cultural background.19
We define the generation to which an immigrant belongs following what is typically
assumed in this literature. We define a person to be a first-generation immigrant if
he/she was born outside of the United States. Immigrants are defined to be second-
generation if they are born in the US and at least one of their parents is born abroad,
and third-generation if they are born in the US, all of their parents are born in the
US and at least two of their grandparents are born abroad. Lastly, a person is said
19For other Southern and Eastern European countries and for the French we do not have enough
observations, given the estimation strategy we will adopt in this version of the paper.
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to be of fourth-generation-or-more if he/she is born in the US, all his/her parents are
born in the US and at most one grandparent is born abroad. With this definition
the last category includes fourth generation immigrants as well as people of a higher
generation who still declare a specific European country of origin. In defining the
country of origin we use the answer to the question: “From what countries or part
of the world did your ancestors come?”. If more than one country is indicated, the
respondent is asked: “Which one of these countries do you feel closer to?”. 79%
percent of the sample can identify a main country of origin affiliation. The definition
could, in principle, be made tighter by limiting our analysis to respondents who
indicate only one country. This, however, would reduce substantially the number of
observations, as only 50% percent of the sample chooses just one country. Therefore
we will not pursue this option here.
3.4 Recovering Country of Origin Effects for Dif-
ferent Generations, Dynasties and Time Peri-
ods
The way an individual perceives the world is shaped by the values and beliefs of
his/her parents. The attitudes of one’s parents are, in turn, shaped by their parents.
This implies that an individual’s ancestral origin is an important factor determining
his/her values and beliefs. In order to capture the extent to which someone’s country
of origin impacts his/her attitudes, we estimate a Probit model which includes indica-
tor variables for one’s ancestry.20 We allow the effect of ancestry to depend upon the
temporal “distance” from the country of origin. This distance is measured by whether
the immigrant is first, second, third, or fourth or higher generation. Moreover the
20Responses to each of the GSS questions are therefore re-coded to produce a binary outcome (see
Table 1).
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ancestry effect will depend upon the birth cohort of an individual, since the cultural
heritage brought by immigrants and transmitted to their descendants depends upon
when they left the mother country and came to the US (we will also assume a 25
year interval between cohorts). We allow the effect of the country of origin to depend
on generation and cohort in a multiplicative fashion, imposing as little restrictions
as possible on the data. We will use these effects to chart the evolution of attitudes
within the only complete “dynasty” we observe in our sample. More precisely, we
estimate the following Probit model:
Pr(yit = 1) =
∑
o∈O
∑
g∈G
∑
c∈C
βo,g,c
(
I(Origini=o) × I(Generationi=g) × I(Cohorti=c)
)
+ θX it(3.10)
where yit takes the value of 1 if a certain event has occurred for individual i in
wave t. I( . ) are indicator functions that take the value of 1 if the condition in the
subscript is satisfied, 0 otherwise. The sums are defined over three different sets: set
O includes all possible countries of origin as defined in Table 1; set G includes each of
the four possible generations of immigrants; set C includes four groups of respondents
– those born in the periods 1890-1914, 1915-1939, 1940-1964 and 1965-2000. The set
of controls includes: income, education, mother’s education, father’s education, age,
age2, year-of-the-survey dummy, gender, number of children, marital status, work
status, religion, regional indicators, and urbanization indicators. Clearly variables
such as income and education may be related to the country of origin: immigrants and
descendants of people from different countries of origin, may, for instance, attribute
different importance to education. Yet, we prefer to define country of origin effects net
of these factors, in an attempt to capture deeper cultural values and beliefs that go
beyond personal characteristics and circumstances.21 Consequently, the evolution of
21See also Algan and Cahuc (2007, 2010) and Giavazzi et al (2013). In our robustness section we
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attitudes that this paper analyzes is not explained by changes in the level of education
or income of immigrants over time. These individual controls are held constant when
we compare changes of attitudes across different immigrants. Finally, note that we
include survey-year effect common to all respondents to capture general variations
of attitudes over time. Summarizing, the country-generation effect is based on the
estimated value of βo,g,c with o ∈ {1, .., 7}; g ∈ {1, .., 4}; c ∈ {1890 − 1914, 1915 −
1939, 1940− 1964, 1965− 1990}.
Our sample includes responses of immigrants whose ancestors moved to the U.S.
during different periods. For example, the ancestors of some of our respondents
arrived with the large migration waves around the turn of the twentieth century, while
the ancestors of others immigrated more recently. In order to avoid mixing dynasties
of immigrants that started at different points in time, and hence brought with them
different attitudes, in our empirical work we focus on the four generations of the only
full dynasty of immigrants observable in our data – the one that starts with the first
generation arriving between 1890 and 1914 and ending with the last generation being
born after 1965. The attitudes of the first generation of this dynasty — the one
arrived in 1890-1914 — is captured by βo,1,1890−1914, those of the second generation
by βo,2,1915−1939, those of the third generation by βo,3,1940−1964, and, finally, those of
the fourth generation (or higher) by βo,4,1965−1990. For some countries the GSS does
not have many respondents who are both first generation and belong to the cohort
of 1890-1914. In order to have enough observations for the first generation of each
country, we assume that the first generation of the 1890-1914 cohort and of the 1915-
1939 cohort are characterized by the same coefficient (βo,1,1915−39 = βo,1,1915−39). In
Table 3, part one, we report the frequency of observations for each country, generation
and cohort for the respondents of the question of trust. In Panel B we summarize
the frequency of observations for the dynasty on which we focus.
also experiment with a more minimalist list of controls, including only age, age squared, year of the
survey, gender, religion, regional indicators, and urbanization indicators.
202
3.5 Measuring Convergence in Cultural Attitudes
In this section we illustrate how we measure and assess whether or not there is con-
vergence in the cultural attitudes of different generations of immigrants towards the
norm set by the more established and dominant groups. We start by calculating
the deviation of the attitude of a given respondent from the average attitude of the
respondents considered to represent the dominant culture. For each of the countries
of origin we define
β˜(o,g,c) = β(o,g,c) − β(ave,4,c) (3.11)
where β˜o,g,c represents the difference of the country-origin effect, βo,g,c, from the
norm (β′s here denote estimated values). To capture the multi-cultural nature of the
U.S., we assume that the “norm” is represented by the weighted average of the at-
titudes of the fourth generation (or higher) European immigrants from all European
countries in our sample, βave,4,c. We calculate the appropriate weights by using infor-
mation from the 2000 U.S. Census about the ancestral composition of the non-foreign
born population across different cohorts. To examine the experience of immigrants
from different origins for the dynasty starting in the 1890-1914 period, we focus on
two relationships. First, we compare β˜o,1,1890−1914 to β˜o,2,1915−1939, i.e. how the dis-
tance from the norm of the first member of the dynasty compares to the distance
from the norm of the succeeding member of the same dynasty. This relationship
allows us to characterize the level of assimilation that occurs from the first to the
second generation of immigrants of the same origin. We then compare β˜o,1,1890−1914
to β˜o,4,1965−1990. We use this relationship to capture how the particular attitude of
descendants changes from the first generation all the way to the fourth generation,
relative to the respective norms.22
22We can also analyze the process of convergence between the first and third generation by com-
paring β˜o,1,1890−1914 to β˜o,3,1915−1939. We choose to focus on evolution between the first and fourth
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This methodology follows and extends the approach proposed by in Algan et al.
(2012).23 However, whereas they focus on the changes between the first and second
generation, we analyze the evolution of attitudes over multiple generations. Most
importantly, we keep the dynasty constant – only consider descendants of a “common
original immigrant”. This approach provides a rich, country-of-origin specific, picture
of the process of cultural transmission, which is not contaminated by changes in
attitudes of successive cohorts of immigrants.
It is useful to characterize the various patterns of convergence or non-convergence
using a graph. Assume one plots the generation-1 deviation on the horizontal axis and
the generation-4 deviation on the vertical axis (i.e. β˜o,1,1890−1914 and β˜o,4,1965−1990).
We can partition the four quadrants in regions by drawing a 45 degree line and a
135 degree line going through the origin (see Figure 2a). Focusing on Quadrant I,
with positive initial and final deviations from the norm, points between the x-axis
and the 45 degree line represent monotonic convergence from above, in the sense that
the deviation is larger in generation 1 than in generation 4, while those between
the line and the y-axis capture monotonic divergence from above. Points between
the (continuation of the) 45 degree line and the x-axis in Quadrant III represent
monotonic converge from below, while points between the 45 degree line and the
y-axis monotonic divergence form below. In Quadrant II, in which the difference
relative to the norm is first negative then positive, the 135 degree line separates points
of divergent leapfrogging (above it) from those representing convergent leapfrogging
(below the line). Similarly, in Quadrant IV, where the difference from the norm is
first positive and then negative, points below the (continuation of the) 135 degree line
are points of divergent regression and those above the line are points of convergent
regression. This graph is useful to understand how the pattern of convergence differs
generation in order to allow as much time as possible for attitudes to evolve further, beyond the
change that occurs between the first and second generation.
23See, in particular, Figure 1.4 on p. 25.
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for each cultural trait and each country.
We construct an overall index of convergence for each attitude by counting the
proportion of countries that fall in the monotonic convergence from above or below,
and in the convergent regression and leapfrogging regions. In other terms we are
counting, in this case, the points outside the hourglass defined by the 45 and 135
degree lines through the origin that represent a decrease in the absolute value of the
distance from the norm going from the 1st to the 4th generation. Alternatively, we
can do this for the 1st and the 2nd generation. We define the proportion of countries
within these convergent region as pi45.
The drawback of pi45 is that it may not be a strict enough criterion. In particular
it does not allow us to distinguish between slow-converging attitudes that feature
country-generation effects close to the 45 degree line (or its reflection), and fast-
converging ones clustered closer to the origin, along the y-axis. To this end, we define
pi22.5 as the proportion of countries situated between the x-axis and the 22.5 degree
line (or its reflection). In other terms, we are now squeezing the hour-glass from
above and count as convergent only those country-wave observations for which the
absolute value of the distance from the norm in generation 1 has been cut at least in
half by generation 4 (see Figure 2b). This is our preferred measure of convergence.
One could use a somewhat tighter or looser criterion. As a robustness exercise, we
will document in Section 7 that the ranking of attitudes obtained using the pi22.5
criterion is very similar to the one obtained when we require that the absolute value
of the distance from the norm for generation 1 is cut by a third (pi30) or two thirds
by generation 4 (pi15).
Note that this approach, particularly when using the pi45 criterion, is related to
β convergence as the latter focuses on whether the slope of the regression line of
β˜o,4,1965−1990, on β˜o,1,1890−1914 is between zero and one (so that the regression line lies
in the monotonic convergence region). Yet, it is less parametric, less exposed to
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the influence of outliers, and it allows for convergent leapfrogging and convergent
regression as well.
3.6 Results
In this section we present our results, using the definition of convergence based on the
hourglass. We start by calculating the percentage of countries whose distance from the
norm in generation four is less than half of the distance of their ancestor in generation
one. We use this fraction to quantify the convergence that occurs in the particular
attitude considered between the first and the fourth generation of the dynasty. We
compare the convergence up to the fourth generation with that occurring between the
first and the second generation. In this exercise we exclude Great Britain from the
count because it plays a dominant role in defining the norm (with a weight of around
40%). After presenting the basic results, we will explore in the next section several
robustness exercises and extensions, such as tightening or relaxing the convergence
criterion, using a reduced set of controls in the Probit equation, and changing the
definition of the norm.
Finally, we shall also present evidence on the changing strength of the relationship
between attitudes in the country of origin and immigrants’ attitudes across genera-
tions. In particular we want to see whether and how the cultural distance of various
generations of immigrants from the mother country increases for different traits. This
last exercise is different from but complementary to what we do in the core of the
paper, with our focus on whether or not the cultural distance between succeeding
generation of immigrants and the US norm decreases for various attitudes.
In Table 4 we report the percentage of countries for which the initial gap has been
cut at least in half (pi22.5 denotes this proportion) either going all the way to the
fourth generation or by the second generation. In the table we order the attitudes
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from the slowest moving (top rows) to the fastest moving (bottom rows) in terms
of our convergence criterion, going from the first to the fourth generation. Table 5
presents the results by attitude and country. Attitudes are organized in categories
which facilitates the assessment of convergence of groups of attitudes. Importantly,
this table allows us to assess whether or not there are country specificities in the
process of convergence.
A number of common patterns emerge. First, whether a cultural trait can be
considered persistent or not crucially depends upon whether one considers the change
between the 1st and 2nd or the 1st and 4th generation. This point is very important:
stopping at the 2nd generation, as the literature has typically done, would miss the
greater convergence of a number of attitudes. These can be seen comparing the
percentage of countries converging by generation four (column 1) and by generation
2 (column 2) reported in Table 4. In approximately three quarter of the cases the
percentage of convergent observations by the 4th generation is larger than for the 2nd
generation (in the remaining cases there is either no change or a slower convergence
by the 4thgeneration). When we focus on the average percentage of convergent cases
for each group of attitudes, in all cases the percentage is larger for generation four
compared to generation two (see the last columns of Table 5).
Focusing on the column of Table 5 for the average fraction of convergent cases
by generation four, the ranking of groups of attitudes, from the slowest-moving to
the fastest-moving are: Gender Role, Religion, Government and Politics, Family,
Mobility/Success, Abortion, Cooperation, and Sexual Behavior. Note that the change
in the proportion of convergent attitudes between the first and the second generation
and the first and fourth generation is greater on average for the Cooperation and
Sexual Behavior group. Moreover the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval does not
include zero for Cooperation and, in this sense, we can reject the hypothesis of no
change between the second and fourth generation. For the Sexual Behavior group
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the 95% confidence interval includes zero, but the 90% interval does not. The 95%
confidence interval does not include zero also for the Family and Religion Group, but
the change is smaller in size. It is even smaller and not significant for the remaining
groups.
In terms of individual attitudes (see the first column of Table 4), the ones that
converge more slowly by the fourth generation are those that describe some religious
values such as prayer in public schools (prayer) and the frequency of personal prayer
(pray), some family values and traditions concerning divorce, frequency of evenings
spent with relatives and parental control on contraception (divlaw, socrel, and pillok)
and views about the general role of women in society (fehome: the role of women is
running the home, while men run the country) and the suitability of women for politics
(fepol). General political views, and views towards the poor (polviews that distinguish
conservative- from progressive-leaning individuals, and helppoor) also belong to this
slow moving group. The next slowest group, in term of speed of convergence is mixed,
containing views about women in market work (fework), towards abortion without
restrictions (abany) and the role of effort in getting ahead (getahead) 24
Trust is among the fastest moving attitudes. It is the key attitude capturing
cooperation. Interestingly, trust is one of the slow moving attitudes when one focuses
on the change between the first and second generation. The group of fast-moving
attitudes also contains attitudes toward children’s independence (thnkself and obey),
as well as homosexuality and abortion with restrictions (homosex and abrisk). The
next fastest convergence group contains the remaining attitudes towards cooperation
(fair and helpful), fechild (whether or not a child suffer when the mother works),
attitudes towards premarital sex (premarsx ), some religious attitudes (such as attend,
24Inglehart and Baker (2000), using the World Value Survey (WVS), suggest that economic devel-
opment is associated with shifts away from absolute norms and values toward more rational, tolerant,
trusting, and participatory ones. However, they argue that cultural change is path dependent and is
affected by the broad religious and cultural heritage of a society. Notice that the values and attitudes
that we identify as slow moving are considered by Inglehart and Baker (2000) as characteristics that
distinguish preindustrial from industrial societies.
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reliten and postlife) and aged. With regard to the latter, note that there is evidence
that in the last decades there has been a return to a greater acceptance of sharing
the home with grown children (see Fry 2014).
In conclusion, the summary convergence rates for groups of attitudes and for
individual attitudes suggest that the slower moving ones are those connected with
general gender views, general political views, and many (but not all) religious and
family values. The fastest changing attitudes, instead, are those related to coop-
eration, sexuality, and children characteristics likely to determine their success in
American society.
Lazear (1999) and Konya (2005), on which the child identity choice of our model
is built, emphasize that cultural assimilation is more likely the greater the gain from
sharing a cultural trait with the majority and the greater the inefficiency of not doing
so. Cavalli-Sforza (2001) also suggests that a trait is more likely to spread horizontally
if it is beneficial (see also Tabellini 2008b). Our simple model indeed captures and
further clarifies this effect, allowing for a parents’ socialization choice, as in Bisin
and Verdier (2001). In our model the range of initial size of the minority for which
full assimilation is the steady state equilibrium and the speed of assimilation in each
period indeed increase with the net transaction gain.
This mechanism seems to be at work with many of our fast moving attitudes. For
instance, there is much to be gained from sharing attitudes towards cooperation, as
captured by trust, the fastest moving attitude: although there could be an initial gain
from taking advantage of the trust of others, it is likely that the gain would be short-
lived, followed by punishment if one is discovered cheating and not conforming to the
social norm.25 Moreover, even though the value attached to the ability of children to
25See Guiso, Herrera and Morelli (2013) on how cultural clashes between countries (including the
dimension of trust) may lead to the choice of inefficient policies once the countries join a union,
with an application to the policy response to the Greek crisis.. There is also an extensive literature
on the role of schools in shaping attitudes towards cooperation. See, for instance, Algan, Cahuc
and Shleifer (2013) on the effect of teaching methods on beliefs underlining cooperation, and the
references there on the effect of the quantity of schooling on social capital. Note that in deriving
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be independent, captured by thnkself and obey, are family attitudes, they affect the
ability to profit from interacting with other members in a society, like the US, that
greatly values independence. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that they are the
only (very) fast moving family attitudes. The other family attitudes are instead more
slow moving, which is fairly consistent with the spirit of our simple model.
Moreover, the fast convergence of views regarding the cost of women working in
terms of the quality of the relationship with one’s children can be explained by the
large economic gains from having women participating in market work and the fact
that generations of women have gradually learned about it.26 Conversely, it is inter-
esting that attitudes that have to do with women’s general role in society and politics,
relative to the home, move more slowly. Indeed many complex forces act on gender
norms. Many authors (for instance, Goldin 2006 and Albanesi and Olivetti 2009)
emphasize that technological innovations, structural change accompanying economic
development, and medical improvements have had a powerful effect on gender roles
in the labor market. Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), instead, find a persistent
impact on gender norms today of the use of the plough as far back as a few millennia,
even after accounting for the other factors mentioned above.
The fact that religious attitudes are on average slow to converge can be rationalized
in terms of the less obvious net transaction gains that accrue from adaptation to the
norm. However, it is not easy to explain why the speed of convergence of the belief in
the after life (postlife) is greater than the one for the importance of personal prayer
(pray), as they both capture deep religious attitudes. The fast evolution of attend
and reliten by the 4th generation is more understandable in terms of the model, as
they are embodied or likely to be embodied in public manifestations of one’s belief.
These are also attitudes for which conforming to the norm may confer social benefits.
the country-generation effects we control for education of the respondent and of his/her parents.
26In our model, we do not allow for learning, See, however, Fernandez (2013) for a model of
belief formation in which it takes time for people to update their beliefs about the implications for
children’s welfare of women working outside the home.
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Gruber and Hungerman (2008) find that changes in shopping hours had a large impact
on church attendance and conclude that this validates economic models of religiosity
that highlight the importance of economic influences, such as the opportunity cost
of church-going for religious participation. On the issue of redistribution, our results
are broadly in line with those of Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007), who find that
this attitude can change rather rapidly. They differ instead from those of Luttmer
and Singhal (2011) who present evidence that such attitudes are rather “permanent”.
It is true, however, than most political views tend to converge relatively slowly.
An interesting question is whether the probability that a cultural attitude con-
verges or not depends upon how spread out across countries is the distribution of the
trait in the first generation. Here the arguments may go both ways. Large differences
in the first generation may make a movement towards the norm more advantageous;
on the other hand it may be more difficult to reduce the distance. In our results
the median initial standard deviation of the seven faster moving attitudes is larger
than the median standard deviation for the slower moving ones (.45 versus .20). The
difference in the standard deviation suggests that an initial larger dispersion may lead
to faster convergence.
Our results have implications for the debate between the views that emphasize
the assimilation of immigrants, versus those that highlight the preservation of a sep-
arate identity, and for the question whether the melting pot metaphor is accurate for
European immigrants to the US. Indeed, by the fourth generation, the majority of
cultural attitudes of descendants of European immigrants has converged, consistently
with Assimilation Theory. However, contrary to the prediction of that theory and
consistently with Multiculturalism, descendants of immigrants from different countries
of ancestry have maintained over several generations a degree of cultural distinctive-
ness along some traits. In other terms, the temperature in the melting pot was hot,
but not uniform throughout, as one would expect given the model of cultural trans-
211
mission we have developed that emphasizes the fact that the speed of convergence is
likely to differ across various attitudes.
Are there interesting country specificities in the pattern of convergence? The
bottom row of Table 5 reports the total number of convergent attitudes by country.
Ireland and Germany are the countries with the highest number of cases in which
attitudes converge over the entire sample period. Mexico is at the bottom with
Poland, while Italy and Scandinavia occupy intermediate positions. An interesting
question is which factors can explain the number of convergent attitudes by country.
For instance, one would expect, on average, that in countries of origin in which
the family is a weaker social institution, direct transmission would be relatively less
important or effective. This is captured in our model by the parameters representing
the benefit to the parent from the child maintaining the original trait and by the
effectiveness of the socialization technology, embodied in the portion of the child’s
switching cost related to the parent’s educational efforts. Indeed there is a positive
and significant rank correlation (r = .62) between the number of convergent attitudes
and the average of the family coefficients for different countries of origin for the 1st
generation (weighted by the size of the 1st generation in each period), taken as a
proxy for the weakness of the family as an institution in the country of ancestry.
However, this is not the only factor. The ease to learn English may also matter in
acquiring other cultural traits. In our model this is captured by properties of the
distribution of the stochastic component of the child switching costs. As a proxy
for the ability to acquire English proficiency, we use the average, for each country of
origin, of the number of words (out of ten) of which 1st generation immigrants can
identify the meaning27. The correlation with the number of changing attitudes is also
significant (the rank correlation coefficient is .67). Finally, the number of convergent
attitudes by country is negatively correlated (r = −.47) with a measure of residential
27GSS includes a series of questions that identify the respondent’s vocabulary ability.
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segregation (See Borjas 1995)28. Although our model is silent on this issue as it does
not include a residential choice, this is what one would expect since a neighborhood
characterized by a high concentration of individuals from the same ancestry is likely
to contribute to perpetuating the culture of the country of origin and to a slowing
down of the process of cultural integration. All these results should be taken with a
grain of salt given the small number of countries in our sample. The issue of how the
composition of the neighborhood affects the evolution of attitudes at the individual
level is a very important and interesting topic that we leave for future research.
3.7 Robustness and Extensions
In this section we discuss several robustness exercises. Are our results robust, for
instance, to a change in the tightness of the convergence criteria in terms of the defi-
nition of the convergence region? Are they robust to the menu of controls included in
the Probit model used to measure the country-generation-cohort effects or to changes
in the definition of the norm to which attitudes converge? The answer to all these
questions, as we shall see in the next sub-sections, is yes.
Finally, in the last sub-section we investigate an issue that is important, though
not directly related to our main result. In the paper we have investigated the con-
vergence to the dominant norm across generations of immigrants. A different but
interesting question is how do such attitudes relate, for succeeding generations, to
those of individuals who have not migrated and kept living in the country of origin?
In particular, do we observe a weakening of the relationship as the temporal distance
from the country of origin increases over generations?
These two issues are related, but different: convergence (non convergence) to
the norm in the US does not imply nor is implied by an increasing distance (non
28More precisely, see Borjas (1995), Table 2. We use the measure based on the percentage of first
and second generation immigrants in the neighborhood of the same ethnicity as a first-generation
immigrants. Similar results are obtained using figures for the second generation.
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increasing distance) from the culture of the country of origin. For instance, differences
in attitudes across immigrants of distinct ethnicity (the issue investigated in this
paper) could persist, and still the attitudes of immigrants could drift away from
those prevailing in the country from which their ancestors came. Alternatively, one’s
cultural traits may remain close to those of the country of origin, but convergence
to the norm across generations may be observed because over time values across
countries become more similar. With this caveat in mind it is, however, interesting to
present some evidence on the changing strength of the relationship between attitudes
in the country of origin and attitudes of successive generations of immigrants.
3.7.1 Changing the Definition of the Convergence Region
In our baseline results we have measured convergence focusing, for each attitude,
on the index we called pi22.5, which measures the proportion of countries that have
cut the absolute value of the distance of generation 4 from the norm by at least
half relative to generation 1. In Table A1 we present detailed results for the 4th
generation based on less or more stringent criteria for convergence: reducing that
distance by any amount (pi45), by at least a third (pi30), and by at least two thirds (pi15).
The (Spearman) rank correlation coefficients between the proportions of converging
country-wave observations (by generation 4) in the baseline and those obtained using
these alternative criteria are reported at the bottom of the table. All correlation
coefficients with the ranking in our baseline case are very high (in excess of 80%).
In other words the ranking of attitudes is robust to the degree of tightness of the
convergence criterion and so are our general conclusions on the relative speed of
convergence of different attitudes.29
29The Spearman rank correlation coefficient remains high for an even tighter convergence criterion,
requiring that the original gap is cut by at least three quarters.
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3.7.2 Reducing the Set of Controls in the Probit Equation
In Table A2 we limit the set of common controls to include only age, age squared,
year of the survey dummy, gender, religion, regional indicators, and urbanization
indicators. Income, education, mother’s education, father’s education, number of
children, marital status, and work status are excluded. The income and education
level of a respondent will surely influence his/her attitudes. But both income and
education (as well as the rest of the excluded individual controls) can be viewed
as an outcome of factors encoded in the country-of-origin fixed effects. The main
results in the paper focus on the ancestral influence on attitudes that cannot be
explained by variations in income, education, and etc.. In this section we allow for
the ancestral influence to capture these changes in individual characteristics as well.
Our conclusions are largely unchanged. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients
with our original ranking is 0.97.
3.7.3 Changing the definition of the Norm
In Table A3 we return to our baseline specification and experiment with changing
the definition of the norm. More specifically we choose as reference point the fourth
generation descendants of immigrants from Great Britain. The rank correlation coef-
ficient with our original ranking is 0.78 and our conclusions remain largely the same.
This should not be surprising since descendants of British immigrants represent a
large share (around 40%) of the immigrants who are fourth generation (or higher).
3.7.4 Immigrants’ Attitudes and Attitudes in the Country of
Origin
As we have remarked in the introduction to this section, the relationship between the
attitudes of succeeding generations of immigrants and those of individuals who have
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not migrated and kept living in the country of origin is related, but distinct from the
main question investigated in this paper. A weakening (non-weakening) link with the
original culture is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for convergence (non-
convergence) to the US prevailing norm. However, it is a very interesting issue and
one the literature has often addressed, as do in this section.30 We measure attitudes in
the countries of origin using the European Value Survey (EVS) and the World Value
Survey (WVS) which ask largely identical questions, some of which coincide or, more
often, are similar to those asked in the GSS and used in our baseline results. The
match is very close for the questions regarding some of the cultural attitudes we have
used in our empirical work, such as trust, attend, postlife, and homosex, and a fairly
close (but not perfect) for pray, thnkself, obey, divlaw, fechild, fehome, fework, and
abany (See Table A4). The match is not close for the remaining attitudes we have
examined. We have pooled the EVS and WVS data for all the relevant countries for
the periods matching those defined in our baseline model. In the first stage, for each
of these periods, we have estimated the coefficient of country-cohort specific dummies
in a Probit model for each attitude, controlling for age, age squared, gender, and
marital status.31 In the second stage, we have then associated these country-cohort-
specific effects with the data in each GSS survey, so that each individual as been
matched with the culture in the country of origin of the cohort she/he belongs to.
We have then estimated the Probit models for each cultural attitude on the GSS
data, as we did before, but replacing the period-origin-generation and origin-cohort
dummies with the time varying and country specific cultural proxy obtained in the
first stage, interacted with generation dummies. We continue to control for all the
individual specific variables used before and for common year effects. Essentially, we
are assuming that the country of origin and time specific movements in culture for
US immigrants are proportional to the cultural proxy estimated in the first stage,
30See the discussion and references in the Introduction.
31The results that follow are not sensitive to the choice of the controls.
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and that its effect may vary across generations. In particular, we are interested in
assessing the significance of the generation-specific coefficients and whether the effect
of the culture of origin decreases (or not) going from the 1st to the 4th generation.
The results are reported in Table 6. First, considering all attitudes, in seven out
of twelve cases the coefficients of the culture of the country of origin for the first or
second generation are significant. The association is closest for the attitudes that bear
a close correspondence in the actual question surveyed. This emphasizes the fact that
an imperfect match between the EVS-WVS and the GSS questions is likely to lead us
to underestimating the strength of the association with the culture of the country of
origin. Most interestingly, from our point of view, the value of the generation specific
coefficients decreases in most cases as we go from the first to higher generations,
implying a weakening of the effect of the culture of the country of origin, as one
would expect. For instance, in the case of trust, the coefficient decreases from .48
to .23, .18, .11 as we go from the 1st to the 4th generation, and remains significant
(or almost so) at conventional levels from the 1st to the 4th generations. A similar
pattern is displayed by attend, pray, thnkself, fechild, and, to some extent, by divlaw
and homosex. Five of the attitudes displaying this decaying pattern are in the top
half of the distribution in terms of convergence speed, according to our preferred
criterion.
3.8 Conclusions
Do cultural traits persist relatively unchanged over long periods of time, or do they
converge rather rapidly to a country’s prevailing norm? In this paper we have pre-
sented new evidence on this question by analyzing cultural attitudes of different gen-
erations of European immigrants to the US and we have provided a simple model to
shed light and interpret the evidence on the speed of convergence.
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We show that persistence is not the same across cultural traits. Some traits con-
verge slowly to the prevailing norm: this is the case, for instance, of some family
and gender values, political views, and deep personal religious values. Other traits,
instead, show a faster pace of convergence: this is true, for example, for attitudes
towards cooperation (the trustworthiness and helpfulness of others), children’s inde-
pendence, and attitudes towards sexuality, and also attitudes towards the effect of
women’s work on the child-mother relationship. Slow-moving attitudes are mostly the
ones for which direct transmission within the family is likely to be more important
and effective. Fast-changing ones are those for which the benefits of assimilation as a
result of economic and social interactions are greater and the switching costs smaller.
Importantly, we show that one would not come to these conclusions if one limited
the analysis to just the first two generations of immigrants, as the literature has so far
mostly done. Focusing only on the first two generations biases the conclusion in favor
of persistence. Finally, we show that persistence is “culture specific” in the sense that
the country from which one’s ancestors came matters for the pattern of generational
convergence (or lack thereof).
The implication of our results for the debate about the “melting pot” is that the
latter was certainly at work for European immigrants for many-cultural traits and
beliefs. However, descendants of immigrants from different countries of ancestry have
maintained over several generations a degree of cultural distinctiveness along some
other traits. Thus, the temperature in the melting pot was hot, but not uniform
throughout, as suggested by our model that emphasizes how the effectiveness and
importance of the socialization mechanism by parents and of the benefits from assim-
ilation for their children is likely to vary across attitudes and countries. In this last
respect, our results also show that the overall pattern of convergence differs across
countries of origin in a manner largely consistent with the model predictions.
Finally, one may ask whether the evidence provided in this paper has any relevance
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for the question concerning the likelihood of success of reforms designed to change
practices within a country. Are such reforms doomed because a country’s culture
cannot be changed, or can they succeed because they can change cultural attitudes
by altering incentives? This paper neither intends to, nor can provide an answer to
this question. What we have shown, however, is that the large shock represented by
the new social and economic environment faced by immigrants can eventually lead
to a change in many cultural traits. We have also found that the process of change
depends upon cultural characteristics of the country of origin, so that any answer is
likely to be country specific. These issues could be fertile ground for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: List of Attitudes: Groups, Abbreviations, Descriptions
Group A – Cooperation
trust can people be trusted or cannot be too careful? (y=1 for yes if xGSS = 1)
fair will people take advantage of you? (y=1 for no if xGSS = 2)
helpful people are mostly helpful or looking out for themselves (y=1 for yes if xGSS = 1)
Group B – Government/Politics
eqwlth government should equalize income between poor and rich (y=1 for yes if xGSS < 5)
helppoor government should improve the standard of living of the poor (y=1 for yes if xGSS < 4)
polviews political views (y=1 for liberal if xGSS < 4)
Group C – Religion
attend frequency of religious services attendance (y=1 for less often if xGSS < 4)
pray frequency of prayer (y=1 for less often if xGSS > 4)
reliten intensity of religious affiliation (y=1 for not strong if xGSS > 1)
postlife belief in life after death (y=1 for no if xGSS = 2)
prayer approval of prayer in public schools (y=1 for disapprove if xGSS = 2)
Group D – Family
thnkself independence of a child is highly important quality (y=1 for important if xGSS < 3)
obey obedience of a child is a highly important quality (y=1 for not important if xGSS > 2)
pillok birth control available to teenagers without parental consent (y=1 for ok if xGSS < 3)
aged approval of sharing home with grown children (y=1 for disapproval if xGSS > 1)
divlaw should divorce be easier? (y=1 for yes if xGSS = 1, 3)
socrel frequency of social evenings with relatives (y=1 for less often if xGSS > 3)
Group E – Gender Roles
fechild working mother can have a good relationship with children (y=1 for yes if xGSS < 3)
fehome women should take care of running homes (y=1 for no if xGSS = 2)
fepol women not suited for politics (y=1 for no if xGSS = 2)
fework women should work even if husband can support them (y=1 for yes if xGSS = 1)
Group F – Abortion
abany approval of abortion for any reason (y=1 for yes if xGSS = 1)
abrisk approval of abortion for health/defect/rape reasons (y=1 for yes if xGSS = 0)
Group G – Sexual Behavior
premarsx approval of premarital sex (y=1 for yes if xGSS = 4)
homosex approval of same-sex sexual relations (y=1 for yes if xGSS > 2)
Group H – Mobility/Success getahead work, help, luck as a source of social mobility (y=1 for work if xGSS = 1)
Notes: The responses from the survey have been recoded to have a binary outcome. y denotes the indicator
variable in the Probit. Variable abrisk does not exist in the GSS. abrisk = abhlth ∩ abrape ∩ abdefect. xGSS
denotes the numerical value of the answers to the GSS questions. Some allow for a gradation of response.
Table 2: Country Groups
Country Group Countries
German origin (GER) Germany
Polish origin (POL) Poland
Scandinavian origin (SCA) Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway
Irish origin (IRE) Ireland
Italian origin (ITA) Italy
British origin (GB) England, Wales, Scotland
South European origin (MEX) Mexico
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Table 3: Number of Respondents for the Question on Trust by Origin, Cohort, and
Generation
Cohort 1890-1915 Cohort 1916-1940 Cohort 1941-1965 Cohort 1966+
Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4 Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4 Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4 Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4
GER 12 67 54 112 47 83 308 639 63 86 340 1,528 32 39 62 587
POL 13 40 3 15 89 60 15 25 29 203 75 7 8 21 68
SCA 10 58 12 4 12 74 127 71 16 28 179 295 6 3 21 124
IRE 7 29 25 106 12 57 161 508 26 44 230 1,115 11 19 51 483
ITA 19 48 2 1 38 186 75 13 36 80 380 157 8 34 78 202
UK 19 38 48 208 61 87 124 1,046 68 81 163 1,460 22 19 28 461
MEX 1 3 3 28 45 13 12 144 105 85 72 270 170 43 77
Dynasty 1890
Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4
GER 59 83 340 587
POL 28 89 203 68
SCA 22 74 179 124
IRE 19 57 230 483
ITA 57 186 380 202
UK 80 87 163 461
MEX 29 45 85 77
Table 4: Convergence by Cultural Attitude: Comparing Generation 4 and 2
Gen 4 pi22.5 Gen 2 pi22.5 (Gen 4 pi22.5 - Gen 2 pi22.5)
prayer 17% 17% 0%
socrel 17% 17% 0%
pray 33% 17% 17%
divlaw 33% 0% 33%
fehome 33% 33% 0%
polviews 50% 50% 0%
pillok 50% 33% 17%
helppoor 50% 67% -17%
fepol 50% 33% 17%
fework 67% 50% 17%
abany 67% 83% -17%
getahead 67% 83% -17%
attend 83% 67% 17%
aged 83% 33% 50%
eqwlth 83% 33% 50%
fair 83% 17% 67%
fechld 83% 67% 17%
helpful 83% 33% 50%
reliten 83% 50% 33%
postlife 83% 50% 33%
premarsx 83% 50% 33%
trust 100% 33% 67%
abrisk 100% 83% 17%
obey 100% 50% 50%
homosex 100% 50% 50%
thnkself 100% 33% 67%
Notes: Percentage of country-wave observations for which
the absolute value of the deviation from the norm has been
cut at least in half between generation 1 and generation 2
or 4
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Table 5: Convergence by Cultural Attitude and Country
GER POL SCA IRE ITA MEX Total Gen 4 pi22.5 Gen 2 pi22.5 4 90% CI 95% CI
Group A - Cooperation
trust 1 1 1 1 1 1 100%
89% 28% 61% (22%, 61%) (17%, 61%)fair 1 1 1 1 1 0 83%
helpful 1 1 0 1 1 1 83%
Group B - Government/Politics
eqwlth 1 1 0 1 1 1 83%
61% 58% 11% (0%, 39%) (-6%, 44%)helppoor 1 0 1 1 0 0 50%
polviews 0 1 0 1 1 0 50%
Group C - Religion
attend 1 1 1 1 0 1 83%
60% 40% 20% (7%, 40%) (3%, 40%)
pray 0 0 0 1 0 1 33%
reliten 1 1 1 1 1 0 83%
postlife 1 0 1 1 1 1 83%
prayer 0 0 0 1 0 0 17%
Group D - Family
thnkself 1 1 1 1 1 1 100%
64% 28% 36% (17%, 40%) (14%, 47%)
obey 1 1 1 1 1 1 100%
pillok 1 0 1 0 1 0 50%
aged 1 1 0 1 1 1 83%
divlaw 1 0 1 0 0 0 33%
socrel 0 0 0 1 0 0 17%
Group E - Gender Roles
fechld 1 1 0 1 1 1 83%
58% 46% 12% (-4%, 29%) (-8%, 33%)
fehome 1 0 1 0 0 0 33%
fepol 0 0 1 1 0 1 50%
fework 1 1 0 1 1 0 67%
Group F - Abortion
abany 1 0 0 1 1 1 67%
83% 83% 0% (-8%, 42%) (-8%, 42%)
abrisk 1 1 1 1 1 1 100%
Group G - Sexual Behavior
premarsx 1 1 1 1 0 1 83%
92% 50% 42% (.01%, 50%) (0%, 50%)
homosex 1 1 1 1 1 1 100%
Group H - Mobility/Success getahead 1 0 1 1 1 0 67% 67% 83% -16% (-17%, 50%) (-17%, 67%)
81% 58% 62% 88% 65% 58%
Notes: The figures in the table represent the number of times we observe convergence for each country and each attitude. Convergence is achieved
when the absolute value of the deviation from the norm has been cut at least in half between generation 1 and generation 4 (pi22.5 criterion). The
last two columns report the bootstrapped 90% and 95% confidence intervals, based on 500 replications estimating the Probit equation, based on
stratified sampling with replacement in the country-generation-cohort cells.
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Table 6: The Impact of European Attitudes on US Immigrants across Generations
Culto × I(g=1) Culto × I(g=2) Culto × I(g=3) Culto × I(g=4)
trust 0.48 0.23 0.18 0.11
(5.21) (3.06) (2.80) (1.82)
attend 0.18 0.02 0.06 -0.01
(4.12) (0.54) (2.73) (-0.76)
pray 0.38 0.09 0.02 -0.02
(3.81) (1.27) (0.35) (-0.62)
postlife 0.07 -0.13 0.18 0.00
(0.39) (-1.24) (2.57) (-0.08)
thnkself 0.65 0.24 -0.06 0.02
(4.15) (2.19) (-0.66) (0.38)
obey -0.15 0.13 0.05 -0.17
(-0.77) (0.74) (0.47) (-3.16)
divlaw 0.09 0.16 0.02 -0.01
(0.99) (2.13) (0.35) (-0.15)
fechild 0.28 0.09 0.05 0.06
(2.25) (1.17) (0.81) (1.32)
fehome -0.19 0.10 0.14 0.03
(-1.56) (0.97) (1.40) (0.40)
fework 0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.03
(1.05) (-0.25) (0.28) (-0.61)
abany -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03
(-0.13) (-0.23) (0.28) (0.88)
homosex 0.12 0.12 -0.02 0.07
(1.38) (1.81) (-0.42) (1.50)
Notes: Culto denotes the culture of the country of origin. Generation
specific coefficients are reported. z statistics in parentheses.
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Figure 1a: Dynamics and Equilibria: Full Assimilation and Non-assimilation Equi-
librium
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Figure 1b: Dynamics and Equilibria: Only Full Assimilation Equilibrium
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Figure 2a: Generational Convergence and Non-convergence Regions (by type)
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Figure 2b: Convergence Region Implied by the 22.5o Cut-off Rule
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Appendix 1
Table A1: Sensitivity of Convergence Across Different Criteria
pi45 pi33 pi22.5 pi15
prayer 33% prayer 17% prayer 17% divlaw 0%
fehome 33% socrel 17% socrel 17% socrel 0%
polviews 50% pray 33% pray 33% prayer 17%
socrel 50% fehome 33% divlaw 33% polviews 33%
helppoor 67% helppoor 50% fehome 33% pray 33%
pray 67% polviews 50% polviews 50% fehome 33%
fework 67% pillok 50% pillok 50% fepol 33%
getahead 67% divlaw 50% helppoor 50% helppoor 50%
reliten 83% fepol 67% fepol 50% helpful 50%
postlife 83% fework 67% fework 67% pillok 50%
pillok 83% abany 67% abany 67% eqwlth 50%
divlaw 83% getahead 67% getahead 67% abany 50%
fechld 83% attend 83% attend 83% premarsx 50%
fair 83% aged 83% aged 83% homosex 50%
fepol 83% helpful 83% eqwlth 83% getahead 50%
attend 83% fair 83% fair 83% attend 67%
abany 83% fechld 83% fechld 83% fework 67%
helpful 83% eqwlth 83% helpful 83% fechld 83%
trust 100% reliten 83% reliten 83% reliten 83%
aged 100% postlife 83% postlife 83% trust 83%
thnkself 100% premarsx 83% premarsx 83% fair 83%
eqwlth 100% trust 100% trust 100% thnkself 83%
abrisk 100% abrisk 100% abrisk 100% abrisk 83%
premarsx 100% obey 100% obey 100% obey 83%
homosex 100% homosex 100% homosex 100% postlife 83%
obey 100% thnkself 100% thnkself 100% aged 83%
Rank Correlation
pi45 pi30 pi22.5 pi15
pi45 1.00
pi30 0.87 1.00
pi22.5 0.84 0.95 1.00
pi15 0.61 0.81 0.85 1.00
Notes: The table shows different orderings of the speed of convergence according
to the percentage of country-wave observations for which the absolute value of the
deviation from the norm in the first generation has been cut by any amount (pi45),
by a third (pi30), by half (pi22.5), and by two thirds (pi15) by generation 4. The second
table lists the rank correlations between the different convergence criteria.
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Table A2: Limited Controls: Convergence by Cultural Attitude: Comparing Gener-
ation 4 and 2
Gen 4 pi22.5 Gen 2 pi22.5 (Gen 4 pi22.5 - Gen 2 pi22.5)
prayer 17% 17% 0%
socrel 17% 17% 0%
pray 33% 17% 17%
divlaw 33% 0% 33%
fehome 33% 33% 0%
polviews 50% 50% 0%
pillok 50% 33% 17%
helppoor 50% 67% -17%
fepol 50% 33% 17%
fework 67% 50% 17%
abany 67% 83% -17%
getahead 67% 83% -17%
attend 83% 67% 17%
aged 33% 83% 50%
eqwlth 83% 33% 50%
fair 83% 17% 67%
fechld 83% 67% 17%
helpful 83% 33% 50%
reliten 83% 50% 33%
postlife 83% 50% 33%
premarsx 83% 50% 33%
trust 100% 33% 67%
abrisk 100% 83% 17%
obey 100% 50% 50%
homosex 100% 50% 50%
thnkself 100% 33% 67%
Notes: This table replicates Table 4 using a limited set of con-
trols. Percentage of country-wave observations for which the
absolute value of the deviation from the norm has been cut at
least in half between generation 1 and generation 2 or 4.
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Table A3: UK Benchmark: Convergence by Cultural Attitude: Comparing Genera-
tion 4 and 2
Gen 4 pi22.5 Gen 2 pi22.5 (Gen 4 pi22.5 - Gen 2 pi22.5)
prayer 0% 0% 0%
socrel 17% 17% 0%
fehome 17% 50% -33%
divlaw 33% 0% 33%
fepol 33% 33% 0%
pray 50% 17% 33%
reliten 50% 50% 0%
postlife 50% 50% 0%
pillok 50% 33% 17%
helpful 50% 50% 0%
premarsx 50% 33% 17%
attend 67% 83% -17%
eqwlth 67% 33% 33%
polviews 67% 17% 50%
helppoor 67% 50% 17%
fework 67% 50% 17%
abany 67% 83% -17%
getahead 67% 67% 0%
obey 83% 50% 33%
fair 83% 17% 67%
homosex 83% 50% 33%
fechld 83% 67% 17%
abrisk 100% 50% 50%
trust 100% 17% 83%
thnkself 100% 50% 50%
aged 100% 50% 50%
Notes: This table replicates Table 4 using the attitude of the
fourth generation of UK immigrants as a benchmark. Percent-
age of country-wave observations for which the absolute value
of the deviation from the norm has been cut at least in half
between generation 1 and generation 2 or 4.
Table A4: List of Matched Attitudes between the General Social Survey (GSS) and
the European Values Survey/World Values Survey (EVS/WVS)
GSS EVS/WVS Question
Number
Description of EVS variable
trust a165 Most people can be trusted (y=1 for yes if xEV S = 1)
attend f028 How often do you attend religious services (y=1 for less often if xEV S > 3)
pray f063 How important is God in your life (y=1 for less important if xEV S < 7)
postlife f051 Believe in life after death (y=1 for no if xEV S = 0)
thnkself a029 Important child qualities: independence (y=1 for important if xEV S = 1)
obey a042 Important child qualities: obedience (y=1 for not important if xEV S = 0)
divlaw f121 Justifiable: divorce (y=1 for yes if xEV S > 3)
fechild d061 Pre-school child suffers with working mother (y=1 for yes if xEV S > 2)
fehome d057 Being a housewife just as fulfilling (y=1 for no if xEV S > 1)
fework d058 Husband and wife should both contribute to income (y=1 for yes if xEV S = 1)
abany f120 Justifiable: abortion (y=1 for yes if xEV S = 10)
homosex f118 Justifiable: homosexuality (y=1 for yes if xEV S > 7)
Notes: The responses from the EVS/WVS have been recoded to have a binary outcome. We indicate the
correspondence between GSS and EVS/WVS and the original value(s) from the EVS/WVS that are matched
with the recoded GSS variables. y denotes the indicator variable in the first stage Probit. xEV S denotes the
answer number to the EVS/WVS questions.
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Appendix 2: Phase Diagram and Location of q˜
Re-writing equation (3.8) in the text, the dynamics of assimilation is determined by:
qt+1 =
1−
(1− qt)θMV − qtθmV − d
(
ϕ0−β[(1−qt)θMV−qtθmV−t]
c(t¯−t)
d
−βd
)
− t
t¯− t
 qt (A1)
dqt+1
dqt
=
1−
(1− qt)θMV − qtθmV − d
(
ϕ0−β[(1−qt)θMV−qtθmV−t]
c(t¯−t)
d
−βd
)
− t
t¯− t
+

θMV + θmV + βd
[θMV−qtθmV ]
c(t¯−t)
d
−βd
t¯− t t
 qt > 0
(A2)
d2qt+1
dq2t
=
2c(θMV + θmV )
c(t¯− t)− βd2 > 0 (A3)
Therefore the relationship between qt+1 and qt (the phase line) starts at zero and
it is increasing and convex. It intersects the 45 degree line also at q˜, where q˜ satisfies
(1 − q˜)θMV − q˜V θmV − dτ ∗ = t ,so that there are no gain from assimilation and
G
(
(1− q˜)θMV − q˜θmV − dτ ∗) = 0. Our parametrization implies:
q˜ =
θMV − ϕ0d2
c(t¯−t) − t
θMV + θmV
(A4)
The numerator of the first line on the right hand side of (A4) is strictly pos-
itive, because we assume that (1 − q)θMV − qθmV − dτ ∗ ≥ t which implies that
(1− q)θMV − qθmV − ϕ0d2
c(t¯−t) − t ≥ 0. Hence q˜ > 0 . The numerator and denominator
of (A4) also imply that q˜ < 1. Therefore, 0 < q˜ < 1 as claimed in the text.
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